Keeping Stolen Land by Purcell, Jeffrey
 
 
 
 
 
KEEPING STOLEN LAND 
 
KWAZULU-NATAL’S  
 
LAND, LABOR & HOUSING STRUGGLES 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A Thesis 
Presented to the Faculty of the Graduate School 
of Cornell University 
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of  
Master of Professional Studies in Africana Studies 
 
 
 
by 
Jeffrey Lee Purcell 
August 2007 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
© 2007 Jeffrey Purcell ABSTRACT 
 
This thesis explores the common roots of several contemporary social movements in 
Durban, South Africa. My point of departure is a series of community meetings in May, 
June, and July 2006, during which geographically separated Black and Indian community 
organizations expressed remarkably similar grievances against the municipality and 
government, all rooted, I argue, in the colonial dispossession and alienation of Africans, 
and later in the enforced marginalization of Indian communities. Largely, these 
dispossessions occurred in the 19
th century and early in the 20
th century – decades before 
the policy Apartheid begin in 1948.  It is the continued relationship of exclusion and 
repression in relation to land and space in Natal, I argue, that accounts for the common 
struggles of these movements. I shall cite Antonio Gramsci extensively in order to argue 
that his conceptions of “consent” and “coercion” explain the perpetual success of policies 
designed to preserve colonial and Apartheid dispossession. Moreover, several labor 
struggles will be considered in order to illustrate the degree to which the majority’s 
consent has been secured, and to offer evidence that Gramsci’s theories are powerful 
assistance to us. Mahmood Mamdani’s identification of “subject” and “citizen” will 
factor, as the transition from Apartheid to ANC rule has essentially cemented the status 
of landless South African subjects. His lengthy iteration of indirect rule in Apartheid 
South Africa will become crucial to understanding how the transition was ineffectual for 
many.  
 
In addition, by surveying documents relating to the management and control of these 
populations, I argue that KwaZulu-Natal’s managers, through several succeeding 
governing regimes, have implemented policies of great similarity to achieve the same 
effect – keeping the power of land and space of Natal in the hands of Europeans. In 
response, a range of land, labour and housing community organizations have protested their government and voiced demands that show a continued resistance to policies of 
exclusion from and access to valuable land and space in the province. From their 
concerns and mobilizations, I will finally attempt to construct an understanding of what 
has, and has not, changed in South Africa. 
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Introduction & Methods 
 
Durban, 1897 
“The ruling power of South Africa is the power of the Anglo-Saxon race.”
1 
Harry Escombe in the Natal Colony Legislature, motivating the Zululand Annexation Bill 
 
Soweto, 1990 
When Walter Sisulu was released from prison and went back to Soweto, he had said, 
‘Much of Soweto has not changed since I first came to live here in the thirties…with few 
exceptions the matchbox houses are very much the same. A government who is not 
addressing the basic issue of decent housing is not seriously committed towards political 
change.
2 
 
Mandela Park, 2000 
 
People who had been evicted from their homes by the Group Areas Act during apartheid, 
who had been forced out of ‘coloured’ townships as the government tried to police a 
‘coloured labour preference policy,’ who had been forced to find shelter in squatter 
settlements, now find the same thing happening to them again.
3 
 
 
Life before Jan van Riebeeck stopped at the Cape in 1652 was neither idyllic nor pristine. 
Hierarchies, sexisms, violence and poverty are not new, of course, and we delude 
ourselves when we represent pre-European Africa as virginal.  But it is not Shaka Zulu’s 
biography that weighs greatly in the contemporary lives of KwaZulu-Natal. Whatever life 
was like, things undoubtedly changed a great deal when the British firm JR Thompson & 
Company sent 26 to the area called Port Natal in 1823 to begin a trading post.  
 
The day I arrived in Durban in May 2006, I sat outside the Workshop bus station. A 
middle-aged white man stopped to talk to the obviously-out-of-towner. “What you have 
to understand, you see, is that South Africa is a first world country and a third world 
country,” he told me, a bit of a grin hanging from his lips.  
                                                 
1 Brookes, Edgar H., and Webb, Colin de B. A History of Natal. Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal 
Press. 1964. at 187.  
2 Desai, Ashwin. We Are The Poors. New York: Monthly Review Press. 2002. p. 91. (emphasis mine) 
3 Desai, Ashwin, and Pithouse, Richard. “‘But We are Thousands.’ Dispossession, Resistance, 
Repossession and Repression in Mandela Park.” UKZN CCS  9. 2003. p. 14.  (emphasis mine)    
  2
Broadly, this thesis argues that the two are more than just linked – they are fraternal twins 
– as a result of the continued existence of a distribution of resources, ownership and land 
that befits a settler colony. This settler colony is special in that North and South co-exist 
between the poolside and laundry room, within spitting distance of each other. Following 
Gramsci
4 and believing that the state’s first purpose is to mold the population according 
to the needs of production, and then to protect and retain property for the owning classes, 
I will argue that successive governing regimes in South Africa have performed this task 
with remarkable consistency. I will then attempt to sketch an understanding of some of 
the social movements in Durban today that, in different ways and to different degrees, 
resist these consistencies. It is only by overturning the enduring white ownership and 
domination of property, I will finally argue, that these movements will achieve even 
some of their professed aims.  
 
Largely, it suffices to say that these property-distributions and owning-relations were 
established during the period before 1913, and have since been retained and strengthened. 
“‘Equal rights for all civilized men south of the Zambezi,’ that clarion call of Cecil 
Rhodes, was inscribed in a propertied franchise, one that would ‘naturally’ exclude the 
vast majority of natives on ground of their propertyless civil status.”
5  These are the 
origins on KwaZulu-Natal’s current land, labour and housing struggles.  
 
In exploring these issues, I examined existing literature on post-colonial legacies, land 
reform, and transition in South Africa, and traveled there. Between May and August, 
2006, I worked at the Centre for Civil Society in Durban. As a Visiting Scholar, I was 
able to participate in many community meetings and workshops, becoming acquainted 
                                                 
4 See Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Hoare and Smith, translators and editors. 
New York: International Publishers. 1999, 1971, and Gramsci, Antonio. Pre-Prison Writings. Bellamy, 
editor, Cox, translator.  New York: Cambridge UP. 1993 
5 Mamdani, Mahmood. Citizen and Subject. Princeton: PUP. 1996.  p.69.     
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with dozens of local activists and organizers from environmental, housing, and social 
justice organizations. Most importantly, I observed the planning, scheduling and 
organizing of the Social Movement Indaba. The SMI brought together over 200 
community activists from the province to the headquarters of the Abahlali baseMjondolo 
in Kennedy Road, Durban. In the course of these meetings, I was tasked to organize and 
run an isiZulu & English writing workshop for several of the invited groups. There, group 
members articulated their groups’ short histories, methods and goals, to be included in 
programs for circulation at the Indaba. I did some formal interviewing, but found that 
patiently listening to the concerns and campaigns of Durbanites and participating in their 
organizing was more effective than removing the actors from their circumstances and 
formally interviewing them. Through these interactions and observations, I witnessed the 
persistence of the land questions in a variety of campaigns and protests.  
 
Again and again, non-white South Africans heard “there is no land” and that the status-
quo of power relations, established long before Apartheid, are non-negotiable. Most 
clearly expressed in the formidable Property Clause of the 1994 Draft and 1996 Final 
Constitutions, the right to own the dividends of colonial South Africa and Apartheid is 
simply beyond debate. In terms of resources, factories, golf courses and farms, what was 
expropriated by settlers and master planners in 1880 or 1913 or 1962 must stay in the 
hands of a white elite. “What we have before us,” then and now, “is a bifurcated world, 
no longer simply racially organized, but a world in which the dividing line between those 
who labour on the land and those who do not.”
6 In this persistent relationship, between 
natives and citizens, between owners and tenants, the misdistribution of land, property 
and resources is maintained. And by examining how the ANC-led Government has 
                                                 
6 Mamdani  p.61.     
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protected these distributions, we better understand the endurance of poverty and 
landlessness in South Africa.  
 
It is often the government’s position that where land is available, subsidies will be paid to 
erect housing. But for almost all whom I met, the place where the government would pay 
to build was distant from employment opportunities and in the periphery of urban centres. 
The transport costs associated with long commutes made these peripheral locations 
unliveable. Very striking was the Republic of South Africa’s claim that there was no land 
available. Almost inevitably in the same breath, residents are told that they will someday 
be moved to the periphery if they do not move themselves. Most familiar with South 
Africa are quick to recognize these arguments, and these national and provincial 
pressures to abandon the urban centres and relocate to the periphery. In 2006, South 
Africa’s urban policies show remarkable consistency with their Apartheid predecessors.  
In labour disputes as well, the government’s opposition to and marginalization of the 
largest labour federation, COSATU, demonstrates the post-1994 government’s purpose to 
muzzle the elements that brought down its predecessor. In turn, the effect of this anti-
labour effort is nothing short of removing the element that most forcefully challenged, 
and eventually stopped, Apartheid. 
 
The research libraries of the University of KwaZulu-Natal and Cornell University, and 
the National Library in Cape Town, proved enormously useful. The Howard Law College 
Library at UKZN and the National Library in Cape Town, both contained valuable 
documentary evidence of the legislative and administrative management of the city.     
  5
Relevant Literature 
The urban squatter or shack dweller has been studied by radical geographers, political 
scientists and sociologists. That capital’s forces and effects have moved huge numbers of 
rural persons into cities is unquestioned, but only some of its effects are understood. Mike 
Davis’ important article
7 recently demonstrated that the urban slum is becoming the new 
form of populations. “Only the slum remains as a fully franchised solution to the problem 
of warehousing the twenty-first century’s surplus humanity.”
8 As global capitalism’s 
destruction of small-scale agriculture has caused millions to flee toward the city centers 
for hope of any employment, there is not nearly enough (housing, jobs, social services). 
“Most new housing and most new neighborhoods in Third World cities are organized, 
planned and built outside the law. Most urban citizens have no choice but to build, buy or 
rent an ‘illegal dwelling’ since they cannot afford the cheapest ‘legal’ house or 
apartment.’”
9 
 
Durban, South Africa, a city of three million in which one third of the population lives in 
“squatter settlements” and shacks, presents some problems to the understands of shacks 
and squatters that presuppose a natural or . For one, these shacks have not formed due to 
“natural increase and to migration”
10 only, and many of them were not created recently. 
Rather, Apartheid legislation, the Group Areas Act of 1952 and Native Land and Trust 
Act of 1913
11 notably, intentionally created these areas. Under that mandate, “the all-
                                                 
7 Davis, Mike. “Planet of Slums.” New Left Review, 26 2004. 
8 Davis at 28.  
9 Hardoy, Jorge, and Satterthwaite, David. Squatter Citizen. London: Earthscan Publications. 1989. at 12.  
10 Ulack, Richard. “The Role of Urban Squatter Settlements.” Annals of the Association of American 
Geography, Vol. 68, No, 4. (Dec., 1978), pp 535-550.  at 535 
11 Natives Land Act of 1913, Natives Trust and Land Act of 1936; then in 1991the Abolition of Racially 
Based Land Measures Act, the Upgrading of Land Tenure Rights Act, and the Less Formal Township 
Establishment Act; then in 1991 the White Paper on Land Reform, Pretoria 1991. “The 1913 Natives Land 
Act reserved 7 percent of South Africa’s land for ‘native reserves’ and prohibited Africans from buying 
land elsewhere. The issue of the augmentation of the reserves was unresolved until the 1936 Native Trust 
and LAct Act made provision for the acquisition of addition land by the Native Trust (later the South 
African Development Trust). This would raise the area of the reserves to 13.6 percent, a process that had    
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white Durban City Council appointed a Technical Sub-Committee to replan the city, and 
this Sub-Committee took as its guiding axiom the proposition that contact between races 
in residential areas leads to conflict. It even regarded as ‘most objectionable’ the large-
scale movement of pedestrians of one race through the area of another. It decided to make 
use of natural boundaries such as ‘rivers, steep valleys, cliffs and hill-tops’ to effect as 
complete a racial separation as possible.”
12 These cantons were designed to restrict 
movement, secure borders, and formally institutionalize space. Much of the painfully 
dilapidated neighborhoods in and around Durban, then, are not the result of an organic 
migration from rural or urban areas, a sea change in populations. Rather, Townships were 
demarcated in urban areas, and property ownership and renting were restricted by race. 
Hundreds of thousands of so-called Bantu, Indian and Coloured South Africans were 
shuffled throughout the Apartheid period when a tract of land was re-designated. It was 
always a driving motivation of the successive National Party  (the architects of Apartheid, 
in power between 1948 and 1994) regimes to maintain a black labour force in proximity 
to its population centers – these slums were planned.  
 
The abject poverty of the townships was/is one of the persistent indictments of the 
Apartheid systems. At most every anti-Apartheid demonstration in South Africa, one 
could find signage demanding better housing. The Freedom Charter, written in 1955, 
demands 
There Shall be Houses, Security and Comfort! 
All people shall have the right to live where they choose, be decently housed, and 
to bring up their families in comfort and security; 
Unused housing space to be made available to the people; 
Rent and prices shall be lowered, food plentiful and no-one shall go hungry.
13 
                                                                                                                                                 
not been cpkpleted by 1991.” Hall, Righ, and Williams, Gavin. “Land Reform: The South African Case.” 
In Cape to Congo, Baregu and Landsberg, eds. London: Lynne Rienner. 2003. at 114.  
12 Kruper, Leo, Watts, HIlstan, and Davies, Ronald. Durban – A Study in Racial Ecology. New York: 
Columbia UP. 1958. at 14.  
13 http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/charter.html. The statement’s first line is a subject header in the 
original document; I embolden it.     
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Indeed, upon his release from prison in 1990, at Mandela’s first public event in 
Johannesburg, some of his first complaints with the Apartheid system that had 
imprisoned him for 27 years was its perpetuation of deplorable housing – slums. Before a 
crowd of 120,000, amidst the “teeming metropolis of matchbox houses, tin shanties, and 
dirt roads, the mother city of black urban South Africa,”
14 he began, “Today, my return to 
Soweto fills my heart with joy. At the same time I also return with a deep sense of 
sadness. Sadness to learn that you are still suffering under an inhuman system. The 
housing shortage…”
15 
According to the Abahali base Mjondolo (“Shack Dwellers” in isiZulu), there are at least 
800,000 shack-dwellers around Durban. Fourteen settlements have recently joined to 
form the group. Its elected leader S'bu Zikode, links their struggle to the previous social 
movements in South Africa in a press release titled “The Third Force.” “The First Force 
was our struggle against Apartheid. The Third Force will stop when the Fourth Force 
comes. The Fourth Force is land, housing, water, electricity, health care, education and 
work. We are only asking what is basic - not what is luxurious. This is the struggle of the 
poor. The time has come for the poor to show themselves that we can be poor in life but 
not in mind.”
16 
The privatization of public housing is only one of these exacerbating trends reflecting 
Harvey in The Urbanization of Capital. “The urbanization process,” he argues, “has 
created scarcity where there was none before. If rent is a transfer payment to a scarce 
factor of production, then the urbanization process has also multiplied the opportunities 
for realizing rent.”
17 If this point is accurate – that the townships creation reflected a 
                                                 
14 Mandela, Nelson Rolihlahla. Long Walk to Freedom. Boston: Little Brown. 1994. at 496.  
15 Mandela at 497. emphasis added.  
16 Zikode, S’Bu. “Durban: The Third Force.” Posted to SA-Indymedia, Friday November 18, 2005 at 10:08 
AM. Available at http://southafrica.indymedia.org/news/2005/11/9253.php 
17 Harvey, David. The Urbanization of Capital. Baltimore: JHU Press. 1985. at 64.     
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broader system of exploitation (Apartheid) and their placement was designed to 
maximize the demands of the minority society at the expense of the majority (anti-
democratic), the perpetuation of these spaces is the maintenance of the Apartheid system. 
The class-monopoly rents charged to the Townships, increasingly through privatization, 
are “realized by speculator-developers only if they possess mechanisms for expressing 
their collective class interest.”
18 Is it possible that a mechanism exists not possessed by 
the NP when these borders were drawn? Law was what they said it was; the NP had what 
Gramsci considered “maximum of legislative capacity.” It “can be inferred when a 
perfect formulation of directives is matched by a perfect arrangement of the organisms of 
execution and verification, and by a perfect preparation of the ‘spontaneous’ consent of 
the masses who must ‘live’ those directives, modifying their own habits, their own will, 
their own convictions to confirm with those directives and with the objectives which they 
propose to achieve.”
19 And that purpose, broadly, is the maintenance of a white 
supremacist regime in tight collusion with corporate interests to exploit the majority so-
called African, Indian and Coloured populations. 
Wallerstein’s and Arrighi’s analysis of World Systems and their theses on anti-systemic 
movements are illustrative consider why the Freedom Charter remains unfulfilled.
20 
South Africa’s has been influenced by global pressures (in this case, capitalism) since the 
Portuguese explorer Vasco de Gama landed in what he called Natal (the province now 
known as KwaZulu-Natal, in which Durban sits) on Christmas, 1497. Discovery of 
diamonds and gold in 1886 and 1867, respectively, had the function of linking South 
Africa to English and American capital; JP Morgan was one of the earliest and most 
prominent investors in the conglomerate Anglo-American (managed by the Oppenheimer 
                                                 
18 Harvey at 68.  
19 Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Hoare and Smith, trans and eds. New York: 
International Publishers. 1971, 2005.  at 266.  
20 Arrighi, Giovanni, Wallerstein, Immanuel, and Hopkins, Terrance. Antisystemic Movements. London: 
Verso. 1989.      
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family, it once controlled at least 3/7 of the wealth on the Jo’Burg stock exchange).
21 An 
animating principle of the domestic political economy of Durban, and South Africa at 
large within this world system, has remained “that cities were the creation and preserve 
of whites, that the African presence should be temporary and limited to serving the 
interests of white citizens and that ruthless controls over African movement and contracts 
were the mainstay in maintaining a labour market convenient for the dominant interests 
of the city: in short a basis for a cheap labour system.”
22 
The South African economy is typically cut in three: agriculture; minerals and the 
secondary industries that result from the extraction and servicing of the mines; and 
service, finance and tourism. Durban, in particular, has been the focus of particular labour 
controls and regimes designed by both British colonists and Afrikaners after the 1948 
Afrikaner Nationalist takeover of Parliament. The city “which has been acclaimed from 
the turn of the century as one of the most effective city governments in the country has, 
for decades, rested on binding and oppressive relationships which has limited its ability to 
meet the human needs of the majority of its inhabitants.”
23 The importance of Durban 
within the South African context has been noted for decades; planners became aware of 
the successes the city maintained in its rigid and highly structured control of its 
population. “The Durban [labour] system, as the set of institutions and controls were 
termed, was added to, expanded, reproduced through legislation, and copied throughout 
southern Africa.”
24 
 
                                                 
21 Pallister, David, Stewart, Sarah, and Lepper, Ian. South Africa Inc: The Oppenheimer Empire. New 
Haven: Yale UP. 1988.  
22 Hemson, David. “Breaking the Impasse, Beginning the Change.” In (D)urban Vortex Freund and 
Padayachee, eds.  Pietermaritzburg: University of Natal Press. 2002. at 197. 
23 Hemson at 197.  
24 Hemson at 198. internal parenthesis omitted.     
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In short, Durban has never been an island, and it along with South Africa has remained 
very tightly linked to global economic patterns. The ANC could not simply undue these 
relations. But what could the ANC do, but that which it attempted? One activist considers 
the situation this way:  
 
The Apartheid system was defeated but nothing changed. This is a farm. South 
Africa is a farm. And the whites were the farm managers. Now they’ve been 
kicked and we have black farm managers, same mother fuckers, same minds, 
same greed, different color, it’s a little paint. It’s the haves and the have-nots. It’s 
always been the haves and the have-nots. Simply put, the Americans, Germans, 
Canadians, who had so much invested in keeping us miles under the ground 
digging our gold and diamonds, they found out that their shares were at risk, all 
right, because the mineworkers were organizing themselves and so they went to 
the ANC who had been in bed with the communists for all that time, and they 
says, 
“Are you willing to manage our business?” 
“What’s your business?” 
“South Africa” 
And they said “sure.” 
So now, in fact, our government is the farm managers. I’m a field nigger. South 
Africa is a farm.
25 
As for a possible explanation for the South African population’s enormous support for 
the ANC, despite the ANC’s demonstrated failures to dismantle Apartheid, Gramsci’s 
conception of consent and coercion will be referenced. The former, he argued, was 
secured though the hegemonic ideology of the state, and diffused by agents of civil 
society. It is the hegemony of the idea that the ANC defeated the NP, and that Apartheid 
ended, that prevents the mass opposition to the Apartheid apparatuses. This, we shall 
discover, is a pitfall of the national consciousness. The persistence of this myth is 
important. Saul and Bond will be referenced to demonstrate the extent of “change” in 
South African life since Apartheid. In his thesis “South Africa’s Frustrating Decade of 
Freedom”, Bond writes “The reality is that South Africa has witnessed the replacement of 
racial Apartheid with what is increasingly referred to as class Apartheid – systemic 
                                                 
25 Unattributed interviews in the film “The Fourth World War.” Likely Milo, Yazir Henry, Ashraf Cassim, 
or Zane Ibrahim, as credited in the company details under “South Africa – Interviews.” Big Noise Tactical 
Productions: 2003.     
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underdevelopment of the oppressed majority though structured economic, political, legal 
and cultural practices.”
26   It cannot be forgotten that the South African population has 
almost tirelessly opposed injustice in the twentieth century, but their recent quiescence to 
the persistence of Apartheid can, I submit, be explained with Gramsci’s political theory.  
Gramsci in Durban - Consent & Coercion 
 
In this section I will attempt to sketch an understanding of Antonio Gramsci’s theories on 
consent and coercion. Chiefly through his Pre-Prison Writings and Prison Notebooks, 
with some assistance from secondary readings, I will argue that Gramsci’s political 
theories demonstrate that hegemonic ideology in bourgeois democracies is maintained via 
these related forces. By bourgeois I mean capitalist-based and elite-run systems of 
political economy in which the demands of production and property take precedence over 
social welfare. Convincing populations that these systems are acceptable and legitimate is 
in large part the task of the State and its subordinates – securing consent to these 
arrangements, and coercing those who do not consent. Consent takes precedence in 
democratic states, Gramsci argued, as rulers must maintain the appearance of freedom in 
their ranks and constituents, a distinction between modern systems and their 
predecessors. Those at the commanding heights can no longer simply rule with “brute 
force”27 ; they must dissemble and win consent. That ideology and the processes that 
legitimate and further it are of great concern to Gramsci and the immediate project. Here 
it is worthwhile to consider how these imperatives were re-made policy in South Africa. 
In the course of this thesis, I will explain the stated desires of the Apartheid rulers – 
expressed in their White Paper, and Strydom and Venter Reports – to preserve land 
                                                 
26 Bond, Patrick. “From Racial to Class Apartheid: South Africa’s Frustrating Decade of Freedom.” 
Monthly Review, May 2004; 55, 10. at 47.  
27 Gramsci, Antonio. Selections from the Prison Notebooks. Hoare and Smith, translators and editors. New 
York: International Publishers. 1999, 1971. (SPN)  p.298.     
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allocations. Yet they knew they would soon accede power to the Black majority. So, on 
the other hand, we will soon witness what the ANC did – what policies they promulgated, 
and the ways they secured consent for them. 
 
Therefore, I will then consider whether Gramsci can be used to better understand a 
current political situation, namely the enormous and nearly uncontested political success 
of the African National Congress (ANC) in South Africa. Since elections in 1994, the 
ANC has ruled South Africa as a “one-party dominant democracy, characterized by 
corporatism and elite pacting.”
28 In those twelve years, the first ten of which are 
gushingly called the “Decade of Democracy,” almost every social indicator has fallen and 
life for the majority of South Africans has become increasingly unlivable. Unemployment 
and inflation have boomed, while access to water, electricity, and decent housing, and life 
expectancy have plummeted. Yet the ANC and its deputies in civil society are adamant 
that they are the only “party of liberation”
29 and the genuine representative of the (Black 
majority) people. Election returns and quiescence in the majority of the population 
ostensibly confirm their pronouncements, although “the powerful working-class support 
for the ANC has faced the uncomfortable reality of a decline in stable waged 
employment, swelling joblessness, and the proliferation of ‘atypical’, de-unionised and 
highly vulnerable occupations.”
30 Marginal movements and civics, however, indicate in 
their discourse that the ANC has largely failed to deliver on its earlier promises, and has 
instead “sold-out” the people and sold-off the assets that could have improved society. 
The subaltern has much to say.   
 
 
                                                 
28 Louw, P. Eric. The Rise, Fall, and Legacy of Apartheid. Westport, Connecticut: Preager. 2004.  p.195. 
29 African National Congress Constitution, as amended  p.51
st National Congress, December 2002. 
available  p.http://www.anc.org.za/ancdocs/history/const/const2002.html 
30 Barchiesi, Franco. “Classes, Multitudes, and the Politics of Community Movements in Post-Apartheid 
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Gramsci’s Explanations 
 
To introduce Gramsci very briefly, the Italian Marxist believed that struggle against the 
ideological support for the capitalist system was extremely important. By attacking the 
“hegemony,” or overarching self-concept/identification of the state and its role in 
maintaining the productive requirements of society, he argued, the passage to a regulated 
state was possible. In modern democracies, Gramsci believed, these ideological processes 
were more totalizing and stronger than in earlier states in which brute force dominated 
any war of ideas. Gramsci spends much space relating the function of intellectuals in 
society to the hegemonic ideology. They work as its distributors, disseminating through 
the population the official explanation on how and why government and society run. 
They are tasked to explain and justify these distributions of wealth and power in political 
society (the government) and civil society (churches, schools, civic organizations). On 
the division of political and civil society (two major superstructure levels) and 
intellectuals, he says “civil society, that is the ensemble of organisms commonly called 
‘private’”
31 and “political society’ or ‘the State’”
32 comprise the relevant space where the 
ideological battle must be fought (and won in pursuit of a new state and economic 
system). The former “correspond[s] on the one hand to the function of ‘hegemony’ which 
the dominant group exercised throughout society” and the latter to “‘direct domination’ 
or command exercised through the state and ‘juridical’ government.’”
33 In these both, 
intellectuals work as “deputies” for the dominant group, though ideologically the function 
which these deputies perform are generating “the ‘spontaneous’ consent given by the 
great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on social life by the 
dominant fundamental group.”
34  
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33 SPN  p.12. 
34 SPN  p.12.     
  14
 
The intellectual in civil society manufactures ideological arguments that maintain and 
justify the existing power relations of a society, while in politics s/he executes the 
coercive apparatus. Consent, in this meaning, is “given” to “imposed” circumstances: it is 
manufactured intentionally, proceeding with the appearance of a natural intellectual 
evolution along strictly regulated lines. The ideological discipline required to maintain 
these intellectuals is considerable, for their task is quite often the demonstration of magic. 
Witness elite intellectuals at government-sponsored think tanks writing on the “freedom” 
that has been brought to Iraq by Americans for an immediate illustration of highly-
disciplined intellectuals.   
 
As Gramsci concerned himself with the ideological struggle that must be won before 
proletarian and subaltern groups can replace the capitalistic state, he focused on the ways 
and means of ideological maintenance in states with apparently functioning democratic 
systems. During election cycles, “generic consent” is sought.
35 The proclamation of a 
“mandate” is common following elections in these states, whereby politicians can 
rhetorically insist that their cause or purpose is victorious. Consent is claimed: the 
appearance of (s)elections functions to legitimize hegemonic power. Regardless of the 
difference between candidates or officials, that one is chosen over another demonstrates 
the victor’s ability to govern “by consent of the governed.” Thus, the social contract is 
negotiated via elections in modern democratic states and consent is claimed by elites 
when the masses “go along” by failing to rebel. It is more the style of governors than 
their substance that is contested in bourgeois elections – all the candidates, as members of 
the ruling class, have tacitly agreed that certain issues are non-negotiable. These 
combinations of TINA (there is no alternative) issues largely comprise the hegemonic 
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ideology of a state. And that hegemony will never be tested in an election (unless the 
wheels have really fallen of the wagon). Only if the entire system of social and 
productive relations is contested will these core issues be seriously challenged, and at that 
point the state’s hegemony has vanished. Asking the question “should the US possess 
nuclear weapons?” is an abandonment of the ideology currently most dominant in 
America relevant to the issue of nuclear proliferation in Iran, for instance.  
 
According to Gramsci, elites are unanimous, and have sufficiently inundated citizens of 
the statement’s naturalness such that it is unchallenged. Consent is generated because of 
the idea’s obvious-ness, and thus there is little need to coerce dissenters. “Hegemony may 
be defined as the means by which the modern state generates consent without the use or 
threat of force. Consent is most easily generated in civil society, which appears to be 
independent of political control. In fact, all of the institutional mechanisms of civil 
society are saturated with politics. Hegemony is the exercise of control over the masses 
through the swindle of consent. It will be superseded in the ‘regulated society.’”
36 We 
find a manufactured lack of alternatives and a repetition of the current system’s strengths 
in the hegemonic model. Consent flows in this tightly controlled environment precisely 
because it can go no where else – TINA.  
 
Thus far we have ascertained that “consent” is arranged for the masses in modern 
democratic states; intellectuals act as “deputies” to indoctrinate the population according 
to the hegemonic ideology – what in elections is only the short distance between the 
hegemony’s peripheries. “This consent is ‘historically’ caused by the prestige (and 
consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and 
                                                 
36 Germino, Dante. “Antonio Gramsci: From the Margins to the Center, the Journey of a Hunchback.” 
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function in the world of production.”
37 And so it appears less the value or virtue of the 
dominant group and more the strength of the status quo that demands “consent,” for other 
options are dismissed as “naïve” or impossible. Precisely because some subaltern 
opinions challenge the hegemony, these ideas are not seriously entertained, and the 
appearance of a distance between the two hegemonic poles appears larger: there are no 
other options in this imposed setting, and consent will be given based on a lack of 
alternatives and the oppression of those who attempt to implement counter-hegemonic 
options. The hegemonic ideology spans the distance between what the productive 
requirements of society will tolerate, and “the bourgeois State is the liberal State par 
excellence. In it, everyone can express his opinion freely by means of his vote. This is 
what formal legality in the bourgeois State really comes down to: the exercise of the right 
to vote.”
38 Witness the ghastly example of the US occupation of Iraq: elections managed 
by the US Army in January 2005 boasted of their democratic credentials, yet the most 
important possible question for Iraqis (“Should the Occupation continue,” to which 
conservative polling indicated at least 70% of the population would answer in the 
negative) was not asked of the population. This situation is admittedly different, as 
coercion far outstrips consent in Iraq in 2006, yet the appearance of the election was 
important. The hegemonic ideology persists (the US is a force of liberation, and the 
Occupation has just given the gift of democracy to Iraq), and intellectuals are required to 
legitimize and substantiate the status quo, awarding it with their intellectual justifications 
and support.  
 
Consent becomes something more of an appearance than an actual process of persuasion: 
it becomes forced when groups can do nothing other than consent to issues that are 
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almost never contested. And for the role of intellectuals in coercion, they are charged to 
maneuver “the apparatus of state coercive power which ‘legally’ enforces discipline on 
those groups who do not ‘consent’ either actively or passively”
39  The process is again 
managed by the dominant’s group’s deputies – intellectuals orchestrating political 
governance. Gramsci continues with details of “other distinctions” that must be made as 
well, “distinguished in terms of [the intellectual activity]’s intrinsic characteristics.”
40  
 
Aside from intellectuals as technicians in the maintenance of hegemony, a larger 
discussion of consent/coercion takes place in the sections titled “State and Civil Society.” 
In this discussion of Gramsci’s Theory of the State, we find at least three definitions of 
the State and Civil Society. Notably, 
 
1. “one might say that State = political society + civil society, in other words  
hegemony protected by the amour of coercion.”
41 
2. “The massive structures of the modern democracies, both as State  
organizations, and as complexes of associations in civil society, constitute 
for the art of politics as it were the ‘trenches’ and the permanent 
fortifications of the front in the war of position: they render merely 
‘partial’ the element of movement which before used the be ‘the whole’ of 
war, etc.”
42,43 
3. “the State is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with  
which the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but 
manages to win the active consent of those over whom it rules.”
44 
 
In all of these definitions we find the architectural metaphor of planned growth around a 
core set of beliefs or structures. This root, fundamentally, is capitalism, and the social 
arrangements it requires are its branches. The maintenance of the capitalistic society is 
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the task of the state – it must control society and dominate the public, molding them and 
their lives to the dictates of production. Securing consent to these relations is the core 
requirement of sustaining the capitalist system; the state’s task in its civil and political 
forms is convincing people that their only options are within the hegemonic framework. 
“The State apparatus is far more resistant than it is often possible to believe.”
45 
Comprising “all forms of association…insofar as they have emerged and developed on 
the terrain of liberal democracy” the pieces of the “bourgeois system and the capitalist 
structure of society”
46 function as consent-generators. Working to reinforce the existing 
systems of power relations by explaining their processes and results as “natural” or 
“inevitable,” civil society pursues the hegemony (consent from the governed), while 
political society legitimately coerces the governed. Landy explains the dimensions of 
Gramsci’s discussion as 
 
Proceed[ing] from the assumption that everything in life is in constant motion, 
that everything is interrelated rather than rigidly schematic and systemic. In 
Gramsci’s analysis of institutions, the church, schools, corporations, trade unions, 
and forms of “entertainment,” social structures are conceived of as a source of 
lived social relations and as sources of constant conflict, thought the tensions may 
not be directed toward the transformation of social conditions but toward the 
legitimization of existing conditions.
47 
 
Given the State’s “aim is always that of creating new and higher types of civilization; of 
adapting the ‘civilization’ and the morality of the broadest popular masses to the 
necessities of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of production,”
48 
we should expect consent and coercion to exist as mutually reinforcing pressures – and 
not just at election times but constantly. The productive requirements of the economy 
change, and the state’s task is to mold society to them always, in whatever ways seem 
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necessary to maintain the exploitative status quo, the “economic apparatus of 
production.”
49  
Securing Consent 
 
In his section “On Americanism and Fordism,” Gramsci devotes a substantial section of 
his notebooks to issues that could be labeled “moral,” and how civil and political 
societies impose conditions for securing consent in this area to economic demands, and 
punish those who do not offer their consent. The example he chooses illustrates how 
seemingly disparate issues – alcohol or marriage and mass production of automobiles – 
are completely linked. Largely speaking to the regulation of alcohol and sexual habits, he 
notes,  
up to now all changes in modes of existence and modes of life have taken place 
through brute coercion, that is to say through the dominion of one social group 
over all the productive forces of society. The selection or ‘education’ of men 
adapted to the new forms of civilization and to the new forms of production and 
work has taken place by means of incredible acts of brutality which have cast the 
weak and non-confirming into the limbo of the lumpen-classes or have eliminated 
them entirely.
50  
 
But times change, and serfdom and slavery have been replaced with industrialized 
urbanization, thus the opening in control has been filled by civil society where once the 
Lord or Overseer functioned. Consent is manufactured in numerous areas of civil society, 
all serving the same purpose. “Puritan ideologies develop which give an external form of 
persuasion and consent to the intrinsic use of force.”
51 And in confronting these 
pressures, “these masses have either acquired the habits and customs necessary for the 
new systems of living and working, or else they continue to be subject to coercive 
pressure though the elementary necessities of their existence.”
52 Attitudes are molded, 
consent is imposed with the explicit threat of coercion should consent be withheld. 
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“Government with the consent of the governed,”
53 Gramsci writes, is related to the 
modern class-State, and its legitimacy rested on its self-identified democratic 
arrangement. “But with this consent organized, and not generic as it is expressed in the 
instant of elections,”
54 he continues, the consent is not arrived at from a free-thinking and 
wide-ranging map of options. “The State does have and request consent, but it also 
‘educates’ this consent, by means of the political and syndical associations…left to the 
private initiative of the ruling class.”
55 Thereby relinquishing its authority to the “civil” 
sphere of the State, consent can flow and exist without the appearance of the State’s 
imposition. Of course he recognizes that capitalism, as an organization of society, cannot 
be prevented “from corrupting the functionaries of the civil service, the military and the 
Church, from corrupting journalists and ‘creating’ just that public opinion which suits 
them.”
56  
 
This last comment merits closer attention: creating just that public opinion, he writes, is a 
function of the journalists. In their power to explain and excuse official State action and 
“private” economic development, the journalists working in the bourgeois State present 
reality to channel popular perception toward consenting to the hegemonic ideology’s 
explanation of and justification for existing power and economic relations. Consent 
emerges as the crucial condition for an economically productive society that is not 
totalitarian – the “free” must be controlled and by restricting their options civil society 
manages the liberated. Withholding consent is the key to dismantling the state. Gramsci’s 
interest in civil society is brilliant as we observe ever more closely the multitude of 
consent-generating actors in the modern democracy.  
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The State’s Means 
 
Through legal channels the threat of coercion is codified and executed. Consent and 
coercion, we can recall, are the two primary movers of the society into the arrangements 
that best serve its productive forces, such that “if every state tends to create and maintain 
a certain type of civilization and of citizen (And hence of collective life and of individual 
relations), and to eliminate certain customs and attitudes and to disseminate others, then 
the Law will be its instrument for this purpose.”
57 Legal systems, invented and 
orchestrated by elites, protected in their positions by gatekeeping, is and “must be 
conceived of as an ‘educator’, in as much as it tens precisely to create a new type or level 
of civilization. Because one is acting essentially on economic forces, reorganizing and 
developing the apparatus of economic production, creating a new structure, the 
conclusion most not be drawn that superstructural factors should be left to themselves, to 
develop spontaneously, to a haphazard and sporadic germination.”
58 Legal thought is 
precise and regulated by its own internal codes, “the repressive and negative aspect of the 
entire positive, civilizing activity undertaken by the State.”
59 In that it is inherently a tool 
of the propertied classes (for they alone write law) to police the great masses of society 
(for they are those whom it regulates), our conception of law “will have to be freed from 
every residue of transcendentalism and from every absolute.”
60 It is, like other inventions 
of political society in the modern democracies, a weapon of class power. The legal 
instrument is used as another molder of populations: abstemiousness is encouraged from 
the pulpit and hiring hall, and those who fail to practice what is preached will be policed 
into doing so. Likewise, the state’s property regulations (land reform) express the 
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productive demands of the land-owning classes. We should find in them statements of 
elite-focused wants demanded on the majority.  
But, he advises, these lines are not so dark: laws and the norms they require “must be 
conceived of as an ‘educator’, in as much as it tens precisely to create a new type or level 
of civilization.”
61 “The distinction between ordinary men and others who are more 
specifically legislators is provided by the fact that this second group not only formulates 
directives which will become a norm of conduct for the others, but at the same time 
creates the instruments by means of which the directives themselves will be ‘imposed; 
and by means of which it will verify their execution.”
62 The former, if we read closely, 
assists in protecting norms by practicing, respecting, and internalizing them. Laws are 
teachers as much as they are disciplinarians. This framework offers guidance to our 
examination of Apartheid and post-Apartheid land law.  
 
Gramsci’s second definition as well merits a close reading. His discussion of a transition 
to a “regulated society” (socialist) indicates that “it is possible to imagine the coercive 
elements of the state withering away by degrees, as ever-more conspicuous elements of 
regulated society (or ethical State or civil society) make their appearance.”
63 The State 
could no longer be run by and for plutocrats, and could begin to identify with “civil 
society,” leaving its coercive apparatus to only a “nightwatchman”
64 role. What emerges 
first is the idea that these elements are not eternal: the reader is charged to understand 
how hegemony works to defeat it. Within the trench theory already mentioned, the 
political society’s coercive powers can recede under the command of more progressive 
leadership, of the proletariat in Gramsci’s mind. These coercive powers will never be 
eliminated (Gramsci was not a pacifist): in the “nightwatchman” conception, the State 
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becomes “a coercive organization which will safeguard the development of the 
continually proliferating elements of regulated society, and which will therefore 
progressively reduce its own authoritarian and forcible interventions.”
65 At the same 
time, we can note, civil society’s function has altered, and it will be reflective of the “new 
social group which has founded the new type of State,”
66 i.e., a society progressing 
toward communism. But the difference between the regulated state and that which it 
destroys is substantial. Whereas the previous state was an expression of the bourgeois 
class and worked chiefly to settle elite disputes and perpetuate social systems most 
advantageous to capitalist accumulation of wealth, i.e. the demands of production
67, the 
socialist state will accelerate the “rhythm of production” and redistribute wealth.
68 Given 
the ANC’’s record in fulfilling the Apartheid-era strategy of “concentrating on 
perpetuating what has been achieved,”
69 we should now better understand why land 
reform failed – it was written to extend history, not to alter its trajectory.  
 
We can expect the consent function to disappear as the state actually serves the people – 
when society is regulated to best provide for all, consent is a priori. For if the masses are 
making the policies, their consent is inherent. What is here crucial is a meter for a state’s 
ethical composition, or political legitimacy. If regulated states needn’t impose consent 
and are rarely coercive, its antithesis that goes to great lengths of indoctrination and 
coercion is the anti-utopia, a state that must dissimulate and dismember to persist. Surely 
there is a useful gauge in this concept – the more one must use force to achieve an end, 
the less legitimate his aims. 
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Until that revolutionary period, however, civil society functions to ensure social 
hegemony, imposing consent and minimizing the number of coerced persons. The state’s 
outer defenses guard against the most recalcitrant elements with coercive force, and its 
inner guards (ostensibly without the use of coercion) continue to secure the consent of the 
masses for the ruling powers. Here, again, the first definition is relevant: the “State is the 
entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only 
justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those 
over whom it rules.”
70 A manifold of possibilities for the execution and implementation 
of a hegemonic ideology is presented, and the possibility emerges that there are 
throughout society a thousand small governments, a million minor militia, all of which 
operate within the confines of the hegemonic ideology to continuously reinforce and 
secure consent. At one end, the “maximum of legislative capacity can be inferred when a 
perfect formulation of directives is matched by a perfect arrangement of the organisms of 
execution and verification, and by a perfect preparation of the ‘spontaneous’ consent of 
the masses who must ‘live’ those directives, modifying their own habits, their own will, 
their own convictions to confirm with those directives and with the objectives which they 
propose to achieve.”
71 This massive arrangement, or complete social control, recalls 
Foucault’s notions of self-discipline,
72 in that society includes millions of minor 
mouthpieces reiterating TINA and preserving the hegemony. On sexual changes and the 
rigorous discipline of sexual instincts, from above, for the productive requirements of 
society: Gramsci explains, 
 
This is a situation which cannot last and is certain to lead to a crisis of libertinism, 
but only when the masses have already assimilated ‘virtue’ in the form of more or 
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less permanent habits, that is with ever-decreasing oscillations. On the other hand, 
in the case where no coercive pressure is exercised by a superior class, ‘virtue’ is 
affirmed in generic terms but is not practiced either through conviction or through 
coercion, with the result that the psycho-physical attitudes necessary for the new 
methods of work are not acquired. The crisis can become ‘permanent’ – that is, 
potentially catastrophic – since it can be resolved only by coercion. This coercion 
is a new type, in that it is exercised by the elite of a class over the rest of the same 
class. It can also only be self-coercion and therefore self-discipline.”
73  
 
We are all under the coercive powers of the state to follow should we ignore its 
encouragement to consent. Consent is so furiously pursued, he argues, because “the 
bourgeois State, which is the more strong, at home and abroad, the less its citizens can 
control and follow the exercise of its powers.”
74 What is here crucial is a populations’ 
quiescence, their acceptance of the stratus quo as a natural outcome – as if it were the 
only arrangement possible. When these conjectures are internalized and naturalized, the 
consent-generating process is successful.  
  
This elaborate examination of the consent imposed on the great mass of society is 
Gramsci’s demonstration of what must be done – fight ideologically the new war of 
position, as due to the development of the bourgeois democracy, the state’s coercive 
strength is no longer its primary offensive tool. “This is why it must be stressed that the 
political development of the concept of hegemony represents a great philosophical 
advance as well as a politico-practical one.”
75 For the coercive apparatus of the state is 
disguised, or considered retrograde in public view, the ideological apparatus of the state 
assumes greater responsibility over the perpetration of systems most advantageous to the 
productive forces of society. “Coercion has therefore to be ingeniously combined with 
persuasion and consent.”
76 
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With this framework in hand, we can move to the facts on the ground in Durban. As 
aforementioned, millions in South Africa, and hundreds of thousands in Durban have not 
experienced changes in the areas of land and housing since 1994. Arguably, they have not 
experienced many positive changes in land and housing since 1824. Though today a 
democratically-elected government does offer some limited housing subsidies, and did 
oversee a brief and narrow land reform program, this thrust of this thesis has been to 
argue that the ruling power of KwaZulu-Natal since 1824’s land claims have been 
exercised to extend and protect the minority’s hold on the majority of the province’s most 
valuable land. Including agricultural and urban areas, this grip by the few on the majority 
of the soil has proved highly pernicious to the capacity of the majority to live in safe 
dwellings and enjoy relocation. Following the transition to democracy, many land and 
housing rights remain unfulfilled, specifically positive rights to land and housing. Here, 
then, given the earlier discussion of colonial and Apartheid-era land and housing laws, it 
is prudent to use Gramsci and re-examine the process leading up to and including the 
transition. 
Consent, in Antonio Gramsci’s meaning, is “given” to “imposed” circumstances, rather 
than awarded to the most deserving or popular groups. “This consent is ‘historically’ 
caused by the prestige (and consequent confidence) which the dominant group enjoys 
because of its position and function in the world of production.”
77 It appears less the 
value of the dominant group and more the strength of the status quo that demands 
“consent.” The ANC, here, is thus still in power because of its old credentials – the 
neoliberal party still self-identifies as the only party of national liberation. The ANC-
dominated “State is the entire complex of practical and theoretical activities with which 
the ruling class not only justifies and maintains its dominance, but manages to win the 
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active consent of those over whom it rules”
78 all in the service of the productive needs of 
the ruling class. In short: townships are created to maintain pools of surplus labour near 
white cities for domestic and manufacturing work; post-Apartheid, these needs have been 
retained, but as manufacturing and industry has declined from the IFI assault, the 
townships were privatized to maintain the overall standards of living of both the ruling 
class and the masses of South Africas. These conditions have naturally been opposed 
since their enactment. Resistance is everywhere; it is the lethargy of the academy that has 
been slow to discover these simple truth, not the pace of the poors to object to their 
condition.  
Mamdani’s Citizen and Subject considers some of these issues. Chiefly, the text is 
concerned with the methods of colonial power – how it is exerted and through whom. 
Mamdani argues the Apartheid apparatus was not, as commonly claimed, unique or 
exceptional to African colonial history, but was instead the final iteration of indirect 
control. Most often first associated with Lord Lugard’s reign over Northern and then 
United Nigeria, indirect control as an apparatus of colonial social control, aimed to shrink 
the Empire’s office while simultaneously expanding its reach. Using intermediaries – 
most frequently, chiefs – as deputies for the colonial power, indirect control aimed to 
meet the ostensibly contradictory goals of minimal appearance of external domination 
and extensive control of local populations. In Nigeria then elsewhere throughout the 
African Continent and elsewhere below the Equator with similar political histories, the 
English aimed to tribalize the native. Insofar as these efforts were successful of stripping 
the “native” of his/her place within the colony, native authorities were both to blame and 
be petitioned for redress by the “native.” These “stateless peoples”
79 were manufactured 
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by indirect rule, relegated during Apartheid, and though fully enfranchised in 1994, never 
redressed for their historical lack of full South African citizenship. 
 
 As much as indigenous institutions continued to be accessible, accountable, and 
observable to the “native,” the tribal authority could function as an effective social 
controller, leaving the colonial power less hindered in its extractive aims. Pushing the 
“native” toward his or her “tribal” identity, and away from his or her European 
dominator, then, establishes mechanisms for indirect control and closes channels for 
resistance to that controller. As aforementioned, those in Durban lacking land are 
consequently more subject to the law than they are involved in it. The security of white 
land establishes their presence and guarantees their security in Durban. Lacking a plot 
today is not very dissimilar to lacking a pass 40 years ago. One’s status is precarious, and 
continuously subject to relocation to the periphery. Then, and now, Mamdani’s 
distinction helps us theorize the root issues at play, so much so that we could reformulate 
his question and ask, “are the Poors in Durban subjects or citizens?” Simply, does lacking 
property in Durban make one an outsider to it? Of course, the people in question are not 
Egyptians or the French – they are Zulu-speaking South Africans with roots in KZN far 
deeper than any other.  
 
This thesis aims to describe how and why the landless in Durban arrived in this location 
and status, with a debt owed to Mamdani’s theoretical groundwork. It is worth noting that 
Mamdani writes it was in Natal that the “separate but subordinate state structure for 
natives” was first codified in Natal.
80 At several points in the following pages, Durbanites 
will be considered as foreigners. By means of legislative fiat and spurious treaties, many 
who were in KZN became subjects of it, or outsiders to it. The century-old dispossessions 
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“Established the social prerequisites of a single legal order in a colonial settler society: 
appropriation of land, destruction of communal autonomy, and establishment of the 
‘freedom’ of the individual to become a wage worker.”
81 These alienations, I contend, are 
most powerfully expressed in the soil – the land question.  
 
In South Africa, more than elsewhere according to Mamadani, indirect control found its 
nadir, or apex, in Apartheid – the apartness of races, the separate development. As 
Apartheid’s creators described South Africa as a country of many nations, and self-
identified as one minority group among eleven, their initiatives to repatriate the Zulu to 
Zululand, and end the ability of the Xhosa to leave the Transkei “where he belonged,”  
represented the indirect control at its finest/worst. Mamdani does consider the methods 
for these crimes, largely among them land expropriation and exploitative labour relations. 
Where he does not focus extensively, and where I will, is just how the land question was 
answered in Natal well before 1910, when the Union of South Africa came into being. In 
a relatively short period of just several decades, where once several hundred thousand 
Zulu-speaking persons lived, Natal and Zululand were created. My focus, then, is how 
these borders remain intact. Mamdani is certainly expert on how varying regimes of 
control expressed themselves and exercised their hegemony in the late colonial period, 
though my focus is more on soil than colonial apparatuses of control. His eponymous 
distinction between those with access to government and those the government controlled 
is nonetheless highly valuable.  
                                                 
81 Mandani  p.66.     
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Chapter One – The First Claims to Natal 
The First Invasion 
Our histories indicate that a document appeared in 1824 ceding the full port of Natal, the 
hundred miles inland to 25 miles north and 10 miles south, to the FG. Farewell and 
Company. This rectangular block,   3 500+ square miles, appears to become British in the 
history books. Did Shaka Zulu mean for the cession to be eternal, or temporary? Did he 
mean to allow for the men to trade but not live in perpetuity? Did Shaka sign under 
duress, and did he in fact sign at all? These questions are completely irrelevent, as our 
engagement thereof requires the attachment of some form of legitimacy to the sale of 
space from under the feet of those who inhabit it. It doesn’t matter if Shaka sold the 
rivers, the soil, and the air – because such privatizations of the commons are wholly 
illegitimate, then, now, tomorrow. Territorial secessions to colonizing Europeans, each 
and every one if we are honest, were bogus. Whether $21 was traded for the island of 
Manhattan or a kingship was recognized in exchange for the control of “Zululand,” either 
way the few men who oversaw such transfers have as much authority over great numbers 
of people as the Coalition Provisional Authority did in Iraq when it slashed corporate 
taxation, privatized state industries and remade the Iraqi economy in 2003-4.  
 
Nonetheless, a wholly different logic underpinned the decisions of the colonizers. The 
King of England, through the Governor of the Cape Colony, wasn’t sure if Natal offered 
commercial enrichment to the tune necessary for its defense under the Crown. It was thus 
not for another 20 years that Port Natal, soon the Republic of Natalia, as the English and 
Boers called it, was shackled to the British Empire. During this period we find several 
enduring patterns that are maintained to this day: namely, the alienation of Zulu or 
African-occupied land to Europeans, by force, fraud, legislation, or other means. In 
addition, then and now, we find a concerted and diligent effort to control the African    
  31
population by geographically confining it and strictly regulating African travels outside 
of the areas to which it was/is confined. The method of these activities is of great interest.  
 
We soon find the trading post and its new territory engaged in ivory sales and other 
exchanges. The area was not at this point a settler colony, though the area that is now 
considered Durban was already alienated from African control. During the time of the 
Republic of Natalia so-called
82 natives were already legally excluded from living in it. A 
squatters law in 1839 and an 1840 resolution of the Volksrand, the legislative body of the 
Republic of Natalia, prevented greater than four Zulu families from living on any 
European farm. “The objects of this legislation appear to have been, first to limit the total 
number of ‘natives’ in the white area, and second to secure an equitable distribution of 
the labour supply.”
83 Zululand, a construct of European imagination and policy, emerged 
as the “reserve” area where the Zulus were instructed to remain. Here we find an attempt 
to expel the population unnecessary to European farm labour by “annex[ing] all Natal 
and a great part of Zululand, [and by] turn[ing] part of the population into farm labourers 
and to transfer the rest to an area which it did not in fact control.”
84 The Republic of 
Natalia became a European domicile in contrast to the African Zulu-land.  
 
Shortly after it was “recognized,” Zululand was cut in half after Mpande, a Zulu chief, 
was forced to cede all space in between the Tuglea and Black Umfolosi rivers to the 
Republic of Natalia after a defeat against Boers in the region. Next, in 1841, the 
colonizers, some claiming to flee the British Empire in the Cape Colony and others 
representing British commercial interests, confined “the surplus African population by 
placing it on a tract of land between the Umtamvuna and Umzimvubu rivers to the south 
                                                 
82 “So-called” should be placed in front of “native(s)” and “coloured(s)”  p.each iteration. For purposes of 
space, I shall not. 
83 Brooks and Webb  p.37. 
84 Brooks and Webb  p.38.    
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of the Republic.”
85 This area was outside the jurisdiction of the Volksraad, and moreover 
outside its sphere of effective control. It was selected precisely because it was foreign to 
Natal. In 1843-5 the Queen of England decided to bring the Republic of Natalia under the 
protection of the Crown in the form of a district of the Colony of the Cape of Good Hope, 
but with three conditions: abolition of slavery, end of aggression toward natives outside 
the colony, and the extension of all laws to cover all inhabitants, regardless of color, 
creed, or origin.
86 That the Volksraad in Pietermaritzburg assented to these terms and 
fulfilled but one of them is indicative of the long and deep pattern of disingenuousness 
and dissimilitude in the legal codes and proceedings of government. Meanwhile, St. 
Lucia Bay was alienated from Mpande, and in a separate conversation the land between 
the Tugela and Black Umfolosi was returned to Zululand.  
 
As Boers and others continued to enter Natal and desired to stay, the Volksraad enacted 
policies that allowed any person to stake a claim on land that was not already claimed.
87 
On a rapacious scale, settlers used these mechanisms to speculate wildly -– laying claim 
to and titling large tracts of land they neither occupied nor improved.
88 “Ultimately a 
great proportion of the land of Natal passed at incredibly low figures into the hands of 
speculators.”
89 Despite the land grants made to them in encouragement of settlement, 
many Boers were uneasy with both the pace of government titling, and the presence of 
the Zulus who, absent more effective government, continued to “enter” Natal. The 
government had not, we can assume, informed them that they were no longer occupants 
or owners of the land. In a more clear indication of their alienation, the Natal District 
passed an ordinance in 1849 that recognized Chiefs as the custodians of the natives and 
                                                 
85 Brooks and Webb  p.37-8.  
86 Brooks and Webb  p.40.  
87 Brooks and Webb  p.50.  
88 Over 60% of Natal was claimed by 1843, though 6/7
ths of th p.land was not used  p.all, “owned by 
absentee speculators, and four-fifths of all the claimants had left the colony.” Brooks and Webb  p.61-2   
89 Brooks and Webb  p.51.     
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determined that tribal law would govern Zululand. The point of these moves was to 
expand the effective distance between settlers and natives, Natal and Zululand. But to 
facilitate control over the 100,000 Zulu men in Natal, the Shepstone system was created. 
To a large extent, it still exists in effect today with slight moderations, and until 1994 
existed almost as enacted in 1845. It must be recognized that these provisions entailed 
both dispossession and alienation: forceful takings and legislative deracination. These 
“natives” were no longer members of the area – they were aliens to Natal and thus made 
to live not as participants in the society and its space.  
 
A first proposal to crudely “send them back” was rejected as “neither just nor 
practicable,”
90 we can imagine with more emphasis on the latter. Thus six Locations or 
Reserves were demarked as per the findings of a Commission investigating one of the 
first native “questions.” The 1846 Commission recommended Locations that were 
criticized as “too large, [but] not that they were unnecessary,”
91 and the Commission’s 
recommendations for the erection of schools and industrial education were dismissed as 
too costly. Nonetheless, between 80,000 and 100,000 Africans were moved from Natal 
into these “places where the Africans could live their own lives”
92 in the next few years, 
areas that comprised roughly 10% of the District. This idea of Africans “living their own 
lives” assumes that a separate existence encompass include the Europeans in Natal. There 
became two places: Natal + Zululand, and with locations for the Zulus in Natal. These 
Locations included the present-day townships of Umlazi, Inada, and Umvoti. The balance 
of territory was reserved for settlement of, then, approximately 10,000 Europeans. A 
Land Commission in 1848 was charged to investigate the sizes of the Locations, and 
made recommendations that they be decreased. Fortunately this did not occur, but in fact 
                                                 
90 Brooks and Webb 58. 
91 Brooks and Webb  p.59. 
92 Brooks and Webb  p.59.    
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the opposite in the next two decades did occur. By 1864 the borders of 42 Locations and 
21 Mission Reserves were etched, and as “the total combined acreage differed very little 
in 1961 from the figures of 1864,”
93 we might well consider them etched in stone. And 
yet in 1848, the District offered some 2,000,000 acres of land to 360 Boer families as an 
inducement for them to stay in the District.
94 As the African natives were all scheduled to 
be removed to their Locations, and had no formal place in the legal system, we find that 
Zulus in Natal were positioned as foreigners. Brooks and Webb explain, “The four years 
of 1845-9 made Natal a British, rather than Afrikaner territory, with a large African 
majority.”
95 Yet this alien majority, as they were constructed, marks the presence of the 
settler colony’s strength in the new territory. For their ability to occupy, deed, and settle 
the land in marriage to alienating, dispossessing and resettling Africans, the colonizers 
must be recognized as incredibly productive for Europeans and those who would settle on 
the lands that became European. It should not be surprising, then, that the Locations were 
most often barren, “rugged in the extreme, not suitable for cultivation or even 
pasturage”
96, and thus their placement reinforced “the white ruling class’s control over 
the water, forests, minerals and energy sources[,] leaving the Africans with only those 
limited and soon depleted resources within the reserves.”
97 Between 1849 and 1852, five 
thousand more European immigrants came to Natal to exploit its resources and make it 
their own.  
 
The management of the Zulu population consumed Natal’s government. Settlers required 
surplus labour, yet the restrictions on movement and occupation for the Africans in Natal 
made this difficult. And while “the Boers had left a legacy of unbelief in the propriety or 
                                                 
93 Brooks and Webb  p.60. 
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95 Brooks and Webb  p.62.  
96 Brooks and Webb  p.69.  
97 Cottle, Eddie. “The Class Nature of Free Water in South Africa: From Past to Present.” The Research 
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fitness of the Native to acquire or receive wages,”
98 the English who rapidly descended to 
the area were not inclined to revise the Location system to the extent that a labour supply 
could freely and regularly service their agricultural and trading needs. So as to never 
allow some aliens (Africans) into Natal on a regular basis – for such an occurrence would 
produce friction between races and, more importantly, introduce a limiting factor to the 
scale and size of the European settlement – Natal’s management turned to India for 
indentured labour. As sugar exports surpassed ivory in the 1860s, residents complained 
that the “over-sized” character of the Locations bore responsibility for the “unwillingness 
of Africans to labour in the sugar plantations.”
99 “In Shepstone’s eyes Natal consisted of 
two watertight compartments, Native and European. To coerce the Native to become 
dependent on the European by economic pressure was not compatible with this 
outlook.”
100 It seems unlikely that those who were critical of African “unwillingness” 
considered the existing restrictions on decent pay, liberty, movement and full citizenship 
as factors that might dissuade potential labour. We must recognize, however, that the 
“unwillingness” was only part of the issue. If Natal were to remain European despite its 
minority population, the majority Zulu-speakers must be compartmentalized elsewhere. 
When they did cross the “border” into Natal, they could be constructed only as outsiders 
and aliens if the integrity of Natal were maintained.  
 
Nonetheless, in 1859, the Natal Colony
101 began sponsoring five-year contracted Indians, 
who after ten years in the Colony could be repatriated at no cost. Within a year 6,000 
Indians were working in the sugar plantations, and by 1885 their numbers equaled whites, 
finally surpassing Europeans in 1904. Given the manner and fashion in which Europeans 
                                                 
98 Cited in Brooks and Webb  p.71.  
99 Brooks and Webb  p.81.  
100 Cited in Pachai, B. The International Aspects of the South African Indian Question 1860-1971. Cape 
Town: C. Struik. 1971.  p.3.  
101 In 1856 the Charter of Natal formally ended Natal’s status as a district of the Cape Colony. More self-
government followed, yet legislative maneuverings had restricted the franchise to white males with 
property, despite an ostensibly color-blind Constitution.     
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in Natal treated Africans, it is unsurprising that Indians were regularly flogged, fined of 
all wages and earnings, and treated as sub-human objects of labour and nothing more. 
Conditions were so appalling that the Government of India, around the time the first 
labourers returned, enacted legislation prohibiting emigration to Natal.
102 In response the 
Government of Natal enacted legislation creating an office known as Protector of Indian 
Immigrants, paid some doctors to visit the sugar estates, and even offered land grants to 
expired Indians near Durban. Unsurprisingly, given the mindset of the settler colony and 
its bottomless hunger for land, these grants were rescinded in later years
103, and as the 
Indian population grew and some pockets of prosperity emerged, efforts arose to forcibly 
repatriate every Indian in Natal. Speaking for the master race, the Attorney-General of 
the Colony in 1893 explained, “Indians were appreciated as labourers only and were not 
welcomed as settlers and competitors.”
104 Thus for a brief period Indians were granted 
titles and space to remain, but they too soon became targets of white domination. The 
Natal Colony was to remain in the hands of whites, the prosperity of who hinged on the 
exclusion of Africans and Indians from profitable ventures and spaces.  
 
Consolidation 
 
Since Shepstone had stared at maps and played God a few decades earlier, Locations 
throughout Natal had lacked some clear boundaries and also a legal status. Boers from 
the Transvaal had made numerous raids toward Zululand and other locations, and in 1869 
Mpande, Cetshwayo and others asked the Natal Government to establish a border 
between the Boers and Africans so as to allow some security of territory. This matter was 
never settled, and raids continued. But the earth under the feet of indigenous Africans 
                                                 
102 Act VII of 1871, section 57.  
103 Pachai  p.8.  
104 Pachai  p.9.     
  37
was redesignated by other means around the same time. By Letters Patent of 27 April 
1864, the Natal Native Trust was brought into creation. It assumed ownership and control 
over all the Locations, “in trust for the African population as a whole.”
105 The Location 
System’s borders were largely unchanged, yet the final authority therein and thereof 
became the Crown representing the interests of fewer than 20,000 Europeans in the 
Colony with nearly 300,000 Africans. Efforts to annex Basutoland, in addition, illustrate 
that the Crown’s hunger for the landmass was increasing at all times. A police force was 
commissioned in 1873 to put down rebellions, a signal that the spatial ordering of the 
Colony was in need of some protection or at least was considered under some threat. In 
hindsight, the anxiety of Natal management indicates a continuous resentment and at 
times rebellion against these conditions by the so-called Native population.   
 
The full crushing of the Zulus was not the result of the mounted police force just 
aforementioned, but instead achieved through the annexation of the then-independent 
Transvaal to the British. As part of confederation the boundary between Natal and 
Transvaal would be formalized with great harm coming to portions of Zululand. It was 
demanded that Cetshwayo, the Zulu “King,” disarm completely and come under more 
subordinate control of the British and Boers, then encroaching on all sides. An ultimatum 
was put to Cetshwayo that “virtually meant the repudiation of the Zulu traditions and the 
surrender of the independence of the Zulu nation”
106 in December, 1878. As a refusal was 
pre-ordained, the invasion of Zululand commenced soon thereafter, inaccurately called 
the “Zulu War” to this day. British armies invaded Zululand in January, 1879 with the 
intent and purpose to subdue any Zulu resistance to the full dominance of Europeans in 
the Transvaal and Natal. Bishop Colenso wrote three days after the invasion “it has been 
intended from the first to annex or subjugate Zululand…this has been the policy of the 
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British Government and the real object of these proceedings, and that the Commission 
has been merely a means of gaining time for warlike preparation.”
107 Armed with spears 
and shields against artillery and infantry, the Zulus were slaughtered by the thousands. 
Cetshwayo sued for peace repeatedly but the British commitment to a completely 
subdued Zulu nation triumphed. Great similarities exist between this war and a great 
many other wars between colonizer and conquered,
108 in which the purpose of hostilities, 
stated or otherwise, was the expulsion or elimination of indigenous peoples from the 
lands they once occupied freely and peacefully, by an army of technologically superior 
and morally primordial Europeans. After the invasion’s successful completion, Zululand 
was carved into thirteen distinct districts of a “manageable” disposition of “smaller and 
more numerous” proportions
109, each without sovereignty. Cetshwayo was also deposed 
from the throne that Shepstone had created for him, the position no longer serving its 
purpose. The local chiefs who had some administrative function were limited in their 
powers and functioned as titular “chiefs.” More Boer encroachment from the Transvaal 
followed the cessation of hostilities, and Boers extracted concessions of some 4,000 
square miles from Zululand. This area, much like others, was excised from its inhabitants 
and settled by colonizers, and the Zulu population therein dispossessed, alienated, and 
robbed in different ways at different times along the prevailing trends already discussed. 
What did this resemble? I haven’t dug in that direction. There may be collected oral 
histories of those who experienced these dispossessions; given the character of the 
disposers, it seems unlikely that any realistic observers would be funded to capture these 
crimes accurately. So let us briefly indulge fiction. Ngùgì wa Thiong’o’s Petals of Blood: 
  After the first big war there was no more land in which to move… 
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…You forget that in those days the land was not for buying. It was for use. It was 
also plenty, you need not have beaten one yard over and over again. The land was 
also covered with forests. The trees called rain. They also cast a shadow on the 
land. But the forest was eaten by the railway. You remember they used to come 
for wood as far as here – to feed the iron thing. Aah, they only knew how to eat, 
how to take away everything. But then, those were Foreigners – white people.
110 
 
The experience of the British invasion of Zululand and “European encroachment had 
uprooted clans, reawakened old jealousies and deprived the Zulu people of much of the 
land that had once been theirs.”
111 At the same time settlers were offered plots of land up 
to 159 acres in parts of Natal, estimates indicate that 300,000-400,000 Zulus lived in the 
forty-two Locations and twenty-one Mission Reserves. White farming was privileged and 
heavily subsidized while Africans were confined to the barren Locations and Reserves. 
By 1935, at least 87 acts of the Union Parliament would strengthen white farming at the 
expense of the African population, notably the subsidization of white farming via 
construction of “an extensive system of irrigation that allowed expansion of white 
commercial farming in a water stressed or semi-arid country.”
112 The intent of these 
programs was as much to support agriculture as it was to ensure that white agriculture 
would dominate, and be staffed by the enormous Black underclass. The magistrate of 
Helibron summarized the effect of the Natives Land Act, 1913, perfectly: “This Act is 
one by which a man is reduced from being a farmer in his own account to being a servant 
at one stroke.”
113 The Natives Land Act of 1936, later prevented Blacks from using 
tractors and irrigation in their reserves, while the subsidization (in some cases at 100% of 
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costs
114) of white irrigation loans facilitated white agriculture and created a wealthy and 
powerful political force. Africans were permitted to reside on white-owned farms insofar 
as they were employed by that farm’s owner, an arrangement “which undoubtedly was 
found profitable to farmers and even gave rise to speculation in both Crown and private 
land by Europeans.”
115 Surplus persons were forbidden as per the Private Locations Act 
of 1909; only the required number of labourers could exist outside of (rural) reserves, 
scheduled areas and released areas.
116  
 
Governing Natives 
 
The history of Natal in the decade preceding the turn of the twentieth century includes the 
political negotiations for greater independence from Britain in the form of “responsible 
government,” the advocates of which did nothing to hide their true motivation of 
“want[ing] responsible government mainly in order to control ‘Native policy.’”
117 
Political maneuverings were geared to prevent British interference in the colonists’ 
control of and violence to indigenous populations that outnumbered them 10-1 in Natal. 
With greater local powers, the Natal government enacted a campaign against Indians: to 
disenfranchise, impoverish and repatriate. The Disenfranchisement Law passed without 
objection in both houses of Natal’s parliament, and the Indian Immigration Law of 1895 
began taxing Indians who did not leave Natal following the conclusion of their indenture. 
“Thus in the first four years after responsible government the Natal Legislature had 
closed the franchise to Indians, endeavored to stop Indian immigration, imposed a heavy 
tax on indentured Indians refusing to re-indenture or return to India , and made it difficult 
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for new arrivals to obtain trading licenses.”
118 These measures lack counterparts 
concerning the African population for the simple reason that pre-existing statutes and 
regulations were successful. In other words, Africans were already without the vote, 
deprived of arms, and unable to trade freely, and as such, legislation enacted in the early 
years of the 20
th Century when Mahatma Gandhi lived in Natal and protested its 
draconian treatment of non-whites, was not tailored to deprive Africans of rights. 
Africans, as stated earlier, were considered aliens in Natal, despite the formal annexation 
of Zululand by the Crown in 1887
119 and the supremacy of British civil servants over the 
locations and reserves. The Crown owned Zululand, but Zulus were not even second-
class citizens – when a Zulu had the audacity to cross the “border” and enter European 
Natal, s/he was a resident aliens holding almost no rights. That the Constitution of 1893 
allowed Natal a free-hand in denigrating and repressing Africans, and served to 
facilitative the movement of “both the Indians and Zulus more or less where the white 
colonists wanted them,”
120 was, after all, the purpose of responsible government. 
 
Zululand shrank again in size in 1897 when it was annexed to Natal “largely because 
more land was required for growing sugar.”
121 The Zululand Land Commission was 
charged to demarcate reserves in the newly-annexed space, and they totaled 3.8m acres, 
excluding 2.6m acres for “privately owned European sugar and wattle plantations and 
vested European interests…in the heart of Zululand.”
122 Between the end of this 
commission’s tenure in 1904 and 1913, as per the commission’s recommendations, 
Africans were permitted to purchase land outside of their Locations and Reserves.
123 
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They were, however, confronted with a host of discriminatory subsidies, indignities and 
mechanisms that privileged white speculation and settlement, and this “open window” 
should not be overestimated. When the Boers and English went to war over political 
control in 1899, they did not fight over Native policy.  In Natal, conflicts were largely 
confined to the siege of Ladysmith. Boer attempts at invasion to secure the port, their 
access to the outside world, failed. Though they did succeed in annexing Natal north of 
the Tugela, the area around Vryheid was returned to Natal after the war’s cessation. The 
Treaty of Vereeniging in 1902 did not affect Natal’s land or native policies much at all, 
and the Colony did not contribute large numbers of men to the British armies, though 
they remained solidly British. European settlement increased again by migration and 
natural increase, and the process of Union formation proceeded with a conservative 
answer to the “Native Question.” During the pre-Union maneuverings, the South African 
Native Affairs Commission came into being, and from 1903-1905 it worked to 
consolidate and standardize the administration of native affairs. In other words, the elites 
from the four Colonies, now under British rule, worked toward a common understanding 
of subjugation of Africans while working to protect the landspace already removed from 
them. In Natal, given that the Zulu areas had already been divided and were formally 
ruled by the white government, answers to the “Native question” could only involve the 
protection of borders and the prolongation of white domination over the vast majority of 
arable, valuable, and productive land. The Natal represented at Union conferences 
represented only those who were considered of Natal
124, and the Natal presented at the 
Union conferences was precisely the earth underneath and owned by those considered 
from Natal. Locations and Reserves were, for all intents and purposes, holding pens of 
labour. While the Native Affairs Commission’s report did not become policy at the time 
of publication in 1905, many of its recommendations were taken up post-Union. But that 
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the Commission recommended Africans possess no ability to purchase land outside of 
certain areas demarcated by legislation should alert readers to the anxiety of elites in 
1905 regarding the ability of Africans to own anything immovable inside South Africa. 
This pattern seems as flat as Table Mountain, as “most of the Natal witnesses” before the 
Commission “were strong advocates of tribalism and rule by chiefs, or in short of the 
now somewhat ossified Shepstone system.”
125 Meanwhile, new Indian trading licenses 
were prohibited in 1909, and after the Natal Government rejected a tax on unoccupied 
lands, a poll tax was imposed on Africans. The Bambata Rebellion, partially inspired by 
that tax, was ruthlessly put down by the guardians of culture and literature, though 
summary executions among other means.
126 In seeking to understand the causes of the 
rebellion, one commission criticized the Shepstone system and its oligarchic control over 
Natives, in turn recommending that the Native Affairs be “taken out of politics.”
127 Act 1 
of 1909 aimed to implement some of these plans with the attempt to “gradually supplant 
the chiefs”
128 with unelected civil servants presiding over districts of locations and 
reserves.  
 
The Union of South Africa came into being in 1910, in the process abolishing Act No. 1, 
out of concern for standardizing tariffs, customs, and railways throughout the four 
colonies. Participation at Union conferences was delegated based on white population, of 
course, though a census taken one year after Union indicated that of the 1.2 million 
persons in Natal, 98,000 were white, 133,000 were Indian, and over 950,000 were 
African, the huge majority of which were forced to live in the locations and reserves.
129 
When the Union moved in 1913 to prohibit Africans from purchasing property outside 
the reserves, it certainly prevented some from moving, but given that the vast bulk of 
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Natal was allocated to whites and was “being well developed as rich sugar and wattle 
plantations,”
130 we can assume that the opportunity to purchase land even without the 
Natives Land Act was a small one. The right of “access,” then and now, is illusory to the 
poor.  In the following decades, the control of reserves was legislated with the Native 
Administration Act of 1927
131, “based largely on the later Natal tradition – the Shepstone 
policy as it was applied after Shepstone’s retirement.”
132 When the Natives Land Trust 
Act of 1936 added 22,000 square miles as “potential” Native areas, Natal farmers 
expressed hostility at the prospect of any increase in the size of the locations, as their 
predecessors did before them a century earlier. The farmer’s urban counterpart likely 
voiced no objections to the Urban Areas Act of 1923
133, which aimed at and largely 
succeeded in restricting the permanent residence of Africans in towns and cities and their 
choice of work. These webs of laws and regulations should be considered with the 
understanding that those who governed Natal were fully of the opinion that Natal was not 
for Africans, and in fact legislators claimed, as they would again during Group Areas 
enactments, that the law was necessary because of the “unfairness of compelling 
municipalities to provide adequate housing for all Africans in their areas if they were to 
have no control over the influx of Africans in excess of labour requirements.”
134 
 
Zululand was legally, spatially, and physically, a possession of the Natal Province in the 
Union of South Africa, yet those Africans within it were essentially imprisoned, and 
those Africans outside it had a precarious existence. As for Indians, the Relief Act of 
1914 abolished some taxes, yet a year earlier the government had signaled its antipathy 
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when, after several earlier attempts, it ended Indian immigration.
135 Indians lacked free 
movement, the ability to acquire coveted trading licenses, and were fully disenfranchised 
by 1924. In preventing the ability of Indians to acquire immovable assets and settle 
themselves freely, the Smuts government in 1943 succeeded in what the Hertzog 
Government had failed to accomplish in 1925. The Trading and Occupation of Land 
Restriction Act
136 ended sales of land from whites to Indians, so as to “peg” the locations 
and percentages of Indian “penetration” in the Transvaal and Natal. In 1946 the 1943 Act 
expired, and was replaced with the Asiatic Land Tenure Act. When reviewing that act, a 
joint Transvaal and Natal committee “was at pains to stress that it favoured repatriation 
and that it saw segregation as the minimum required if Asians were to continue living in 
South Africa.”
137 
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Chapter Two – Apartheid’s Land Policies 
In 1948 the National Party surprised electoral observers in South Africa and took power. 
In defeating Smuts’ Union Party, the NP did not repudiate a central principle of 
governance: white supremacy. The Union Government’s 1913 Native Land Act had the 
general effect of confining the majority population to what eventually became 13% of the 
landmass, and prohibiting any African from purchasing land outside of those regions. 
These restrictions “sealed” the earlier colonial thefts.
138  
 
All land within the reserves was owned by the Crown in the form of the Native Land 
Trust. In urban and peri-urban areas, segregation was more local; Cape and Natal policies 
differed slightly, though each was guided by national laws, notably the Natives Urban 
Areas Act of 1923. This law, also enunciated and promulgated before 1948, placed 
restrictions on Africans living outside of the reserves; only domestic workers could reside 
in urban areas and property rights were again curtailed. Peri-urban areas also developed 
along peculiarly detrimental and brutally colonial/Apartheid lines, with the notable 
consequence of an absence of farming “rings” around South African cities.
139  The 1934 
Slum Clearance Act added to the powers of the government to dismantle other 
settlements. The NP’s 1948 victory did of course announce the commencement of 
Apartheid, but the apparatus to affect and maintain Apartheid was already in place.  
 
What was novel about Apartheid was the extent to which the state would control space 
and land. The Group Areas Act of 1950 (GAA) mandated that local authorities, 
composed entirely of whites and accountable only to white constituents, assemble a 
Group Areas plan for its municipality and submit it to the Land Tenure Advisory Board 
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(LTAB). As has been shown, GAA “was not therefore simply the product of NP 
ideology, but the culmination of repeated attempts by white legislators to impose 
segregation more effectively in response to demands by white interest groups.”
140 
Coupled with the Population Registration Act of the same year, Group Areas “is so vast 
[in scope] as to stagger the imagination,”
141 aiming to make apartness concrete and 
permanent in South Africa.  Upon receipt of a Group Areas plan, the LTAB performed 
“public” hearings in the cities where the Plans had been drafted, though the ability of 
“interested parties [to] voice their opinions”
142 was curtailed by the repressive state 
apparatus. Southworth notes, “the Act provided no mechanism to ensure that the Board 
would heed public representations,”
143 and these events unfolded based on the “existence 
and growth of planning bureaucracies whose origins were wider than those of the [Group 
Areas] Act itself,”
144  thus building on existing – rather than new – apparatuses. The 
Board made recommendations to the Minister of the Interior, whose power to “proclaim 
Group Areas through the Government Gazette ‘whenever it is deemed expedient’”
145 
sounded the official dirge of hundreds of thousands of homes, communities and 
settlements. Race and territory were fused, again, based on “two interlinked necessities 
on planning: allocation of racially-zoned land for new areas; and deciding on, and 
achieving, uni-racial areas where many ‘groups’ lived and worked.”
146 Thus, soil was 
made to function in line with the racist economic requirements of the white society: 
proximity to industry necessitated the urban township, and the Act strengthened the 
spatially-restrictive components of colonial South Africa. The alien Zulu was only in the 
                                                 
140 Festenstein, and Pickard-Cambridge  p.5.  
141 Landis  p.24.  
142 Southworth, Hamilton III. “Strangling South Africa’s Cities: Resistance to Group Areas in Durban 
during the 1950s.” The International Journal of African Historical Studies. Vol. 24, No. 1 (191), pp 1-34.  
p.4.  
143 Southworth  p.4.  
144 Mabin, Alan. “Comprehensive Segregation: The Origins of the Group Areas Act and Its Planning 
Apparatuses.” Journal of Southern African Studies, Vol. 19, No. 2. (Jun., 1992), pp. 405-429.  p.429.  
145 Southworth  p.4, internal citation omitted.  
146 Mabin  p.423.     
  48
township temporarily. GAA operated, as has been seen, on top of other existing 
regulations and restrictions. And given that the Zulu “question” had already been 
answered in Natal, its effects were felt far more strongly in Indian and Coloured 
communities.  
Remaking Durban 
 
In 1950, the Durban City council appointed a Technical Sub-Committee to plan all of 
Durban’s areas, as per the GAA. After some tinkering at the insistence of whites who felt 
they were somehow shortchanged, the City Council voted in 1952 to approve the plan 
that “surpass[ed] the worst fears of Durban’s non-whites,”
147 and sent it to the LTAB. 
Hearings in Durban were confronted by Indian and African protests, though the 
respective organizations did not succeed in building viable coalitions. “The Act was not 
only notable for the segregation it sought to impose but for the racial and class tensions 
that its implementation aggravated.”
148 Given that Indians were, generally, better-off than 
Africans in Durban and owned more highly-valued land, their complaints were not 
identical to Africans, and the Group Areas designations worked to accentuate these 
differences. Group Areas “divided South Africa’s racial groups into competing factions, 
each fight for its own economic and social survival.”
149 The LTAB forwarded a slightly 
modified plan to the Minister of the Interior in 1954, who then had the prerogative to 
designate any portion of Durban as he saw fit; an announcement in the Gazette would 
alert residents if they had become illegal overnight.  
 
Given the urban population increases of the 40s and 50s, their severe economic 
oppression and the effects of 1913 Native Reserves and 1923 Urban Areas Act
150,  the 
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African population in Durban had already faced housing shortages. But as their dwellings 
were increasingly criminalized and their evictions grew, an already serious housing 
situation deteriorated. In 1952, one estimate indicated that 90,000 Africans lived in 
shacks.
151 And “[w]hile the City Council recognized the problem, it refused to address 
it.”
152 There is no simple way to determine how many of these 90,000 were among the 
80,000 Africans whose movement was required according to the 1952 City Council 
plans.
153 What is clearer is the motivating force behind the movement of half the African 
population, whose full community represented “49.54 per cent of the labour force, 
through only 31.68 per cent of the whole population.”
154 The GAA in Durban would, like 
so many laws before it, ensure “the main residential core of the city from east to west and 
north to south, indeed most of the residential area of the city, is reserved for 
Europeans.”
155 Durban was rezoned, and writing in 1958 demographers commented, “it 
seems probably that Government policy will be directed toward the entire removal of the 
African population from the city into the peripheral zones.”
156 What those zones must 
necessarily abut will be addressed later. This, it must be noted, is nothing novel in Natal. 
These activities by government are the same undertaken by the Republic of Natalia, Natal 
District of the Cape Colony, Natal Colony, and Natal Province of the Union of South 
Africa. Let us not confuse past and present, however; what distinguishes GAA is its scale 
and its context. In terms of its reach, GAA was a more overwhelming and overarching 
attempt to cement the colonial land allocations by national policy. Moreover, GAA aimed 
to destroy Coloured and Indian property and possessions more than it aimed to affect 
Blacks.
157 It has been shown that Africans had already been relegated to Reserves, 
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Homelands, Locations, and other fixed areas as per a plethora of legislation, in addition 
to numerous colonial enactments. GAA also must be considered in light of Wolpe’s 
examinations of the evolving political economy. The labour requirements of South Africa 
in 1846 were agricultural and rural; at the time of Union they were concentrated in the 
mining sector; and, by the time of GAA manufacturing and secondary industry was, with 
extractive industry, primary. As the economy changed, so did the repressive apparatus 
designed to comfort and provide for industry.
158  
 
These massive and rapid forced migrations obviously had deleterious effects on the 
health and safety of those involved. Many with legitimately deeded-property were simply 
dispossessed of their holdings, but as well many tens of thousands were uprooted from 
their shacks and dwellings and simply trucked elsewhere.
159 New zones and Areas were 
neither designed nor prepared for their residents. Persons were most often simply dumped 
there. Sophiatown’s tens of thousands were removed an “open veld”
160 without 
completed dwellings, thirteen miles from the city. The Group Areas Board, we should 
note, is not charged with any responsibilities in this regard. “The only require[ment] 
under the Group Areas Act is that the Board take into consideration whether or not 
suitable accommodation will be available for persons displaced from Group Areas for 
Occupation or Ownership, and, as we have seen, no obligation is laid on the Board to act 
on any such consideration, or to ensure that accommodation is in fact available.”
161 The 
Group Areas costs are not clearly delineated in the legislation, including those associated 
with re-settling displaced persons. When the Durban Combined Indian Ratepayers’ 
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Association included this oversight in their complaints to the LTAB in 1953, their voices 
fell on deaf ears. Durban City Councilor J. Bolton remarked: “The Government has made 
no provision for compensation. They are just not interested.”
162 Forced removals to 
nowhere, then, increased shack, informal, and unsafe settlements and increased the 
housing shortage in Natal. Expressing his inability to act, Durban Mayor R.A. Carte 
reasoned “If the Native is to be housed, then land must be taken from the Europeans, and 
they are not willing.”
163 That the “Native” should be outside while the “European” is 
housed is simply inequitable in itself, but more interesting is the double-standard of 
property rights: Europeans are entitled to their lands (allocated by fiat, stolen in conquest, 
whatever), and retain the prerogative to dispense of them as they see fit. Their 
“unwillingness” is sufficient for their eternal domination of an erf or farm.
164 None of 
these statements apply to the Native or Indian, of course, whose property rights simply do 
not exist in the way the European’s do. Again, we cannot solely blame Apartheid for 
these activities, as Zulus had been foreigners in “Natal” since the trading port 
metastasized in 1824, and Indians were not accepted as permanent until the 1960s. 
 
An interesting consequence of these dispossessions is the creation of slums. Clairwood, 
Durban, was home to some 25,000 persons of Indian descent. The population had grown 
since its beginnings, in the late nineteenth century, and had “built homes, factories, 
businesses, schools, temples, mosques and burial grounds.”
165 In 1956, the Durban City 
Council decided the land would be better used for “unfettered industrial expansion.”
166 
Persons of any race could, technically, temporarily work or dwell in an industrial zone 
(with compliance to all Pass Laws, property-accumulating restrictions and other related 
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repressive apparatuses, of course), but the rezoning of Clairwood would require the 
clearance of its Indian community. After the community rallied to inform its governors 
that under the 1946 Asiatic Land Act Clairwood was supposedly exempt from further re-
zonings, the deputy mayor assured them that any clearance was ten to twenty years away. 
This, unsurprisingly, did not assuage concerns, but rather had the immediate effect of 
making Clairwood moribund: property values collapsed as the indefinite demolition 
loomed large. And, as could be predicted then, Clairwood’s residents “stop[ed] investing 
in their neighborhood and community; they would not paint or repair their homes, build 
new houses or develop community facilities…Clairwood’s physical condition would 
slowly decline, turning the neighborhood into a slum.”
167 In 1957 the Chamber of 
Commerce echoed the complaints of Clairwood’s residents and others, citing a decline in 
investment and the stagnation of real estate markets due to uncertainty of future Group 
Areas proclamation. Likewise, the City’s planners voiced complaints about the possibility 
of tax increases to pay for the resettlement of the dispossessed. Cato Manor, like 
Clairwood, was a point of contention between the national and local government, but not 
because either was even slightly concerned with the welfare of those targeted for 
removal. The Natal Daily News accurately characterized the white opposition: “Durban 
will have to foot the bill…there is nowhere for these [26,000] people to go, no alternative 
housing are ready for them and none is likely to be built in short time.”
168 
 
The extensive planning apparatus, we have seen, was not the product of the  NP ’48 
victory alone, but the result of decades of like-minded policies. The repeated destruction 
of African and Indian property then decreased (destroyed?) any capital they had 
accumulated, and required their impoverishment – wages sank “since very little housing 
was provided by the municipality, [and] there was a proliferation of squatter settlements 
                                                 
167 Southworth  p.18.  
168 Natal Daily News, Feb 8, 1960. cited in Southworth  p.30.     
  53
in the peri-urban areas, which further subsidized the costs of the reproduction of 
labour.”
169 In addition, as “the local state was not prepared to finance African housing 
from the municipal budget,”
170 the shack settlements Africans (re)built for themselves in 
other areas lowered the costs of their reproduction for Durban’s managers. Already 
impoverished in their settlements, the demolition of African settlements and their 
removals to open fields thus simultaneously caused new informal settlements with fewer 
resources.  
Space During Apartheid 
 
Moving on to the placement of the African population we find (shack) settlements were 
arranged where Africans were legally permitted to sleep (and other more precarious 
settlements where they were forbidden to sleep), and in keeping with the hyper-paranoid 
planning apparatus of Apartheid, these zones of African dwellings were located for 
optimal racial exclusion and economic efficiency for the planners. The placement of 
Africans has always been deleterious to them due to the excessive distances they are 
forced to travel. “because those who can least afford transport are forced to travel the 
longest distances to work, Black passenger transport has become uneconomical – and a 
highly politicized source of Black discontent and mobilization.”
171. Durban was 
overdependant on African labour,
172 the Technical Sub-Committee could not simply 
banish the labour supply. An obsession with managing the African population, “by and 
large just another factor of production”
173 after their liberation from land, property and 
any remaining rights in 1913, has been a chief motivation in the urban policies of South 
Africa’s cities. Durban’s rulers believed “that cities were the creation and preserve of 
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whites, that the African presence should be temporary and limited to serving the interests 
of white citizens and that ruthless controls over African movement and contracts were the 
mainstay in maintaining a labour market convenient for the dominant interests of the city: 
in short a basis for a cheap labour system.”
174 Therefore, the Technical Sub-Committee 
recommended “a narrow ribbon-like elongation of industrial areas, a solution compatible 
with the topography of the city. Racial zones would then radiate from the commercial and 
industrial belt, and workers could move directly from their own zones into racially 
neutral areas.”
175 Rigid rules around industrial areas were discouraged, as the Natal 
Employers’ Association, Chamber of Industries and Durban Chamber of Commerce all 
requested “on grounds of inconvenience, expense, unsuitable siting of factories, transport 
complications, and retardation of development”
176 that industrial areas not be subject to 
racial zoning.
177 Though elected leaders reasoned that the passage of one race in the area 
of another “causes friction”
178 and the Mayor in 1873 insisted that Indians “with the 
belongings of dirt and other objectionable things”
179 and “their habits and customs being, 
as is well known, [are] so totally at variance with and repugnant to those of 
Europeans,”
180 those who demanded apartness did not mind the mixture of races in 
industry.
181  Using the Group Areas Act and legislation “like it, the National Party hoped 
to solidify its electoral position. To this end, the Act enabled whites to broaden their 
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economic power by controlling the ownership and use of nearly all property in South 
Africa.”
182 It is obvious, then, that the selection of Group Areas locations was a tool for 
economic power and white supremacy, but one, like much of the Apartheid apparatus, 
that did not affect the landowning patterns of the natives already imprisoned in the 
Bantustans. It is worth remembering that Piet Koornhof, former minister of co-operation 
and development, who oversaw the forced removal of some 3,000,000 million people, 
applied for amnesty during the TRC. “With this application, says Koornhof, he wants to 
say all of this was wrong and he is sorry.”
183 These statements, from the man who 
indicated in 1981, “The resettlement of Black people is resorted to in order to ensure their 
national unity, to protect their ethnic and political interests, and to improve their living 
conditions and standard of life ,"
184 are rank and do much to establish the motives of the 
NP during its reign.  
 
It should be clear, given the Sub-Committee’s own summary of its report that required 
residential zones to have “boundaries which should as far as possible constitute barriers 
of a kind preventing or discouraging contact between races” and “have direct access to 
working areas”
185 that in their placement of industrial and residential zones, the latter 
were intended to serve and suit the former.  We can see this throughout the TSC’s plans, 
for their industrial and commercial demands have “extensive consequences” for the entire 
scheme: “The requirement of direct access to industrial and commercial areas, without 
traversing the residential zones of other race groups, is met by extending the working 
areas in a long band from north to south.”
186  In response to Group Areas, the ANC 
decried the attempt “to deprive them of the free occupation and ownership of land, so as 
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to ensure that they will be Government tenants at all times, and hence a source of cheap 
labour.”
187 The Natal Indian Congress saw “the true aim as the redistribution of wealth 
and resources in favour of the Europeans, and the removal of Non-Europeans from their 
developed areas of residence and trade to the remote outskirts of the towns and cities.”
188 
Bull’s eye.  
 
As the TSC was disinterested in making provisions for those who were removed during 
GAA, these persons were forced to create accommodations for themselves, often after 
their dwellings were bulldozed or otherwise destroyed. Earlier legislation had “explicitly 
imposed segregation and aimed to clear Africans out of the mixed residential areas which 
had grown up in larger cities and rehouse them in locations; together with anti-squatting 
provisions and the Blacks Resettlement Act of 1954, it was used to enforce removals of 
Africans.”
189 The crucial term in this quote for interrogation is “rehouse,” as we have 
seen that Group Areas and its predecessors required only the “consideration” of new 
housing and suitable land for those removed. In areas that became “defined” or 
“proclaimed,” “no buildings could be erected or altered
190 without a permit; residents or 
owners, usually Blacks, who unlawfully altered these builds lost the right to occupy them. 
This froze development.”
191 Housing shortages, already existing because of 
overcrowding in the Locations and Reserves, and maintained by Urban Areas and 
Pegging Acts, multiplied when Group Areas demarcations forced occupants out of 
dwellings. The Land Tenure Advisory Board purchased the land underneath many of 
these structures and was reputed to be the largest landowner in the country.
192  
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Under the Community Development Act of 1966 and Group Areas Development Act of 
1955, (as amended), the government assumed control of many of these parcels and 
assumed control of development there. These national bodies provided roughly 20% of 
the costs of new housing in these areas, and in the definition of an unfunded mandate, left 
40% to local boards and the remaining 40% to private parties.
193 Here the First Report of 
the Commission of Inquiry into Township Establishment and Related Matters, the Venter 
Report, becomes relevant. Appointed in 1982, Venter was charged to investigate 
complaints about “the problem of acquiring land for housing purposes,” and the declining 
“rate of provision of building sites, especially for the lower and middle income 
groups.”
194 In contrast to other commissions of the same period, Venter examined all 
“population groups” including “Blacks or the needs of the lower income group.”
195 
Therein we find the NP’s analysis of land and housing issues, especially in terms of 
economic and financial policies that affect housing delivery and land acquisition. One of 
their most important findings, which will be discussed in time, is “the private sector’s 
lack of confidence in the township establishment industry.”
196 Moreover, the 
commission’s report admitted the “shortages of building sites that already exist in certain 
urban areas” combined with the “accelerated rate of urbanization predicted on all sites for 
the immediate future, up to the end of the century”
197 will require new housing financing 
and land acquisition strategies if supply will come close to meeting demand. We should 
not assume that this is their goal, of course. While public sector investment remained 
static between 1960 and 1980, private sector investments decreased “sharply since 
1971.”
198 This decline of already inadequate investment, was lower in the late 1970s than 
in 1960. Given that the Commissioners find the housing industry is the most unstable in 
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South Africa, and the already existing dearth of investment in housing for non-whites, the 
circumstances painted are grim. Other observes indicated that the Natal government 
offered no funds for housing during this time frame, and the Port Natal Administrative 
Board cut loans for African housing in 1973.
199 Yet the commissioners urge the private to 
be more closely involved in housing business for low-income persons. “In view of the 
limited funds available from the Government, the strategy depends on greater 
participation by the private sector and in particular by the individual in the provision of 
housing for the lower income groups.”
200 That the recommendation of a “partnership 
basis by the private and public sectors …will increasingly have to be conducted within 
the framework of the free market economy”
201 would be wholly inadequate for the 
demand is somewhat recognized by the authors, though they appear willing to accept that 
fact. Building society loans are urged, though they recognize that low income persons are 
unlikely to qualify for them.
202  
 
Township establishment was sickly, the cause being a severe shortage of space on which 
to build, and the enormous underfunding of any projects. Reliance on private sector 
involvement was failing, owing to their “lack of confidence”
203 and observed 
“diminishing role”
204 in the field, and the inability of low and no income persons to 
acquire credit from building societies added to the problem. Private sector involvement in 
the housing market, it was argued in 1990, means “high administrative costs associated 
with small loans” and when coupled with the fact that “the majority of urban residents 
cannot afford the products the developers have to offer”
205 results in the majority of any 
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subsidy offered going toward more expensive housing with the lower income brackets 
excluded.
206 The development corporation Venter considers, which “will be more 
dependent on funds from the private money market at normal economic rates”
207 
requires, of course, some extraction of surplus value, one consequence being that “steady 
supply of” housing sites will “except possibly the lowest group.”
208  Just how deluded the 
commission was is unclear, as the document is contradictory at points and seemingly 
oblivious to its own conclusions at other points. Given that they recognize the 
unwillingness of the private sector to serve low-income groups, there are few ways to 
understand their insistence on great private capital participation. Indeed, we should 
consider the following paragraph if we hope to understand the purpose of Venter: In 
estimating the number of Africans who will be urbanized by the year 2000, 
commissioners reason, 
 
It is assumed that for the most part, historical trends in the economic and the 
social field will continue in the future. Naturally it is not only influx control as 
such that prevented large-scale squatting in, and on the periphery of, South 
African cities in the past. With a sophisticated land use control system…local 
authorities are equipped to ensure the systemic development of the urban 
environment. This form of land use control, together with the land tenure system 
that applies in South Africa, possibly also played an important part in ensuring 
orderly urbanization in South Africa. This form of control of urban development 
will probably always play a part in future, as an indirect factor, in countering 
undesirable and uncontrolled squatting.
209  
 
This passage is important in that it reveals just how, beyond influx control, South 
Africa’s managers have worked to maintain the desired land control patterns of the 
colonial era. With the decline of the more obvious methods of spatial control like Group 
Areas and Influx Control, the reliance of private sector dominance in establishing 
housing and space development in cities is an attempt to prevent low-income migration to 
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cities by controlling the locations and methods of settlement. Remember that passage, as 
it will illuminate the work of the Strydom Report and White Paper on Urbanization. Land 
and housing, the requirements of healthy settlement, are obviously linked, and we should 
not consider these items separately. That the ANC today strives to consider them 
differently should, at least, be cause for skepticism. “The fact that the price of the erf and 
the cost of the house are linked, especially in the case of the lower income group”
210 is 
clearly related to the ongoing spatial arrangement of South Africa, whereby and wherein 
property near employment centres (cities) is still primarily in the hands of entrenched 
whites. Acquisition of land for non-white housing is a serious challenge given the 
perpetuation of the settler colony distribution of resources and parcels. “The inescapable 
fact that the provision of both the residential site and the dwelling should be treated as an 
integrated action”
211 is lost on current South African President Mbeki, among others, who 
are careful to separate the land “question” from the housing “question.” Following the 
high-profile land occupations by the home and landless, Mbeki he declared that “the 
problem in South Africa is homelessness, not land.”
212  Alexander explains,  
 
The Brendell occupation and similar occupations near Cape Town and Port 
Elizabeth were thus construed as outcomes of failed housing and ‘basic services’ 
(water, electricity, etc.) delivery. The urban poor were portrayed as homeless, not 
landless, actors; they were acknowledged as having land needs insofar as they 
needed land for building homes, but not necessarily for other purposes. Their 
relationship with urban land was thus mediated through a right to housing, but did 
not consist of a direct right to land.
213 
 
Separating land from housing disguises the central issue in South Africa, which 
Greenberg
214 and others argue is fundamentally land. When the landless are portrayed as 
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homeless, bureaucratic designs are considered as “solutions” to backlogs and inadequate 
delivery. Services, not soil, we are told, are the issue in the new South Africa. But in the 
“old” South Africa, when Influx Control and Group Areas were in decline, let us turn to 
see how land was addressed. Greenberg argues that these property relations are crucial in 
understanding the loss of citizenship rights for South Africans, and redressing them is as 
important a step as could be taken toward making South Africans full persons before the 
law again. This was not in the interest of capital or the ANC if we are to take their 
policies as any indication of their interest. A strong protection of property in the new 
Constitution, landless groups screamed during negotiations, “would actually ensure that 
historic land theft would be legitimized by the new Constitution, thereby limiting the 
possibilities of land reform in the post-Apartheid era.”
215 
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Chapter Three - Planning for Post-Apartheid 
 
As NP power ebbed in the 1980s official Group Areas were relaxed. The Group Areas 
Amendment Act of 1984, and Riekert (1979) and Styrdom (1984) Committee Reports 
acknowledged the inevitable decline of Apartheid, and by 1986 the Durban City Council 
had opened its central business district to all races for commerce. Simultaneously, “the 
combination of repressive urbanization policies, acute housing shortages, the recession, 
and conditions in homelands and farming areas, all conspired to produce a wide array of 
shack settlements.”
216 But “politicians moved to protect the racial order that Group Areas 
had established over forty years”
217 as it became clear Apartheid as a legal system was 
moribund; as a social and economic system, it was still alive. And in important ways, the 
legal system was more updated than repudiated. “There is no clear break with colonial 
and Apartheid relations of oppression, exploitation and indignity for these landless, less 
so with capitalist property relations and ownership of land.”
218 The ANC-led government 
demonstrated as firm a commitment to white private property as did its predecessor, 
though we must be clear on the NP’s record during the last years of Apartheid. As their 
system of codified racism became unstable, the South Africa’s management put into 
place policy recommendations that focused on “concentrating on perpetuating what has 
been achieved.”
219 Let us concentrate on their plans and, in turn, consider how they have 
been implemented by the Republic.  
Prime Minister Malan called Group Areas “the essence of the Apartheid policy,”
220 and 
the abolition thereof marked an ostensible sea change in the spatial management of land 
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and the social management of persons in South Africa. This development goes to the 
credit of those who resisted Apartheid, but we must also recognize that the abolition of 
Group Areas and Influx Control occurred largely because they had achieved their 
purpose. The “vital question of how the land question would be resolved [that] was 
discussed as early as the 1980s,”
221 was thoroughly joined to these events and was in 
many ways answered in the 1984 Strydom Report and 1986 White Paper on Urbanization. 
Here the Afrikaner-controlled National Party announced that Group Areas and Influx 
Control, the “essences” of Apartheid, would be rescinded. The Rubicon was crossed, but 
critically engaging these sources and related legislation and policy since the ANC 
assumed control of the South African state reveals that much late-Apartheid policy 
focused on retaining the gains of Apartheid and earlier colonial land theft. And it is the 
ANC – whose motives can be discussed later – that has accepted these perpetuating 
frameworks and indeed made them their own. Regarding new housing, spatial 
distribution and urbanization, the NP and ANC selected policies to achieve the same 
goals, namely to keep South African property firmly in the hands of whites
222 with 
diligent focus on the maintenance of white land, “concentrating on perpetuating what has 
been achieved.”
223  
 
The Strydom Report & White Paper on Urbanization 
 
In pursuit of retaining the gains of Apartheid, namely in terms of immovable assets,
224 the 
continued spatial separation of whites via the exclusion of Africans, Indians and so-called 
Coloureds, the Strydom Report was commissioned. Given the increasingly hostile climate 
of ungovernability and the forebodings of sanctions and divestment, the authors were 
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forced to find means to perpetuate the status quo without the enormous apparatus that 
was Apartheid. “Taking everything into account the Committee is of the opinion that the 
principles of the [Group Areas] Act should be retained but with a new political 
dispensation for Whites, Coloureds and Indians imminent, the question arises whether 
possibly another and more suitable form of legal coercion can be found to replace the 
Group Areas Act whilst preserving residential separation.”
225 Commissioners show that 
90% of disqualified persons had been moved under GAA by 30 September 1982, 
concluding that “the pressure to proclaim group areas has drastically diminished”
226 and 
“the proclamation of group areas is practically concluded.”
227 In seeking that new basis of 
coercion, the authors were “unanimously of the opinion that the form and method of such 
coercion as embodied in the Group Areas Act, is not indispensable and can be suitably be 
substituted.”
228 Coercive means were hardly rejected
229, yet the authors made conscious 
and explicit efforts to find other means of control. Strydom recommended that conditions 
of title be attached to all property, much like earlier Pegging Acts, that “will ensure 
countrywide freezing of ownership and occupation of land between the various 
population groups.”
230 Enforcement devolution was encouraged repeatedly in an attempt 
to localize Apartheid down to the level of the property owner whose evictions rights 
would be expanded. This should be seen in tandem with title deeding and the abolition of 
Group Areas and Influx Control. “Orderliness is strived at by substituting State control 
with control by the owner and manager.”
231 The authors crafted legislative 
recommendations around the “responsibility of the owner[s]”
232 of businesses
233 and 
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property to locally control what the state no longer claimed as its own. Slum regulation
234 
should also be devolved and “entrusted to local authorities.”
235 Also, the effective 
protection of private property was an unstated requirement – this seems obvious – as the 
Interim and final Constitution’s strong private property rights clauses demonstrate.  
 
The 1986 White Paper on Urbanization (“WP”) maps out the National Party’s strategy 
for consolidating and entrenching the status quo of spatial arrangement and ownership, 
while “accept[ing] the permanence of Black people in the RSA.”
236 This document, a 
close reading reveals, has served to guide government planning of urban communities in 
regard to new development, finance, and migration much along the lines recommended 
by Strydom’s and Venter’s calls for private sector development dominance (with its 
resulting deficiencies for low-income [Black and Indian] persons) and Strydom’s call for 
local, private and informal control (with its resulting effects of preserving spatial 
“achievements.”). Though the ruling party of the Republic has changed since the WP was 
promulgated, its policies are still much in effect. Indeed, these policies have been carried 
out by the successive ANC regime. The WP’s authors euphemistic “accept[ance of] 
responsibility for maintaining social order and stability”
237 should be translated as a 
perpetuation of the settler colony’s land regime in which white property remains under 
white control, and existing patters of ownership are unchanged. Urbanization is described 
as something to “manage” “positively” and “control” or “plan”
238 in the context of 
repealing Influx Control and Group Areas restrictions. Emphasis is placed on “maximal 
devolution of authority and responsibility” so as to localize the Apartheid set of 
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controls.
239 This stress should be linked to the Styrdom Report’s recommendation for 
local property regulations that retain the dominance of existing property owners in urban 
and valuable agricultural areas (whites). As aforementioned, Styrdom insisted that 
individual and local titling should replace national Group Areas. The complexion of 
Group Areas would, in its and the WP’s strategy, remain: “the present control measures 
in the RSA should be abolished and replaced by a strategy for orderly urbanization.”
240  
 
These policies of indirect control aim to maximize returns on the albatross of economic 
impoverishment and political marginalization that colonization and Apartheid attached to 
Africans, Indians and Coloureds. Pieter de Lange, chairman of the Broederbond in 1986, 
summarized the position of the powerful whites this way: “Look, we Afrikaners thought 
we needed many things to secure our future: segregated living areas, no mixed marriages, 
and all that…but the reality is that we can remove the Group Areas Act tomorrow and it’s 
not going to make any difference, because [Black] people don’t have the money to move 
into the expensive white suburbs. So from your point of view it will be a meaningless 
change.”
241 By exploiting the exploited’s inability to engage in market-based or cost-
recovery-circumscribed service and housing provisions, the WP aimed to stem migration 
or at least preserve the core of white property and the racist spatial arrangement of South 
Africa. An implementation of the WP would entail cost-recovery, market-based housing 
and land delivery or reforms, and a large role for the private sector in new development. 
For some perspective on the extent to which these policies, with their odious motivations, 
were implemented, we can turn to Mcdonald, who in 2002 demonstrated “that cost 
recovery on basic municipal services is a policy of national and local governments in 
South Africa. This has not always been the case, however. It is only since the end of 
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Apartheid in the mid-1990s that full (or fuller) cost recovery has been an explicit and 
widespread policy objective in the country.”
242 It is of considerable import to recognize 
the timeline of these policies in reference to those who encouraged them: the NP fell 
from power, but the ANC has since promulgated, rather than abrogated, NP plans. That 
the ANC can implement NP policy is striking in its own right, but should also be realized 
as an important tool in understanding and challenging ANC policies.  
 
Specifically in reference to the availability of land for new settlement, the WP expresses 
the fear of its authors that “the lifting of direct influx control measures can lead to an 
excessive degree of in-migration to places where not enough and and/or facilities are 
immediately available.”
243 In recognition thereof, the WP should only occur at “approved 
accommodation/site[s].”
244 Given the pre-existing distribution of space and land in urban 
Natal, however, this restriction is damning, and investigation therein indicates the 
government’s core purpose in preserving the gains of Apartheid and colonization in 
South Africa. So much is recognized by the authors, who indicate this restriction “will be 
contradictory to the principle of freedom of movement which has been accepted,” yet the 
objection is overruled when they reason “this requirement amounts to a general civilized 
norm that people cannot be permitted to settle indiscriminately in any place in any 
city.”
245 Though the colonizers were capable, through force and fraud, to settle 
(in)discriminately
246 and dole out enormous parcels of land as best suited their productive 
aspirations, these gains go unnoticed. It is as per the “general civilized norm” that 
settlement will be restricted to locations which the government finds acceptable.
247 Low 
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and no-income persons would face an increased “potential for the poorest to be pushed 
out to the urban periphery…because the few remaining well-located portions of 
undeveloped land in the African group area are being allocated to private developers for 
formal up-market housing.”
248 That this core requirement of finding affordable space for 
development continues to present itself as a difficulty was reiterated by the Department 
of Local Government, Housing and Traditional Affairs at an open forum in Durban. He 
there stated “the availability of suitable land is the most important consideration” for 
resettlement of shack dwellers.
249 We must split hairs in order to argue that the current 
regime differs markedly from the previous in terms of its respect for white property as 
neither sought to disturb “what has been achieved.”
250 The government in 1986 verbally 
committed itself to addressing the housing and service backlogs, but “in such a manner 
that the rights of established persons and communities are not impaired.”
251 In the 
confines of finding “suitable land” in a “timely” manner, both regimes fail to address the 
crux of the issue: “the true nature of the South African problem, which is colonial 
conquest (translated later into racial capitalism, and now multi-racial elite-pacting and 
plunder.) Of course, white capital remains dominant.”
252 Indeed, that the state would 
continue protecting existing property allocations is observed in 1986 as a consequence of 
the WP. “The controls include measures to contain illegal squatting and the development 
of slums, and also allow the state to determine where and how development occurs 
through land-use planning and the allocation of land.”
253  
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That Mbeki is as anxious to disturb white property as the NP is evident given the 
definition of “occupation” as set forth in the Strydom Report on which so much of the 
White Paper is based. According to the former, “occupation” should be defined as 
continuous physical presence, but excluding presence for work, sporting events, 
temporary presences for the use of amenities, and any presence outside of a designated 
area for which a person is assigned.
254 The White Paper affirms that “occupation should 
be used as a deliberate measure to promote orderly urbanization, especially under 
conditions of rapid urbanization.”
255 The occupation restrictions mean, in other words, 
that the state will act to upend existing settlements of non-owners, i.e., disqualified 
persons. In defining occupation to exclude those poor people who move and settle in 
shacks, tents, or other informal structures, the occupation strategy is malignant to poor 
groups and especially those without title rights to land. Only for temporary visits (jobs, 
sports) can a non-landowner be on earth s/he does not own – in South Africa, given the 
spatial segregation and vast discrepancy of land holdings in relation to urban areas, the 
occupation strategy works well to protect those places where, through colonial and 
Apartheid history, non-whites do not own land. Locating the NP’s occupation strategy 
deployed in ANC documents, notably the RLA, demonstrates another continuity between 
Apartheid and post-Apartheid policy.
256 “Beneficial occupation” therein, which can result 
in a “right in land” exists only after “a continuous period of not less than 10 years prior to 
the dispassion in question.
257  Readers are informed that “persons cannot be permitted to 
settle indiscriminately,”
258 a caveat we can read both literally and critically with largely 
the same result. Linking the old spatial regime with its successors by “maintaining social 
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order and stability during this period of rapid change”
259 would require mechanisms of 
informal control to restrict indiscriminate settlement. These are enumerated in the 
government’s strategy of private development, cost-recovery and market-based schemes 
of change. The acquisition and selection
260 of settlement locations surely is one of the 
most effectual criterions, yet in addition the selection of private and market-based 
development is urged to accomplish the same. 
 
Next on the list of conservative dictums, we find a staple of ANC policy, especially since 
1996: cost-recovery. “Services and housing provided by the state should be supplied on a 
recoverable basis. Consequently, the standards thereof should, where possible, be 
brought into direct relationship with the needs and financial means of the inhabitants.”
261 
These recommendations for private capital to determine services and housing outlays 
surely compromise its prospects for the least well-off. This much was recognized by 
observers in 1986, among them one Mike Sutcliffe, now Durban’s City Manager. 
“Privatization means that only certain social classes, usually the wealthiest and/or those 
with access to housing subsidies, are catered for.”
262 
 
Yet “the Government is, so far as circumstances permit, in favour of a system whereby 
property rates…are based on the market value of the property concerned.”
263 It seems 
clear, given the Venter Commission’s findings, that the government realized the effects 
of these policies would be highly unsatisfactory for the population, and simultaneously 
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solicitous to the small land-owning minority in whose names the land mass was deeded. 
As the WP “confirms that the basis for imposition and collection of rental and service 
levies must be the same for all communities,”
264 the recommendations contained therein 
function more to prevent urbanization than to facilitate it. We should be aware that the 
WP was written to deny suitable and healthy accommodations for urbanizing Africans 
following the abolition of Group Areas and Influx Control. It is accepted that “the private 
sector” should be accommodated “to make it possible for this sector to participate 
increasingly in financing the acquisition of land and urban development for lower income 
groups.”
265 The consequence of this development, it was argued, causes new “problems 
people experience when trying to get access to land and housing” including housing 
“which is beyond the economic reach of large numbers of people” and “the scale of 
corruption over land deals has increased markedly.”
266  
 
Strydom & The White Paper in Practice 
 
In light of these warnings, let us turn to examine the housing policies enacted by the 
governing ANC since 1994. Commentators were quick to criticize the initial subsidies of 
R 16 000 as wholly inadequate, and to label the R2 479 “access fee” for the subsidy as 
exclusionary. The exemption for disabled beneficiaries is defined as “narrow” as well. 
Public awareness of subsides has not been adequate, leading to under-expenditure of 
housing budgets. In 2002/3, for instance, “under-spending came to 20% of the housing 
budget.”
267 In the Western Cape, where the backlog stretches into the hundreds of 
thousands, municipal “companies” were established “to deliver social housing operating 
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on cost recovery principles…tak[ing] the form of micro loans, and are based on certain 
criteria such as ‘having a clean credit record with the municipality, repay the loan in five 
years, and put down a 10% deposit.’”
268 Bond’s review of the “decade of democracy” 
finds similarly pathetic results, the “primary reason is that for most of the period since the 
ANC adopted a market-orientated housing policy in 1994, the grant level…was far too 
small to pay for more than a poorly-located site and an inadequate structure.”
269 Abahlali 
baseMjondolo vice president Philani Dlamini describes the conditions of some of the 
structures, which we should more realistically title “sheds” or “doghouses.” Regarding 
the Joe Slovo settlement in Durban and the private developer contracted to build them, he 
found numerous inadequacies in both the siting of the dwellings and their construction: 
 
We elabourated on quality of the houses: [they were] not fully material: the 
plastic that is normally laid under tiles isn’t there, so where did that money go to? 
We also had complaints, that houses were built on the sewer system, next to the 
highway where the houses make big noise and someday when the incident takes 
place the car will fall on their houses, and the situation whereby some people their 
informal settlement was demolished because they were going to be upgraded, but 
[the house was built] not for that person, for someone else, so this person has to 
find his own way, where is he going to go to?
270 
 
Adhering to private development and cost recovery, “developer-driven, bank-centered 
housing policy”
271 is largely what the NP advocated to retain an orderly and stable 
migration. In practice, it is obvious that these schemes do not make a “better life for all.” 
Orlean Naidoo, writing on the private “upgrading” of flats in Westcliffe, observes “They 
came to upgrade our flats two years ago, but we found that only the rich have benefited. 
The contractor and the consulter have taken most of the monies. The conditions of the 
flats have worsened.”
272 
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Proceeding in their recommendations for what they called “orderly” urbanization, the 
National Party ranked itself last in “responsibility” for the “provision of housing with 
respect to less affluent persons,”
273 following the individual, employer, and private 
sector, even then doubly-qualifying its actions “within the financial ability of the state”
274 
in “absolutely exceptional cases.”
275 Admittedly the focus of the “orderly” urbanization is 
retaining and entrenching existing spatial patterns, i.e, those created well before 1913 
whereby the majority of the landmass became white. Preserving those spatial and 
ownership patterns with restrictions on new housing and settlement further limits the 
ability of formerly disqualified persons to relocate to cities in a healthy or safe fashion, as 
housing and land decisions and acquisitions are left to the private sector. Even an 
“information and education programme”
276 described would function to dissuade 
potential migrants “at their places of origin”
277 by alerting them “about accommodation 
and employment possibilities.”
278 Influx Control having failed, and Group Areas having 
succeeded, these policies mark deliberate efforts to “slow down the migration of people 
to cities and towns”
279 by devolving the influx control power to private developers and 
land owners via occupation definitions, and land and housing acquisition and provision 
schemes that perform only for the well-off. Privatization “has directly contribution to 
various types of urban forced removals. ‘Squatters’ are being forced to move to make 
way for new housing schemes which, in some cases, are for the Black middle-class.”
280 
Those lacking the financial ability to pay market rates and house themselves 
discriminately will be removed as per anti-squatting and slum legislation. Government 
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actors were likely aware of earlier findings that the urbanization of Blacks likely to 
follow an end to Influx Control (or even without the repeal, though natural increase and 
the growth of “grey areas” and “Black spots”) “is such that neither the economy nor 
economic development in years to come nor the infrastructure that exists in the urban 
context or could be provided would be able to accommodate this influx.”
281 Venter 
Commissioners recognized that Influx Control measures were no longer functional and 
Group Areas were complete. “The resettlement programme is largely complete.”
282  In 
this regard they advocated a range of policies designed to prevent the permanent settling 
of formerly-disqualified persons in white areas; namely, combinations of cost-recovery, 
occupation, and settlement policies were geared toward maintaining the spatial exclusion 
of the unqualified. In addition, the White Paper recommended a revision of the existing 
influx control scheme and a repeal of the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act
283, 
substituting for it a new non-racial legislation on squatting.  
 
Evictions, Demolitions 
 
For continuity’s sake, it is worthwhile to here consider the revision to the squatting act
284 
the WP and Strydom Report consider. Primary recommendations are the racial neutrality 
of any new squatting bills: “It is necessary for the Act to be revised, adapted and made 
racially neutral and of general application.”
285 The task to designate slums and call for 
their clearance will fall to local authorities, and the “duty to prevent and control illegal 
squatting will vest in the local authority concerned.”
286 Making the law racially neutral is 
both an attempt by the government to shed some of its Apartheid vernacular, but also a 
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strategy to cope with the expected influx of migrants from the homelands and townships 
toward the economically viable nodes of South Africa. These are, namely, cities, and 
cities primarily owned and occupied by whites. It is fitting to fast-forward to 1998, when 
the government finished the task laid out by the White Paper. The Prevention of Illegal 
Eviction from and Unlawful Occupation of Land Act, 1998
287 came into force by 
repealing the 1951 Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act
288 and enacting the racially-neutral 
removal provisions that the NP determined were necessary for the maintenance of 
settlement only to “approved sites”
289 as selected by local authorities
290 and to “prevent 
and control conditions of large scale settlement in unsuitable places.”
291  
The 1998 legislation (hereinafter “PIEUOLA”) ends the charade and names the dwellings 
the NP has been focusing on for the duration of the discussion: “any hut, shack, tent, or 
similar structure or any other form of temporary or permanent dwelling or shelter.”
292  
The suspense is only for those who live in gated communities and do not know about the 
shacks and the regular threats of eviction they face. The NP and ANC are writing about 
shacks on hillsides and in backyards. PIEOULA enacts what the NP never did (could?) 
by extending enforcement to “all land throughout the Republic”
293 in a racially-neutral 
manner. Notwithstanding new provisions that require a court order and hearing before 
any evictions may occur, the new PIEOULA allows for evictions more easily than 
previously. “Urgent proceedings” that largely moot the court and due process provisions, 
may be triggered if “there is real and imminent danger of substantial injury or damage to 
any person or property.”
294 And, as during Apartheid and before it, evictions may be 
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carried out without allocating space or shelter elsewhere for the evicted. Courts are 
charged to “consider” “whether land has been made available or can reasonably be made 
available,”
295 but this consideration is a matter of interpretation. 
 
 The “consideration” requirement applies only to those occupying land for greater than 
six months; new migrants can be tossed with great celerity. Demolitions of shacks are 
sanctioned
296 and when the eviction is urged by the State at one of its levels, the 
“consideration” condition is applied in a similarly insignificant manner: “the court must 
have regard to…the availability to the unlawful occupier of suitable alternative 
accommodation or land.”
297 It is also interesting to compare this with GAA’s requirement 
on the same issue: “The only require[ment] under the Group Areas Act is that the [Land 
Tenure Advisory] Board take into consideration whether or not suitable accommodation 
will be available for persons displaced from Group Areas for Occupation or Ownership, 
and, as we have seen, no obligation is laid on the Board to act on any such consideration, 
or to ensure that accommodation is in fact available.”
298 So as to end any speculation 
about whether PIEOLA was a fundamental link between and land and housing, in 2005 
when PIEOLA was amended, the matter was charged to the Minister of Housing, now 
included provisions for the eviction of “buildings or structures on land” and not just 
land.
299 The included memorandum indicates that “high-rise buildings have been and 
continue to be occupied unlawfully,”
300 likely a reference to occupations of 
Johannesburg’s vacant apartment buildings by the LPM.
301  
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One business-friendly observer writes, “In fact, it appears that these laws have 
contributed to pre-emptive evictions by landowners.”
302 Mike Sutcliffe warned in 1990 
that the implementation of the WP would result in private developers “becoming a force 
for removals.”
303 When the WP was promulgated, observers correctly “suggested that the 
state was simply replacing an influx control system based on pass laws with new forms of 
influx control based on the Prevention of Illegal Squatting Act, and limits on access to 
land and housing.”
304 The current city manager’s view then only “constrast[ed] to some 
degree” with this interpretation, arguing instead that the state “is more concerned with 
managing how and where Africans live within cities.”
305 Aside from these semantic 
differences, what is definitive is the state’s interest in deciding how and where, and by 
what means, Africans migrate into South Africa. The mechanisms selected, of an 
“informal” nature, have worked spectacularly to preserve colonial and Apartheid land 
thefts and exclusions.  
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Chapter Four – Gramsci & Transition, Reforming Apartheid 
 
Capital in South Africa faced a severe crisis in the 1980s. The ANC’s ungovernability 
tactic in the country caused several states of emergency and required enormous public 
expenses to police the population. While “the role of de facto local government in both 
urban and rural areas was to police the system of Apartheid, making sure that segregation 
remained intact,”
306 the repressive apparatuses were strained to their breaking point as a 
war of constant riots, boycotts and demonstrations rocked the country. Consent was 
nearly absent in the majority for the duration of the National Party’s (NP) regime and its 
Apartheid policies; resistance had peaked such that the country’s status quo could no 
longer persist. The ability of co-opted indigenous leaders to placate the majority had 
vanished, and the NP’s surrogates in homelands were attacked as symbols of and 
operators for Apartheid. Adding to this chaos was the impact of the international 
divestment movement and the decision of global capital to stop rolling-over loans to the 
regime. Chase Manhattan was the first bank to close credit lines in 1985, leading to 
currency crashes and the brief closure of the Johannesburg stock exchange. Coercion in 
its most brute forms was everywhere as South Africans rejected their government en 
masse. At this point “direct coercion, [was] proportionately greater in South Africa than 
in the Western ‘democracies’,” so that the “crisis” situation expounded by Gramsci 
(“naked coercion”), is virtually the “normal” situation.”
307 
 
In the same year Chase Manhattan turned down Apartheid, business leaders defied 
President Botha in 1985 and visited the ANC in exile in Zambia, insisting in the words of 
Zac De Beer “We do not allow the baby of free enterprise to be thrown out with the 
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bathwater of Apartheid.”
308 The ANC emerged after decades of banning and disrepute 
into a possible manager of the crisis. It could do what the Apartheid regime could not: 
return South Africa to profitability and stability. Desai and Pithouse consider the ANC’s 
eventual role as crisis managers in the capitalist system, continuing to the NP’s role in its 
own way by 
 
Seek[ing] to win consent for its armed extraction of wealth from the poor by the 
twin ideological strategies of the particular discourses of nationalism, with their 
demand for obedience to the leaders and the party, and the universal discourses of 
neo-liberalism with their demand for obedience to the market.
309 
 
But this was not self-evident in the moment to the masses, as the ANC’s historical 
legitimacy was sky-high. “The self-styled role of the ANC as the only truly non-racial, 
cross-class mass party able to build a unified citizenship out of the oppression and the 
antagonisms of the past, was the hallmark of legitimacy for the new state.”
310 It was also 
the credential that made it so appealing to international investors who had largely 
withdrawn from South Africa in the mid to late 1980s. We can thus consider the 
unbanning of the ANC and the subsequent negotiations and eventual transition to power 
as a necessary market adjustment – NP managers could no longer extract surplus value 
due to ungovernability and divestment, and only through a “democratic” process could a 
new hegemonic bloc form to win consent from the governed (and return investments). As 
the state’s purpose is “adapting the ‘civilization’ and the morality of the broadest popular 
masses to the necessities of the continuous development of the economic apparatus of 
production,”
311 the rulers would change but the state’s apparatus and purpose would 
remain. Therefore, let us now turn to the period when “it was evident to both dominant 
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business circles and sufficient numbers within the ruling political elite that a situation of 
relative stalemate had been reached and steps would have to be taken to incorporate the 
ANC into the circle of legitimate political players.”
312 This is the story of how the 
business of South Africa changed hands – white to Black – based on the consent of the 
majority to majority rule.  
 
Negotiations from Apartheid to majority rule began at Kempton Park, outside 
Johannesburg, in December 2001. The deliberations between ANC-SACP –COSATU 
and NP were framed largely within the dominant market model that the Apartheid regime 
had grown. South Africa’s managers were “finally prepared to concede to majority rule if 
there was only limited economic redistribution and if the political framework allowed for 
renewed accumulation.”
313 Debates on the property clause of the new constitution, were 
of singular concern to the millions of landless Africans and Indians whose homes, farms 
and shacks had been seized and or razed during Apartheid. They quite simply demanded 
that any justice would require restitution or return, but conceding to their concerns would 
have seriously jeopardized agribusiness and its associated industries. The demands of 
production would not allow it. Yet as the NP could no longer generate “the ‘spontaneous’ 
consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on 
social life by the dominant fundamental group,”
314 changes in political government were 
required to restore domestic confidence (consent) to the economic arrangements. These 
changes included one-person-one-vote elections,  
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Protesting the Clause 
 
The National Land Committee, a grassroots coalition of 7 NGOs of the landless, “argued 
that the protection of [stolen] property in the Bill of Rights would actually ensure that 
historic land theft would be legitimized by the new Constitution”
315 during the 
negotiations. But it was clear to observers that all negotiators understood that private 
property would be protected; the plunder would never be returned. “The reality was that 
the basis of the ‘transference’ of political power from the racist minority regime to a 
Black majority was based on the agreement that land would not be taken from the settler 
colonists and the Property Clause guaranteed this understanding.”
316  Here emerged one 
of the persistent claims of the ANC since it assumed control – “There is no alternative.” 
Considering how much was guaranteed to the NP and its criminal past at Kempton Park, 
it is difficult to argue against the statement 
 
There can be little doubt that, in the end, the relative ease of the political 
transition was principally guaranteed by the ANC’s withdrawal from any from of 
genuine class struggle in the socio-economic realm and the abandonment of any 
economic strategy that might have (sic) directly to service the immediate material 
requirements of the vast mass of desperately impoverished South Africans.
317 
 
Yet ANC rulers have increasingly relied on the opposite claim since 1994 to offset their 
persistent failures to deliver on any of their claims made before and during their banning, 
and after their unbanning and assumption of state control. The ANC’s ability to continue 
identifying itself as a “liberation movement” which since 1994 has been “in the position 
of responsibility for leading the process of reconstruction and development aimed at 
eradicating the problems of poverty and inequality created by Apartheid and creating a 
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just and equitable economic and social order”
318 is striking in both its audacity and its 
reception! 
 
We find that the ANC has largely taken the reins of the Apartheid state and admittedly 
deracialized much of the government and political culture. They have taken few steps, 
however, toward changing the economy of Apartheid. In fact, they have moved more 
quickly and successfully to mold post-Apartheid South Africa and South Africans toward 
the contemporary demands of production that could not be achieved during Apartheid. 
During the NP’s rule, “coercion [was] the basis of local governance,”
319 whereas in the 
post-Apartheid period, the ANC’s “discourses seek to legitimate economic arrangements 
that entrench racialised inequality that is a direct consequence of historical racist 
domination.”
320 The slogan “No Peace Under Apartheid” epitomized the ANC’s war 
against the NP, a war against the far stronger, wealthier, and entrenched minority. Within 
the occupied townships, a war of attrition was the best strategy to force the NP to 
negotiations – making the regime’s policies unworkable, the state ungovernable. In those 
struggles, the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) was one of the most 
important actors. 
 
Founded after a three-day stay-away in 1984, COSATU was the first explicitly political 
trade union, and it entered the political scene with a political strike. Some of its 
constituent unions had taken part in strikes against Apartheid since the 70s, and the rise 
of militancy in the Black population in the 80s only saw these numbers grow. As 
COSATU never took the position of earlier trade unions (unaffiliated politically, and 
striking only for workplace conditions), “this political line has placed COSATU in a 
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much stronger position to play a key role in initiating campaigns, in directly influencing 
decision making in resistance politics, and in taking forward the task of building work 
class leadership in struggle and hegemony within an alliance of resistance 
organizations.”
321 Such was the “confidence and militancy”
322 of COSATU in its ability 
to make the workplace ungovernable that when its first president, Elijah Barayi, 
demanded an end to the pass laws lest his organization “burn the passes of the Black 
man,”
323 Botha and Parliament took notice and rescinded the pass laws within the year.  
 
The exact relationship between the ANC and COSATU was not explicitly clear until 
1989 when the latter adopted the Freedom Charter, though COSATU leadership had met 
with the ANC in exile in Lukasa, Zambia in 1986. Whether the groups would be formally 
aligned or just allies was resolved soon before the ANC was unbanned and Mandela 
released. This is the essence of the counter-hegemonic bloc that had the ability to 
dismantle the crumbling Apartheid hegemonic order. 
 
Yet as soon as the possibility of genuine social and economic change was palpable, trade 
union leaders “came under increasing pressure to accept the Congress tradition, and with 
it the leading role of the ANC”
324 as 1990 approached. In February of that year when the 
SACP and ANC were unbanned, both were markedly out of touch with the population 
given their banning since the 50s and the imprisonment of most of their leadership since 
around the same time. It was the unions, COSATU in the lead, that had millions of 
members, tens of thousands of shop stewards, and a militant and organized recent 
tradition. “The unions were faced with a dilemma, as a number of their officials became 
increasingly active within the emerging political parties, using union time and resources 
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to build the movements they supported.”
325 COSATU’s resources were invaluable to the 
ANC and SACP, and this was recognized by leadership. In May 1990, just three months 
after their unbanning, the SACP and ANC formally aligned with COSATU, forming the 
Tri-Partite Alliance that persists today. Cyril Ramaphosa, general secretary of the 
National Union of Mineworkers, would become one of Mandela’s closest aids and serve 
as a lead negotiator at Kempton Park where “the hand of the unions in their negotiations 
with the government both as part of the Alliance and on issues that are particularly 
relevant to union members, such as economic and industrial relations policy”
326 was 
strongly represented. For a time civil society, in COSATU, was acting as a representative 
of the people. COSATU imagined its 13,000 stewards would represent the working-class 
on the floor of the parliament. Strikes were organized during the negotiations and 
transition period by COSATU at strategic intervals – the ANC could use COSATU to 
disrupt the workplace when it was tactically prudent. Here and elsewhere, COSATU was 
“a fit and fearsome champion – world champion perhaps – of class and national 
liberation.”
327 Indeed, the Redistribution and Development Plan, the 1994 general 
platform of the Tri-Partite Alliance in the country’s first elections, was written primarily 
by the unions and espoused a Keynesian approach to land reform, housing upgrades, 
expanded service delivery and a deracialized government.  
 
Conflict-Free Workplaces 
 
Demobilizing COSATU was thus one of the ANC’s biggest challenges since 1994 if it 
was to return SA to profitability and mold the population back into the status of extreme 
exploitation that made white poverty all but disappear during Apartheid. The ability of 
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COSATU to rapidly and effectively disrupt capital in the country could no longer be 
tolerated once the ANC was in power. As the ANC had, in essence, taken control of the 
management of South Africa from the NP because it was seen as a legitimate governor, 
the militancy of COSATU became an Achilles’ heel to the government. Corporatism 
would be necessary to muzzle the militants because “acts of popular illegality, 
insurrectionary acts, are deemed to be out of order in the new democratic order.”
328 
Central to the ANC’s imperative to generate consent was their need to police COSATU. 
The institutionalization of COSATU would follow - its hobbling essentially -  
“coincide[ing] with a gradual decline in the unions’ ability contest the decisive, and under 
many aspects detrimental, changes in economic policies that have taken place under the 
ANC government.”
329 One of the first punches to COSATU was the unveiling of “non-
negotiable” GEAR in 1996, a macroeconomic policy that “came to symbolize the loss of 
union power in shaping strategic choices and orientations of the new democracy.”
330 The 
RDP was scrapped without ceremony and the ANC wedded World Bank/IMF SAPs, the 
results of which would be disastrous for the majority and lucrative for a minority.  
 
South Africa’s governors moved the labour relations system toward a corporatist 
paradigm out of their desire for a “conflict-free” workplace. While labour groups were 
once of paramount import in the country, their relations with the state were 
fundamentally altered when they ceased to be an opposition group. In the 1994 election, 
COSATU and the ANC were almost indistinguishable, and many stewards gained seats 
in Parliament. The Labour Relations Act (1995), Basic Conditions of Employment Act 
(1997), and Employment Equity Act (1998), were all the results of COSATU strength in 
government. Differences between the ANC and COSATU, however, were already 
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appearing: labour fought the LRA because it did not compel employers to bargain, but 
rather created workplace forums
331 and bargaining councils to mediate employment 
conflicts (with the aim of neutralizing them). The three pieces of legislation, crucially, 
also complicate labour relations with their definitions of regular and contract labour, 
essentially drawing arbitrary lines of distinction between who can and cannot be 
recognized and organized by labour groups, and Bargaining Councils and Wage Forums. 
Gramsci’s conception of legal systems in bourgeois democracies is again relevant:  “[I]f 
every state tends to create and maintain a certain type of civilization and of citizen (And 
hence of collective life and of individual relations), and to eliminate certain customs and 
attitudes and to disseminate others, then the Law will be its instrument for this 
purpose.”
332 Varying interpretations of “labour” and “contractor” give these legislation 
the teeth to gnaw away at organized shops and union employees, in the words of two 
observers “seriously undermining the objective of fostering a comprehensive collective 
bargaining system.”
333 This significant reduction of labour power – whether it be under 
the COSATU banner or another – is an important step for the South African government 
to take, for it generally liberates capital from the effects of unionization. The state has 
seen an explosion of informal labour, the effects of which are exploitative and 
detrimental to wages and benefits. “Apart from a persistently high rate of unemployment, 
the past ten years have seen a steady increase in the use of ‘flexible’, ‘atypical,’ and 
casual labour, and the expansion of a relatively unstable, unprotected and unionized 
workforce.”
334 Hoping to explain why South Africans would consent to the 
demobilization of their powerful labour organization and the pre-emptive 
disempowerment of future labour organizations, we might consider Saul’s response to the 
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1999 election, the first after GEAR was implemented and labour power effectively 
destroyed: “it was difficult to miss the significance of the election as being a mere 
popularity contest, the ANC still floating to a considerable degree on its legitimacy 
amongst Africans as a successful liberation movement rather than on any delivery on 
popular expectations during its first tem in office.”
335  
 
The demobilizing effects of the LRA were intentional; the institutional framework 
arranged by the post-Apartheid government “binds labour to a set of processes that 
prevent industrial action and bind workers to the vision of enhancing productivity in the 
interests of growth as defined by GEAR.”
336 Outright hostility to labour action has been 
seen as well, with the ANC’s “demobilization of unions and hostility to national strikes 
undertaken for political purposes,”
337 especially to those attacking GEAR and 
privatization. Thus the organization whose origins were political and whose energy and 
persistence had in fact brought the government to power were pushed away from their 
beginnings and their accomplishments, pushed toward a corporatist and single issue 
(wages) organization. Logan and Molotch explain the resignation of COSATU in 
reference to dominant growth priorities: “The co-optation of labour leadership is again 
evident in its role in national urban policy. Labour essentially is a dependable support of 
growth – anytime, anywhere. Although its traditional constituency is centered in the 
declining areas of the country, the unions’ national hierarchy supports policies little more 
specific than those that provide “‘aid to the cities.’”
338 Though Logan’s and Molotch’s 
analysis is primarily of Western cities, we should recall that South Africa has since the 
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1600s been run by British, Dutch, and American capitalists. Regarding those very 
linkages, former National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA) and current minister of 
trade and industry Alec Irwin described his current role, 
 
Our target is to persuade international investors to invest here….but if you lose a 
whole factory like VW, it is a major problem. You don’t know how much damage 
that [the strike] did…we had to send cabinet ministers to Germany on the VW 
dispute to convince them. At the beginning of this year, the president met top VW 
people. Their concern – ‘your best union can’t hold its factories.’
339 
 
It is likewise telling of the situation in “post” Apartheid South Africa that the strike to 
which he refers was against NUMSA as much as it was against VW. Factory workers 
outside Durban learned of their new contract from the newspaper; their COSATU-
affiliated union NUMSA had negotiated it without their participation or vote. President 
Thabo Mbeki described its participants as “selfish and anti-social” and warned that they 
held “hostage” the ANC “in the eyes of the investor community,”
340 despite the fact that 
the contract “eroded many shopfloor gains” won in the 1980s.
341 
 
The ANC’s continued ability to act as a self-defined representative of the people has 
allowed “the party to maintain the progressive nature of its endeavors and enlist 
organized labour’s support for neoliberal policies.”
342 Now that COSATU needs the ANC 
more than the ANC needs COSATU, the process is largely complete, and COSATU 
functions as a legitimator for the ANC, a dominant member of civil society firmly 
committed to the polices of the ANC in which macroeconomics are expressed “in terms 
of objective ‘constraints,’ [and] ‘limits’ to redistribution and social spending.”
343 The 
ANC has secured – in the most literal sense – Apartheid’s dividends with its ineffectual 
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redistribution policies and anti-egalitarian privatization strategies. It is as if everyone in 
the townships are poor and living in slums because they rationally selected to do so. “And 
without history poverty is naturalized as is, by implication, wealth.”
344 These discourses 
are what Gramsci warned against, namely, the actions of elites in their “entire complex of 
practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and 
maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent over those whom it 
rules.”
345 
 
Generating consent for policies loyal to capital has not been automatic for the ANC. It 
has been necessary to demobilize labour strength, create organs in civil society to 
disseminate its hegemony ideology, and consistently self-legitimate through a nationalist 
and emancipatory discourse. In pursuing capital’s project for South Africa, the ANC has 
succeeded where the NP could not because of its authority over the masses. As Gramsci 
warned, “This consent is ‘historically’ caused by the prestige (and consequent 
confidence) which the dominant group enjoys because of its position and function in the 
world of production.”
346 The strong consent generated by the ANC in power has allowed 
it to retain Apartheid policies of severe inequality and preserve land ownership patterns. 
It must still coerce some elements of society (through forced removals, police harassment 
and other repressive policies), but on the whole it does not nearly confront the rebellion 
the NP did although its policies have resulted in declines in most social indicators.  This 
is not to say that life is worse, for such a claim cannot be substantiated with data on social 
indicators alone. Yet the declines do suggest that the situation of Black and Indian South 
Africans post-Apartheid are complicated when compared to their situations during 
Apartheid. It is nonetheless obvious that the role of the ANC in maintaining and 
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justifying the social relations endemic to the Apartheid system, the productive 
requirements of the South African economy, is strong. 
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Chapter Five – Shutting Down Labour 
 
Recent labour relations in Durban are similarly illuminating for our purposes. In the 
struggles of labour in the city and KwaZulu-Natal, observers quickly locate labour 
organizations that were – once – the spear of the movement, now relegated to vote banks 
and industrial placidity. In Durban, the government’s macro-economic policy, combined 
with the largest labour federation’s increasingly conservative and corporatist leanings, 
have left gaps of representation for large numbers of unemployed and working poor 
people. I argue that COSATU’s  self-interested alliance with the ANC has prevented 
(prevents) it from resisting the anti-worker and anti-poor policies of the government. 
Moreover,  COSATU’s shift from social movement unionism to business unionism 
ignores the new social struggles that are reshaping lives COSATU once touched.  
 
Spatially, Durban was designed, maintained and functioned as the epitome of Apartheid – 
separate living spaces, educational opportunities, workplaces, and lives with a keen 
emphasis on maintaining labour controls. As we have seen, Durban’s refineries and 
manufacturing centers were specifically located to ensure the separation of non-whites 
and to perpetuate their landlessness. Historically dominated by multi-nationals like the 
mining conglomerate Anglo-American (which at one time controlled 
3/7 of the wealth on 
the Johannesburg exchange
347). Durban was built on what von Holdt calls the Apartheid 
Workplace Regime
348: rigid controls on mobility and employment for Africans and (to a 
less extreme extent) Indians. All pay grades, positions, homes, property, and governing 
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were tracked by race; most unions functioned to exclude Africans and Indians from all 
but the most dangerous and poorly-paid positions. This internal colonial system was 
lucrative precisely because of the extensive controls on the underskilled, undertrained 
majority – preserving the exploitation of Africans and Indians was crucial to the wealth 
created in and extracted from South Africa from the port of Durban.  
 
Non-racial trade unions were therefore a huge impediment to the Apartheid system – the 
solidarity of workers in a 1984 stay-away demonstrated to the shareholders of South 
Africa that political demands would now be voiced in the workplace. The Congress of 
South African Trade Unions (COSATU) formed out of actions like that one, and in 1985 
it claimed 500,000 members among 33 unions. Today 21 unions combine to represent 1.8 
million workers.
349 Some speculate COSATU’s first purpose was to bring the anti-
Apartheid struggle into the workplace so that no part of South Africa was immune to the 
ungovernability tactic. Others were more inclined to preserve a business unionism 
function, particularly after the ANC-COSATU-SACP  (South African Communist Party) 
slate triumphed in 1994. Throughout Apartheid, the former won the contest, and 
COSATU officially endorsed the then-banned African National Congress (ANC)’s 
Freedom Charter in 1990. In the crucial period following the unbanning of the ANC and 
release of Mandela and other leaders, it was COSATU’s mobilizing capacity, organizing 
drives and councils that allowed the ANC to hit the ground running. COSATU was “a fit 
and fearsome champion – world champion perhaps – of class and national liberation 
struggle.”
350 
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The Republic of South Africa’s elections in 1994 were lauded globally, and the ANC-
COSATU-SACP Tripartite Alliance was swept into power. The Alliance ran on the 
Redistribution and Development Plan (RDP) that had received enormous influence from 
COSATU. The macro-economic plan for the new Republic called for a fulfillment of 
basic needs through people-driven Keynesian economics and for a redistribution of land 
seized and appropriated during the Apartheid years. South Africa’s Constitution (1996) 
guaranteed rights to water, housing, non-discrimination, and environmental security; 
some call(ed) it the most progressive constitution in the world.  
 
South African cities have the particular characteristic of a high degree of collabouration 
between government and business. The Apartheid system was largely based around 
industry, with socially controlling policies serving its needs. After a serious of municipal 
corporations ran the Durban city throughout Apartheid, in 1996 Metro Durban was 
created out of 60 separate government units. Structured into a series of Councils, the 
Metropolitan Council administers the area and is oriented by the national government 
toward development as a priority.
351 “Economic strategy…formed part of the wider 
process of defining and legitimating the new shape of local government in Durban.”
352 
Business-friendly policies are a section of the Growth Machine as considered by Logan 
and Molotch, with labour relations playing a crucial role. “In the good business climate 
the work force should be sufficiently quiescent”
353 and local government “is primarily 
concerned with increasing growth”
354 rather than redressing the consequences of 400 
years of colonial domination, of both foreign and domestic varieties.  
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The ANC summarily scrapped the RDP in 1996 when it unveiled its “non-negotiable” 
new economic strategy: Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR) demanded a 
shrinking public sphere, the end of social spending, a liberalization of exchange controls, 
the opening of restrictions on foreign investment, and the privatization of state industries. 
This last component stood in polar opposition to Mandela’s pledge, while in prison and at 
his release, to nationalize South Africa’s enormously wealthy sub-surface mineral and 
related industries. GEAR was, in short, an IMF-requested structural adjustment program 
(SAP) the results of which are almost identical to similar SAPs in similarly-situated post-
colonial states where neo-liberalism has accelerated the flow of capital in the same 
direction it has traveled since the 1400s.  
 
As part of these restructurings, we find the Labour Relations Act (1995), Basic 
Conditions of Employment Act (1997), and Employment Equity Act (1998), were all the 
results of COSATU strength in government. Vagaries in the definitions of “labour” and 
“contractor” empower these legislation to disempower organized shops and union 
employees. The demobilizing effects of the LRA were intentional; the institutional 
framework arranged by the post-Apartheid government “binds labour to a set of 
processes that prevent industrial action and bind workers to the vision of enhancing 
productivity in the interests of growth as defined by GEAR.”
355 Outright hostility to 
labour action has been seen as well, with the ANC’s “demobilization of unions and 
hostility to national strikes undertaken for political purposes,”
356 especially to those 
attacking GEAR and privatization. Thus the organization whose origins were political 
and whose energy and persistence had in fact brought the government to power were 
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pushed away from their beginnings and their accomplishments, pushed toward a 
corporatist and single issue (wages) organization.  
 
Throughout South Africa, there are a plethora of new community organizations arranged 
around issues of unemployment (nationally at least 40% and in some places reaching 
80%), access to basic services guaranteed in the Constitution (water, housing, and 
electricity are notoriously unavailable – as many as 10 million South Africans have lost 
water connections due to privatization of services, the same amount suffered electricity 
cut-offs; at least two million have been evicted from slums; and public housing has been 
built at a negligible pace, and even then at a prohibitive cost
357) and better jobs. The 
relations of these “crisis committees” and “citizen’s forums” to labour has not been 
productive. For one, many of these organizations are staffed and run by disaffected 
COSATU stewards and members. For them, COSATU’s alliance with the ANC speaks to 
their commitment to the ANC, not the rank-and-file. These South Africans see COSATU 
as the ANC-aligned corporatist neo-liberal technocrats, blind to the reality of 
“democratic” life in South Africa. As the country has hemorrhaged jobs (net job losses by 
year  registered between 1 and 4% in the late 1990s, with a total of perhaps 4 million 
fewer jobs in South Africa today than during Apartheid
358) COSATU’s membership has 
shrunk and its image has drastically changed into just another arm of the ANC (useful 
during elections cycles for turnout, and always a good buffer between the government 
and the rank-and-file).  
 
At the World Summit on Sustainable Development, civil society groups withdrew when 
COSATU “attempted to exclude”
359 the Johannesburg-based Anti-Privatization Forum 
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for its criticisms of the ANC-government. Likewise, the Chatsworth- (a township of 
Durban) based Concerned Citizens Forum “has not had any interactions with 
COSATU”
360 precisely because those in Chatsworth are unemployed, and the corporatist-
leanings of COSATU preclude its participation in movements that are not workplace-
based. COSATU’s hands are tied in its allegiance with the ANC, and some speculate that 
it does not disaffiliate because it feels even more impotence outside of government. Its 
density is tortured by privatization and outsourcing of industries where it once had great 
strength (particularly textiles and the public sector). It remains unclear whether “the 
diversity of these social struggles, whether they can be defined as social movements, and 
their implications for the consolidation of democracy….will establish links with the 
labour movement in general, and the unions emerging among informal workers in 
particular.”
361 
 
VW, Engen, Textiles 
 
In the context of these complications, we can examine the relation of labour and Durban 
residents with cases of informal labour in the merchant and textile industry, and large-
scale industrial action at a Volkswagen plant and Engen refinery (a subsidiary of Exxon-
Mobil). All of these struggles are influenced by GEAR and the increasingly corporatist 
orientation and ANC-alignment of COSATU.  
 
The textile industry in KwaZulu-Natal illustrates the complexities facing labour 
organizations in Durban today, as macro-economic policies and Tripartite Alliance 
politics combined to both abate the total number of jobs, and make those still existing 
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jobs difficult to organize or secure. Previously large employers are increasingly turning to 
subcontracting to avoid labour legislation. “Employers seem to be able to bypass the 
legislation and collective bargaining agreements with relative ease.”
362 In 1990 the 
approximately 450 firms employed almost 50,000 in Greater Durban, and retailers were 
sourcing 93 percent of their goods domestically.
363 As part of GEAR, South Africa 
reduced its tariffs on textiles and began competing more directly with foreign 
competitors, with a consequence being “a massive downward pressure on price.”
364 The 
Southern African Clothing and Textile Workers Union (SACTWU – a COSATU 
affiliate) estimates that there have been 22, 756 jobs lost between 1999 and 2001, the 
majority of them in the Durban Central Branch.
365 Chiefly due to drastic tariff reductions 
in a short period, the formal textile industry has collapsed. Many firms have moved to 
areas with even lower standards of living, such as Malawi and Lesotho. Home-based 
industry and informal contracting is, however, on a dramatic rise. Smaller manufacturing 
units where informal work arrangements reign are sprouting around the city center, with 
rare participation in Bargaining Councils. The Natal Clothing Manufacturing Association 
(the employer’s representative in the Bargaining Council - NCMA) reports 450 members 
in 1990, and only 65 in 2001. NCMA officials estimate more than 300 employers in the 
region contract more than 20,000 employees outside of collective bargaining agreements 
or participation in the Bargaining Councils. For these new informal workers, their 
numbers on the rise, there is no role for COSATU as the dimensions of the relationship 
between employer and employee have contracted. Re-structuring employment relations 
“into a system of independent contractors” makes the LRA’s provisions irrelevant, a 
strategy now so common that the Confederation of Employers South Africa (COFESA) is 
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now registered with the Department of Labour to change “employees to contractors and 
to outsource production to them.”
366 The contraction of SACTWU’s membership cannot 
be blamed on COSATU, but we must ask if they are acting appropriately to combat what 
even they call a “job-loss bloodbath.”
367 
 
The in-formalizing of Durban’s textile industry has drastically lowered the number of 
CB-covered employees. SACTWU’s “dramatic decrease in membership numbers” has 
also not been offset by new organizing; the Union “concedes that they have been largely 
unsuccessful in organizing unregistered factories.”
368 It is troubling, then, that the macro-
economic program of South Africa that is in force in COSATU’s government is 
referenced in COFESA’s internal documentation. “Promoting the national government’s 
macro-economic strategy,”
369 COFESA is working within the system of labour relations 
that the ANC-COSATU-SACP government created and runs today. Here we again 
confront an obstacle to labour’s strength in Durban: the macro-economic strategy its 
partners in government authored and promulgate. The proliferation of tiny textile “firms” 
in Durban that operate with little or no concern for worker’s rights is a result of GEAR’s 
emphasis on rapid tariff reduction, easing of exchange controls, and the corporatist and 
de-mobilizing labour relations system that accompanied it. That the “process of 
casualisation and externalization is certainly part”
370 of the obsolescence of Bargaining 
Councils is likely not a matter of chance: it is argued that these COSATU-aligned 
policies were intended to shrink and disperse workplace disputes, all in the name of 
creating a “conflict-free” and “business-friendly” South Africa. 
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SEWU 
 
Between these confines, the Self-employed Women’s Union (SEWU) has organized 
informally-employed women, especially in Durban. Data indicate that there are at least 
two million consistently employed “informal” workers (self-employed street venders, 
dependent producers of homemade goods, and wage workers in smaller shops who do 
casual work for fixed wages).
371 Targeting street vendors (there are at least 16,000 in 
Durban), SEWU aims to organize  any woman over 18 whose work is not covered by 
other trade unions, who “earn their living by their own effort” and who do not employ 
more than three others on a regular basis.
372 In targeting those otherwise excluded from 
labour organizing, SEWU finds new avenues of representative capacity. Given that 
members are often not employed in the sense that a complaint could be taken to 
management, SEWU’s advocacy for members takes different forms. The organization has 
used its new (and independent – the union is not aligned with COSATU) strength to 
campaign for more infrastructure near popular markets (such as toilets and clean water), 
and has created child-care facilities for street vendors. SEWU sees part of its purpose as 
empowerment of home workers who otherwise would receive no education or training 
elsewhere; in essence, a targeting of those who may be considered un-organizable or not 
worth organizing because of their locations and informal settings that do not easily fit any 
collective model. In fact, the organizing work done by SEWU and its later campaigns aim 
to accomplish much the same as any other union (address the problems and needs of the 
workers and convert them into collective demands) yet the nature of their spatial 
characteristics (stalls along a street, or behind sewing machines in their homes) makes 
these women a far cry from the shop floor of a refinery.  
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SEWU leaders indicate that they first hired COSATU organizers, but dismissed them for 
lacking the skills “and demands of organizing informal workers.”
373 The union remains 
all women out of a desire to remain run by those whom it represents, and does not admit 
men into its ranks because of the specific issues related to their informal employment, 
and the gender issues involved in their campaigns. Child-care facilities are an example of 
the gendered needs of these workers, as the informal female employee often divides her 
time between several jobs, childcare being one of them. But new organizations like the 
SEWU, though currently quite small, indicate that the informal worker and casual 
labourer are as organizable as any other with some adjustments in style and technique. 
Though old channels of business unionism would not organize these women, it is the 
novel and pragmatic approaches of the SEWU that has won victories for them in a 
climate of defeats for worker’s organizations.  
 
At the level of larger industry, unions and their members are facing challenges of their 
own, though outcomes are mixed. In the next two cases, we find the corporatist 
“business-friendly” macro-economic policies reaching into the labour relations system 
and denying or preventing gains for workers. We find as well that meeting the challenges 
of labour-orphaned workers and unions require reaching past and beyond the styles of 
COSATU and COSATU itself in order to record gains.  
 
COSATU-affiliate National Union of Metalworkers (NUMSA) offers an example of 
corporatist unionism that has distanced itself from its members in alliance with state 
capital. At a Durban-based Volkswagon plant in 2000, NUMSA officials signed a 
contract to produce 68,000 Gulfs – without overtime pay, with compulsory overtime, a 
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reduction in break time, and a pension reduction. NUMSA’s members read about their 
new contract in the newspaper, as negotiations had taken place within the high circles of 
government between Finance ministers, COSATU leaders, and VW. These negotiations 
should be seen in the context of a government dedicated to business-friendly policies that 
largely neglect workers in the name of “growth” and investment. Likewise, it is clear that 
the union remains as dedicated to business as to the ruling government, if its reactions to 
the strikers are any guide. The resulting VW plant strike was as much a strike against the 
contract as it was against NUMSA. Thabo Mbeki lambasted the strikers, and NUMSA 
officials were taken aback that their members would damage the image of NUMSA as a 
union that can control its rank-and-file. The strike failed because enormous 
unemployment in Durban made “scab” labour easy to find, and the Durban labour 
mediation court sided with the NUMSA-signed contract. In this context, however, it is 
difficult to retain the admittedly crude definition of a “scab.” When the union represents 
the government more than the rank-and-file, it is hard to maintain that those who would 
take the striker’s place are anti-union. Moreover, given that unemployment is so high, 
and jobs so few, we are challenged to use the pejorative “scab” when characterizing 
starving, marginalized peoples whose opportunities for labour are few and far between 
and the union itself has failed (with the President an “ally”). President Mbeki’s lack of 
support for the strikers was even more alarming when he praised his International 
Investment Council as a remedy for the unsophisticated strikers’ disruption of 
international investment etiquette. One NUMSA officer spoke out against his members, 
saying “Our target is to persuade international investors here. You don’t know how much 
damage the strike did…We had to send cabinet ministers to Germany on the WV dispute 
to convince them,” thus revealing his role in the Growth Machine as theorized by Logan    
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and Molotch: “Labour cannot serve the needs of its most vulnerable and best organized 
geographical constituency because it won’t inhibit investment at any given place.”
374  
 
Another industrial location whose labour practices are increasingly corresponding to the 
conditions GEAR and the new labour relations system implemented is Engen, the South 
African affiliate of Exxon-Mobil. Its refinery in Wentworth, a Durban township, is the 
area’s largest employer. Each year the refinery employs thousands for dangerous work 
during the “turnaround” phase during which the refinery is essentially refitted, and its 
components dismantled, remade, and reinstalled. The turnaround period is the company’s 
most vulnerable moment for industrial action, and the time at which it contracts limited 
duration workers. Most of these limited duration contract workers are Black, a reflection 
of the nature of temporary employment in South Africa. Turnaround period work is so 
unsafe and poorly paid that it is seen “as the Coloured man’s calling.”
375 Work brings the 
men of Wentworth “the strongest sense of both price and force commitment” to each 
other, increasingly in a non-racial fashion.
376 Without the Apartheid government’s 
restrictions on movement and employment on racial lines, there are growing number of 
South Africans who identify simply as “the Poors.” This group remains under or 
unemployed, and for them the two weeks of work at Engen each year was often the only 
income they receive.  
 
Short-term contract employees are typically arranged through labour brokers. Following 
the major ungovernability strikes of the late 1980s, Engen and other large industries 
began its relationships with the brokers, who often had ties with gangs. Labour brokers 
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have become something of an oligarchy in Wentworth, essentially doing Engen’s dirty 
work and distancing Engen from the workers. The independent Chemical Engineering 
and Industrial Workers’ Union (CEIWU) formed to combat some of these conditions that 
became worse, as work became more scarce, in the late 1990s. “The management of 
contract labour for shutdowns has been outsourced through labour contracting 
companies, most so since the enactment of the 1995 Labour Relations Act,”
377 that, if we 
remember, was authored and enforced by the government that COSATU had helped 
build, and with which it was formally allied.  
 
In 2001, CEIWU planned a strike that would challenge Engen from the bottom.  
Its organizers and leaders decided to form a joint body – the Industrial Relations Forum – 
to coordinate activity between the workers and the community of Wentworth. It 
functioned as a resident’s association and strike committee, in essence binding the two 
groups into one campaign, but without the banner of the union. For many in Wentworth, 
the work at Engen was the only formal employment they had, but for the other 50 weeks 
of the year they were members of the starving Wentworth community and its related 
civics. Like the Chatsworth Concerned Citizens Forum, Wentworth has been the site of a 
new and powerful kind of organizing that eschews ideology and standard politics. There 
are unions of unemployed, underemployed, landless, homeless, poor South Africans 
whose government neglects them as much as it ever did during Apartheid. The VW strike 
failed in part due to “scab” labour, but the Engen strike was successful because it was a 
voice of Wentworth, not the Engen employees who lived in Wentworth. It was as if the 
community had found a vehicle in the Engen strike for the struggles of Wentworth: 
“workers and the community came together in a 2 week long strike and campaign against 
Engen that included mass community meetings, mass marches and pickets and acts of 
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physical violence against Engen.”
378 When Engen made offers to end the strike, and 
made an offer for wage parity, Wentworth refused, demanding that no comprises be 
reached. At its conclusion, Engen capitulated to all the demands, and back-payed 
employees terminated during the action. CEIWU reports that since forming Engen has 
blacklisted, bullied, cajoled and bribed to continue its exploitation of Wentworth’s 
workers, but successes are landing on the side of Wentworth. In 2004, the union won a 
legal victory against Engen’s termination of 176 workers whose contracts Engen 
considered “limited.” The case was an important victory, securing that “Striking workers’ 
jobs could not be terminated either for insubordination or operational requirements 
without following due procedure.”
379 
 
The changing role of COSATU in South Africa (perhaps already changed forever) is 
more complex than these four stories convey. Something happened to the Congress 
between its radical childhood and today, and I doubt we can easily explain away the 
(d)evolution with overly-simplistic references to capital. Nor should it be taken for 
granted that all COSATU-affiliated unions are failing, and only those without COSATU 
linkages are dynamic. Though my cases indicate precisely that, COSATU’s failures are 
top-down, and its energy and progressivism is bottom-up. COSATU’s shift from an 
opposition federation to an affiliate of the state’s rulers may offer some insight on the 
transition from social movement unionism to business unionism. But that is a topic I have 
not undertaken here.
380  
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If fish always do rot from the head down, COSATU’s members need to disaffiliate, 
regardless of the outcome of the endless debate within COSATU’s leadership of whether 
to disaffiliate with the ANC. Indeed, its membership remains far more militant (and 
hungry) than its leaders. For them the myopic discourse on growth and development are 
silly. And that COSATU has, for one reason or another, lost its disposition and become a 
prominent member of the neo-liberal growth machine, is a given. Future success in South 
Africa for the Poors seem dependent on the new civics, not COSATU and certainly not 
the ANC. That this is clear on the bottom should register: 
Municipal Workers Union members sometimes dispense with traditional ANC 
loyalties to join Anti-Privatization Forums (APF) in the major cities, even while 
the latter are tentatively preparing for a future political party challenge to the 
ANC Government. Most importantly, the APFs and other militant communities 
continue taking matters into their own hands - including illegal reconnections of 
electricity and water.
381 
 
When and if it becomes obvious to the leaders of the Republic that the energy and 
ingenuity that ended Apartheid is re-taking form in the civics, crisis committees, anti-
privatization forums and independent unions may determine the duration of the ANC 
government. COSATU’s hostility to the civics and the voices of the people may well 
determine its fate, as those at the bottom have turned sharply away from the ANC-
COSATU government and toward a new politics of local empowerment based on their 
basic needs. South Africa is one of the most unequal societies on the planet, making this 
component of the population larger than most comparable states. As COSATU’s leaders 
became (and are becoming) interchangeable with the ANC, its ability to represent South 
Africans diminishes. This result is compounded by (or possibly the cause of) the 
                                                 
381 Bond, Patrick. “The New Apartheid.” New Internationalist. Oxford: Apr 2003. , Iss.  355;  pg. 24    
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shrinking number of jobs in South Africa and the dire possibilities for fair work for most. 
COSATU was once a “world champion,” now “punch drunk, scarcely able to lift its 
hands against an onslaught of right upper-cuts from lightweight nationalist 
parliamentarians, bar-room brawlers of the ANC”
382 and greedy directives of VW. What 
is interesting, and of the most dynamic import to South Africans, is whether its 
abandonment of the liberation struggle is only temporary is for COSATU’s leadership. 
Labour’s muscle in South Africa has always resided in its poorest – and therein COSATU 
may well reside, training for the next bout of the Poors, though it will surely not call itself 
by that name.  
 
This chapter has argued that the recent failures, and successes, of labour movements in 
Durban are directly related to the macro-economic policies the ANC-COSATU-SACP 
government has promulgated. Building on previous arguments, this chapter and the 
immediately previous have set out to show that COSATU has in many ways been 
demobilized by national legislation. The effects of these changes in industrial relations 
are nothing short of a rollback in workers’ rights and strength since their pinnacle 
between 1990-4. As the overall purpose of this thesis is to show what has been preserved 
since Apartheid, and the methods of that preservation, I shall now turn from the shop 
floor to the earth beneath it.  
                                                 
382 Desai  p.1.     
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Chapter Six  – Constrained Land Reform 
 
Given the continuing role of the South African government – regardless of party – to 
retain the settler colony’s distribution of land, property and power, we can read the 
Restitution of Land Act (RLA), No. 22/1994, and its Amendment in 1999, No. 18.
383, to 
consider how this crucial process is or is not an attempt at change or another attempt to 
“perpetuate what has been achieved.”
384 Both acts give process to the Interim 
Constitution’s
385 and Final Constitution’s
386 “commitments” to land reform.  Both 
documents most important failing is their scope as defined by the Constitution.
387 The 
first RLA, as per Section 121 (3) of the Interim Constitution requires the “dispossession” 
“shall not be a date earlier than 19 June 1913.”
388 The Final Constitution is more 
restrictive in one area, yet adheres to the identical date, 19 June 1913. It, No. 108 of 
1996, indicates “A person or community dispossessed of property after 19 June 1913 as a 
result of past racially discriminatory laws or practices is entitled, to the extent provided 
by an Act of Parliament, either to restitution of that property or to equitable redress.”
389 
This caveat of the nature of the dispossession (“as a result of past racially discriminatory 
laws”) is textually linked to the RLA that, too, stipulates claimants are seeking regress 
“because of a law which would have been inconsistent with the prohibition of racial 
discrimination,”
390 though this distinction is absent in the Interim Constitution. The RLA 
                                                 
383 The former was also affected by Restitution of Land Rights Amendment Act 84 of 1995, Land 
Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment Act 78 of 1996, Land Restitution and Reform Laws Amendment 
Act 63 of 1997, and the Land Affairs General Amendment Act 61 of 1998, though the most substantial 
amendment was No. 18 of 1999.  
384 Strydom Report  p.29.  
385 Act No. 300 of 1993, Sections 8 (3) (b), 28, 121, 122, 123. 
386 Act No, 108 of 1996, Section 25.  
387 These sections will consider it a “failing” of the RLA th p.so little land has been returned to its original 
occupants. Whether the authors of the RLA wrote the legislation to prevent significant land reform, then, is 
unaddressed. If we believe they did not desire significant land reform, we can consider the outcome a 
complete success. 
388 Act No. 300 of 1993, Section 121 (3) 
389 Act No. 108 of 1996, Section 25 (7). Emphasis added.  
390 RLA, Chapter 1, Section 3 (a).     
  108
Amendment further limits the legislation’s scope in two ways as well; firstly, the addition 
of three references to “past racially discriminatory laws”
391 and the addition of a new end 
date. Entitlements to restitution are again temporally bound as they must be “lodged not 
later than 31 December 1998.”
392 Thereby a window of “land reform” is created between 
enactment of the first RLA and the claim-lodging sunset in 1998.
393 All dispossessions 
that were not the result of a “racially discriminatory law or practice” and all 
dispossessions that occurred before 13 June 1913 are therefore not subject to claims or 
restitution. We can consider these lands as protected by the property rights clauses of the 
Interim and Final Constitutions. Given the scale of dispassion that preceded 1913, this 
protected portion of South Africa, and in the focus of this document in KwaZulu-Natal, 
the protected portion is dominant. Yet the RLA and the mechanisms it created operate to 
protect more than just the pre-1913 landmass.  
 
Protecting Land from Reform 
 
The silences of the document are of enormous import for urban areas. The first transfer of 
land from African to European hands in Natal occurred in 1824. It concerned over 3 500 
square miles of land (about 9 000 square kilometers) that comprise the bulk of 
contemporary Durban. The Etekwini Municipal Area, for guidance, covers just 2 297 
square kilometers.
394  And though this area includes some former “tribal” homelands, it is 
inclusive of the initial claim made by FG Farewell and Company. Thinking solely about 
that parcel between 1824 and 1998, we find that both the original alienation of land and 
                                                 
391 RLA Amendment Act, Act No. 18, 1999. 2. Entitlement to restitution,  p.2. (1) (a), (b), and (d).  
392 ibid.  p.2. (1) (c).  
393 The opening period can in fact precede the RLA. Section 41 (2) allows applications lodged with the 
Commission on Land Allocation, according to section 89 of the Abolition of Racially Based Land 
Measures Act, Act No. 108, 1991), to be considered. Section 41 (2) of RLA. All claims must be settled by 
the end of 2007, as well, as per the Ministry of Land Affair’s decision. See van dan Brink  p.28. I wildly 
speculate here th p.this is to end the fear of land reform in the hopes of raising business confidence and the 
security of property investments.  
394 http://www.durban.gov.za/eThekwini/Council/about/ema    
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its perpetual control happened both before 1913 and without explicit racial 
discrimination. As all claims must be made between certain dates, and be made in 
reference to a particular piece of land that was dispossessed between another date range 
as a result of racially discriminatory laws or practices, it becomes increasingly clear that 
the RLA does not address the bulk of South Africa, and more specifically does not 
address urban lands sufficiently, which were seized by 1913. As the 1913 (Black) Natives 
Land Act
395 forbade the purchase or renting of land outside the tribal areas, legislators 
drafting the RLA and Constitutions mistakenly considered that law in itself as the 
primary instrument of dispossession, the effects of which post-Apartheid legislation 
would, in theory, ameliorate.
396 Yet the Act does nothing to acknowledge or compensate 
those who had been dispossessed before 1913, and offers nothing to those who were not 
dispossessed but simply unable to regain what had been stolen from them by the 
colonizers, abetted by the NP, and naturalized by the ANC.  
 
Land theft occurring after 1913 was considered illegitimate and subject to redress, yet all 
land theft perpetrated prior to 1913 was excused or naturalized. It was protected. The 
effect of the 1913 designation is, then, to protect the bulk of white South African 
property. In terms of Durban and other long-existing urban areas, our history is clear that 
its European settlers arranged, often via force, fraud, theft, intimidation and other obscene 
means, some form of “title” to these urban areas. Therefore all settlement on lands 
already alienated before 1913 is protected as much by the current regime as its 
predecessors. Given that whites are urbanized and in peri-urban areas
397, and the grants 
                                                 
395 Act No. 27, 1913.  
396 Secondary acts would include the Group Areas Act, Apartheid-era’s most significant instrument of 
dispossession. Given the RLA and Constitutions’ dating, we can deduce th p.legislators assumed the Union 
of South Africa, and later the Republic, between 1913 and 1994, dispossessed persons of land as a result. 
Whether they were ignorant (and thus their legislation is a “failure”) or aware (and thus their legislation is a 
“success”) of the degree to which these dates circumscribe any redress, is not here considered. It is also 
worth investigating the extent to which the 1913 law caused dispossession rather than preventing future 
possession, a form of marginalization not addressed by the RLA.  
397 Current estimates indicate there are only 60,000 white farmers in South Africa.     
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made available to persons under the land reform process amounted to only R15 000 to by 
buy back land
398, it seems again that the process was designed to cause no discomfort 
among the white population, to preserve the status quo in already existing and deeded 
communities. That the RLA and Constitutions offered land “reform” with such caveats so 
as to protect the bulk of white property, especially where they are concentrated, tells us 
much about the RLA and Constitution’s relation to the National Party’s intent to 
“manage” urbanization and “maintain social order and stability during this period of rapid 
change.”
399 Insofar as efforts to “reform” the land of South Africa have failed to 
acknowledge that the bulk of dispossession took place before the RLA’s effective date 
and still fail to address urban spatial relationships, earlier Apartheid “era” 
pronouncements that aimed to “prevent and control conditions of large scale settlement in 
unsuitable places”
400 have been realized. The persistence of a settler colony system of 
land allocation, preservation and protection is, after all, what successive regimes in South 
Africa have worked so hard to enforce.
401  
 
Moreover, the bulk of the legislation that follows entails and lengthy, costly and 
complicated process in which the onus to prove dispossession is on the claimant. 
Effectively, the current land owner enjoys a presumption of innocence (and are 
empowered to refuse transfers as per the willing-seller scheme). Though the Chief Land 
Claims Commissioner is tasked in a variety of ways to provide assistance, support, and 
funding for claimants to prepare their cases, and is authorized with subpoena power
402, 
current land holders are not compelled to produce any “document or object which could 
                                                 
398 van den Brink  p.34-5.  
399 WP  p.5.  
400 WP  p.20.  
401 Continuing to interrogate the RLA, we find th p.claims can be made for those who were “prevented 
from obtaining or retaining title to the claimed land because of a law which would have been inconsistent 
with the prohibition of racial discrimination”
401 and who can prove “th p.the registered owner of the land 
hold title as a result of a transaction…” The interpretation(s) of this statute is/are very problematic. RLA, 
Chapter 1, Section 3(b) 
402 RLA, Chapter 2, Section 12 (b) and (c)    
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be used in evidence against him or her in a criminal trial”
403 and can trigger mediation 
proceedings if s/he objects to the claims filed.
404 Current land owners are also entitled to 
“just and equitable compensation”
405as per the Expropriation Act, No. 63 of 1975 that 
also entitles the property owner to compensation for “suffering” in addition to fair market 
value.
406 When land claims are successful and restoration is determined appropriate, land 
claims must also meet “feasibility”
407 guidelines that are not explicitly limited. After a 
host of requirements, steps, hearings, investigations and governmental judgments, the 
Chief Land Claims Commissioner can still determine that persons deserving restitution 
will not acquire the land claimed, but instead “request the Minister [of Land Affairs] to 
certify whether it is feasible to designate alternative state-owned land.”
408  
 
The cumulative effect of much of the RLA, then, is to protect existing property relations 
and inhibit its transfer where those currently inhabiting or owning wish to resist. There 
are twelve considerations of the feasibility section, including zoning, “relevant urban 
development plans” and “any other matter which makes the restoration or acquisition of 
the right in question unfeasible.”
409 So while the new majority rulers of South Africa did 
enact some land “reform” processes, they designed them for the protection of the 
landowner. Given the history of dispossession and alienation that is South Africa’s, a 
more legitimate process could reverse the onus and demand that existing property owners 
demonstrate that his or her claims and titles came through payments of just 
compensations and with no illegitimately produced monies, and no assistance racially 
discriminatory legislation. As stands the presumption of innocence – and permanence that 
                                                 
403 RLA Chapter 2, Section 12 (2) 
404 RLA Chapter 2, Section 13 (1) (c) 
405 RLA Chapter 3, Section 35 (5) 
406 van den Brink, Rogier, et al. Consensus, Confusion, and Controversy. Selected Land Reform Issues in 
Sub-Saharan Africa. World Bank Working Paper No, 71. Washington. 2006.  p.34.  
407 RLA Chapter 2, Section 15 (1) (a) and (b) 
408 RLA Chapter 2, Section 15 (3) 
409 RLA Chapter 2, Section 15, (6) (c)    
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is granted to current land/title holders – seems a brutally unprogressive and privilege-
retaining policy. Land reform can be labeled bogus because its timeline and targets, so 
much so that the Government of National Unity and ANC have the effect of preserving 
colonial land distribution as much as their predecessors.  
 
Adding insult to injury, the bureaucratization of land reform, for instance, has proceeded 
painfully slowly if at all, and the “willing buyer-seller” model, selected by Land Affairs, 
effectively insures those holding land. Given the ANC’s concession at Kempton Park to 
“sunset clauses” that “safeguard for a period the position of whites in public 
employment” and the perseverance of slum clearance and forced removals as acceptable 
political choices, is there any cause for surprise that these policies are not so much 
legacies of Apartheid as much as they are being practiced by those who ran Apartheid? 
With assistance from the World Bank, the ANC’s selection of the “willing-buyer-willing-
seller” scheme has required marginalized and impoverished populations to engage in 
market-based negotiations for land redress. Such has proven wholly inadequate
410, and 
even the World Bank concedes that the “land market, as it is defined in many countries 
that are characterized by very unequal landholdings, fails to redistribute land.”
411 Initial 
capital subsidies offered were only R15 000 under the Settlement and Land Acquisition 
Grant (SLAG), but these only operated between 1994 and 1999, when a total of 41 land 
claims were settled.
412 Though the state is charged to facilitate claimants’ appeals and 
provide some support them, the land reform model adopted by the ANC “limit[s] the 
state[‘s] function to providing a tiny once-off capital subsidy (R15 000) far too small to 
acquire a decent plot of land.”
413 Suspended between 1999 and 2001 for internal review, 
                                                 
410 Again, we need to complicate our assessments of the goals of the government. It is only if we believe th 
p.the government set out to redistribute land th p.we can call their policies “failures.” If the government set 
out to preserve property relations and prevent substantial restitution and alteration of South Africa’s 
existing land and space arrangements, the government deserves credit for its remarkable successes. 
411 van den Brink et al.  p.29.  
412 van den Brink et al  p.36.  
413 Bond, Patrick.  p.47.     
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SLAG was replaced with Land Redistribution for Agricultural Development (LRAD) 
grants on a sliding scale, conditional on the buyer’s contribution. Fantastically, LRAD 
allows that, if groups of dispossessed poor persons could contribute R400 000, they could 
claim the highest grant of R100 000, yet on the whole LRAD “is currently severely 
budget-constrained.”
414 The pace of claims settled did increase under LRAD when 
government allowed settlements to occur outside of the Land Claims Court; 48 000 
claims have been settled through 2004.
415  
 
Given that we have witnessed the NP, in seeking to retain its Apartheid gains and 
colonial plunder, “favour[ed]… a system whereby property rates…are based on the 
market value of the property concerned,”
416 can we say that the ANC’s land reform and 
urbanization policies have accomplished exactly what the NP desired?  To establish their 
failure, we must assume some motive on their behalf, and surely the bromides of 
legislative preambles are not reliable. For those who are unwilling or unable to assign 
motives to the ANC’s “failed” reforms, we must insist that these persons demonstrate 
how the ANC’s approach has differed from that recommended by the NP, and then 
consider the extent to which preambles really affect policies. In terms of policy, there are 
remarkable consistencies between those enacted, which some call “failed,” and those 
recommended by the NP. Given the NP’s goals, some observers will survey the situation 
and conclude that the legislative power has been used excellently to achieve the goal of 
stagnating the spatial land and property complexion of South Africa. Ntsebeza 
concludes, “there is no doubt that the market-led approach to land reform including the 
property clause and the willing buy, willing seller condition will not unravel years of 
colonial and Apartheid dispossession.”
417 The pre-1913 dispossession which is 
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416 WP  p.39.  
417 Ntsebeza  p.85.     
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categorically excluded from any “reform” mechanisms, it is crucial to reiterate, 
represented “more than 90 per cent of the land surface, a process that was formalized 
with the passing of the notorious Native Land Act of 1913.”
418  
 
But it is not as if lands stolen since 1913 have returned to those disinherited; through 
2003, the deracinated have seen .007% of commercial agricultural land transferred
419 and 
the ANC’s own targets have been missed for land redistribution and restitution.  It is duly 
important to realize that the persistence of exploitative relations were foreseen and 
protested. The National Land Committee and others launched sustained protests during 
the Kempton Park negotiations with a simple statement: “The land that was stolen from 
us must be returned.”
420 These demands were accompanied by land occupations near 
Johannesburg and elsewhere during the negotiations and intended to highlight the 
continued plight of the landless and the squatters in South Africa. A strong protection of 
property in the new Constitution, they insisted, “would actually ensure that historic land 
theft would be legitimized by the new Constitution, thereby limiting the possibilities of 
land reform in the post-Apartheid era.”
421 Mngxitama continues, “The reality was that the 
basis of the ‘transference’ of political power from the racist minority regime to a Black 
majority was based on the agreement that land would not be taken from the settler 
colonists and the Property Clause guaranteed this understanding.”
422 Land reform has 
been sickly, with all targets for redistribution missed. Glen Thomas, then Deputy 
Director-General of the Department of Land Affairs, has since called those estimates 
“dreams.”
423 The RDP called for 30% redistribution in the first five years of democracy, 
                                                 
418 Ntsebeza, Lungisile. “Slow Delivery in South Africa’s Land Reform Programme: The Property Clause 
Revisited.” In Articulations, A Harold Wolpe Memorial Lecture Collection. Amanda Alexander, ed. 
Asmara, Eriteria: Africa World Press. 2006.  p.78. 
419 Greenberg  p.17.  
420 National Land Committee, “Land Charter,” 1994.  
421 Mngxitama  p.58.  
422 Mngxitama  p.60.  
423 Ntsebeza  p.77.     
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but in over ten years only 3% has been returned.
424 “The demand-led nature of land 
reform has meant that benefits are more likely to be claimed by those” with pre-existing 
privilege and resources.
425 Apartheid-era crimes were never rectified, and rather than 
being repudiated in post-Apartheid planning, strategies for forced removals and racist 
zoning are continuously implemented. Moreover, some legislation of a particularly 
crippling nature to any moves toward “the people sharing in the nation’s wealth” are still 
in effect and are enforced by the executive, today. The Subdivision of Agricultural Land 
Act,
426 promulgated in 1970 to guard against the “blackening of the countryside” (“die 
verswarting van det platteland”) safeguards large tracts of unproductive land from 
subdivision to accommodate smaller buyers. This “social policy which ensured that white 
farmers earned an income acceptable to white society” “functions as a powerful barrier to 
racial integration in the commercial farm areas.”
427 Agricultural land taxation is likewise 
biased against new and small landholders, and “the land wealth of large farms is either 
not taxed at all, or, based on a 1939 law, taxed at a rate 100 times less per hectare than 
that which applies to small farms.”
428 Again, we cannot under-stress the point that these 
situations are persistent: policies that have either now changed since 1994 or policies that 
have deepened property divisions. 
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Return to Removals 
  
Moreover, rural and urban populations have experienced removals and slum clearance 
identical in effect to those of the Apartheid era. Mandela Park, outside Cape Town, and 
Brendell, outside Johannesburg, are illustrative cases, but must be situated in a context of 
South Africa under the ANC. Joining the GATT in 1994, just days after his election, 
Mandela and his cohorts quietly abandoned the Freedom Charter
429 and COSATU’s 
Redistribution and Development Program (RDP) in the next year. The latter document, 
on which the ANC-COSATU-SACP alliance triumphed in the country’s first elections in 
1994, was replaced unceremoniously with Growth, Employment, and Redistribution 
(GEAR), a macro-economic framework designed by World Bank economists and the 
ANC. Standard structural adjustment followed: lowering of corporate taxes, reductions in 
tariffs, and the privatization and cost-recovery requirements of municipal services and 
state industry. Public housing was privatized across the country. “Soon after the ANC 
took power it entered into relationships with banks and private developers and, in an 
astonishing ideological somersault, became unashamedly committed to neo-liberalism’s 
foundation developmental principal – cost-recovery.”
430  
 
Mandela Park is interesting here because it was built by the Apartheid government in 
partnership with private capital for private profit, in 1986 in a situation that the Venter 
Commission would champion. Western Cape authorities were eager to move large 
numbers of Africans away from white population centers (“Black spots”), and these 
shacks reflect the government’s priorities. “They had no ceilings, or only one door, or no 
ventilation, they had cracks. They had rising damp. There was no plaster. There was only 
                                                 
429 For a powerful interrogating of the Freedom Charter and its contested history, see Tleane, Console. “Is 
There any Future in the Past? A Critique of the Freedom Charter in the Era of Neoliberalism.” in 
Articulations, Alexander ed.  
430 Desai and Pithouse  p.4.    
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one door. And the lot size was too small. The banks built two houses on a single plot. 
These problems still exist in those houses today – 14 years later.”
431 In 2000, however, it 
was the ANC that would demand cost-recovery from the poorest, in partnership with 
lenders. What remains enormously important is that the ANC assumed responsibility for 
the NP’s disastrous. “In Mandela Park, the ANC took up the drive for cost recovery with 
such brutal enthusiasm, [and] offered such quick support to the banks’ own drive to make 
good on bond repayments.”
432 And this has become the ANC’s housing policy, in line 
with GEAR’s requirements for minimal state-subsidization of any public projects; cost-
recovery demands profits or at least full-repayments, and a surplus value is necessarily 
extracted from the shack dwellers and the squatters to enable to persistent enrichment of 
South Africa’s richest. Prices for schooling, water, electricity, housing, and other basic 
requirements of life, have increased such that at least 10 million have been disconnected 
from water, 10 million have been disconnected from electricity, and at least two million 
evicted, since Apartheid ended.
433 
 
Beginning in January, 2002 at Mandela Park, evictions began. Over 2,000 dwellings were 
scheduled to be emptied, though since 1994 (1986?) the stated purpose of these removals 
is economic rather than racial. But like previous evictions, the slums in which the evicted 
are resettled (if they exist at all) are barely adequate to raise cockroaches. One former 
resident of Mandela Park was removed to a house “with no inside plastering, a leaking 
roof, and no bath or shower.”
434 He died of pneumonia that winter. The Western Cape 
Anti-Eviction Committee has been formed and demonstrated throughout Cape Town, at 
times in excess of 5,000 persons, and throughout the townships. We should expect 
nothing less from the people who ended the NP’s rule. “People who had been evicted 
                                                 
431 Interview with Ntanyana and Goboza, cited in Desai and Pithouse  p.3.  
432 Desai and Pithouse  p.10.  
433 Desai, Ashwin. “Neoliberalism and Resistance in South Africa.” Monthly Review, Jan 2003, 54, 8.  p.19.  
434 Desai and Pithouse  p.14.    
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from their homes by the Group Areas Act during Apartheid, who had been forced out of 
‘coloured’ townships as the government tried to police a ‘coloured labour preference 
policy,’ who had been forced to find shelter in squatter settlements, now find the same 
thing happening to them again.”
435 The bureaucratic apparatus for forced removals and 
resettlement is still at work. Moreover, the persistence of removals to nowhere cannot 
over overlooked as a strong continuity between NP and ANC rule. GEAR’s housing 
policies, like its labour and land policies, work to preserve the Apartheid arrangements 
and not change them.  
 
Outside Johannesburg, evictions from slums proceeded similarly, though perhaps more 
violently. Ten thousand people were removed from a shack settlement near the airport in 
July 2001. “Scenes of wailing women visited national television screens for days, 
newspapers carried pictures of mothers and small children watching hopelessly as their 
only homes were destroyed.”
436 In Durban, the municipal government has recommended 
“slum clearance” from an Apartheid ghetto into “poorhouses” where electricity and water 
consumption can be more closely monitored (and billed), while “the houses that they 
occupied for over three decades are upgraded and sold at a profit.”
437 Durban’s managers 
are also working to prevent any improvement of current shacks by their residents – they 
consider this “building” and thus antithetical to their objective of slum clearance. 
Municipal authorities also refuse to bring electricity and water to many of the shacks, 
including Kennedy Road settlements where the Abahali baseMjondolo was formed in 
2005 to challenge the city’s continued refusal to take any benevolent interest in the lives 
of the 800,000 shack dwellers around Durban. Motala Heights shackdwellers Lewisa 
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Motha and Sthembiso Mkhize explain it perfectly: “When we try to attach small 
extensions to our Mjondolos, we are greeted by municipality’s saw.”
438 
 
Since “democracy,” more than two million have been evicted in South Africa, mostly 
from shacks, slums, and “illegal” squats. Piet Koornhof, NP Minister of Development, let 
us recall, applied for amnesty for moving 3,000,000. “In the face of a coldly rational 
model of planning, the horror of forced removals has not been consigned to history along 
with Apartheid, but remains alive in post-Apartheid South Africa.”
439 The demands of a 
market economy on the housing supply for South Africans have sustained the effects of 
Apartheid. “Relocation, the Apartheid discourse, was now a part of the language of the 
ANC.”
440 These devastating heritages are suffered chiefly by the children and 
grandchildren of those removed in the 1920s, 1930s, 1940s, 1950s, 1960s, etc. It is 
additionally cruel that the policymakers today – those securing court orders against the 
10,000 of Bredell, those privatizing horrendous public housing and refusing to provide 
electricity in Durban – are the ones for whom so many died to put in power. But the 
ANC’s “[f]ormal deracialisation is accompanied by continued exclusion based on 
economic ‘value.’”
441 Given that the Constitution entrenched rather than reproached the 
enormous crimes of the Apartheid regime, are these results really surprising? And, given 
the motives of the NP who advocated nearly identical policies to keep low-income South 
Africans in the rural areas and in the plumes of toxic refineries, should ungovernability 
be resurrected (yet)? The dispossession of the African majority in South Africa cannot be 
redressed with the Washington Consensus, nor by elites. At Chatsworth, outside Durban, 
Desai recalls “one of the central reasons for raising the specter of relocation was because 
the indigents were seen as a barrier to the [Durban Metro] council off loading the houses 
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as quickly as possible at a tidy profit.”
442 Housing backlogs are staggering and service 
delivery is priced beyond the reach of the poors – whether politicians and policies are 
returning to or consolidating Apartheid seems an unnecessary distinction, perhaps even 
semantic, given the immutable status of the poors. 
 
A consistent effect of removals in South Africa is the destination of displaced persons: 
nowhere. Given that the Apartheid and ANC governments have enacted wide-reaching 
programs to move people to barren plots, we cannot assume that their motives are the 
betterment of the persons involved. Pithouse recalls the alarm of the Kennedy Road shack 
settlement when, in 2005, municipal authorities informed them of its desire to resettle 
them in “the periphery,” instead of a nearby plot of land (which had been promised to 
them years earlier, and would now become home to a brick factor).
443 The learning curve 
of those on the receiving end of these policies, however, is sharp. A year later in a similar 
meeting, when told “that the only complaints that will be entertained are about corruption 
within the policy but these must be made, in specific detail, through the right channels”, 
Mnikelo Ndabankulu responded “'It is the policy that is oppressing us. Moving us out of 
the city is the same as Apartheid.”
444 
 
Be it for racial purity, industrial expansion, or cost-recovery, successive regimes in South 
Africa have treated the majority population more as units of production than persons, and 
more like aliens to be deported from the white areas or repatriated to Zululand or India 
than citizens. Another Mandelaville was emptied outside Johannesburg in 2002: 1750 
families were uprooted and their property destroyed, only later to hear the City of 
Johannesburg Property Company announce the land would be developed for retail and 
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industrial purposes. “Despite the rhetoric of integrated urban spaces,” the Rainbow 
Nation, and the deracialized South Africa, “most housing subsidy projects ‘have been – 
and continue to be – located on cheap land in peripheral locations, thereby consolidating 
existing Apartheid spatial patterns and creating new inequities.”
445 As I write, the Abahali 
baseMjondolo community at Motala Heights is in a state of siege. On Youth Day, June 
16, officials hoped that residents would be away celebrating the 30
th Anniversary of the 
Soweto Uprising. They spray-painted shacks marked for demolition and announced plans 
to bulldoze. The community has obtained temporary legal protection against pre-emptive 
destruction, while the councilor and municipality urge the destruction of thousands of 
“illegal” persons’ homes. 
 
 Post-Apartheid reforms have failed miserably, unless we consider the enrichment of the 
few a goal of the regime all along: though the gap between Black and white has narrowed 
in the 1990s, the gulf between rich and poor has widened far beyond where it stood 
during Apartheid.
446 In 2004, one observer recorded, “The ghost of Apartheid returns to 
haunt spatial planning, since existing land ownership by the state makes it much easier 
and cheaper to simply continue with the process of resettling people in areas that were 
already designated for resettlement under Apartheid, where land is already owned by the 
state.”
447 At the same time, in Cato Manor, city authorities encouraged displaced persons 
from the 1950s to weigh the possible benefits of “developing” the area against their 
desires to return. Where there are funds going toward any form of redistribution or public 
services, they are wholly inadequate to the task.  
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Johannesburg established a rapid response team that bragged about its ability to quickly 
dismantle and remove informal settlers, and policies in South Africa appear to be 
returning (did they ever retreat?) to the Apartheid-era maxim “cities are for whites, 
Bantustans are for Bantus,” albeit with a tiny Black middle-class and even tinier Black 
upper-class of in the cities. “Privatization” as forecast in a review of the WP, “has 
increased the potential for the poorest to be pushed out to the urban periphery.”
448 In 
Johannesburg, occupations of high-rise apartment buildings have been met with brutal 
repression, while “poor residents of the inner city complain that most of the new cheaper 
housing is on the periphery of the city – from there, they will have to spend at least 12 
rand ($2) a day commuting.”
449 Sheresa Sibanda of the Inner City Resource Centre says, 
"The government says there is no land for housing, but there are buildings."
450  
 
Community groups are demanding upgrades of shacks by city managers (or even the 
allowance to upgrade without the city dismantling the improvement), and flat 
communities are protesting against arrears and rents. Shirley Ebrhiam explains, “We have 
been paying for the flats since they were built in 1961. They have never been upgraded; 
there are cracks in the walls. Why should we be paying rent when we have already 
bought these crumbling flats many times over?”
451 The similarities between “post” and 
“Apartheid” are obvious. Another important factor yet unacknowledged is the persistence 
in political circles of the forced removal as a political and/or economic tactic. It is 
striking that the victims (and vociferous detractors) of such a crime could later commit it, 
and likewise it is curious that such an event has not become beyond the pale for a 
politician in South Africa. To commit an act like Verwoerd, for instance, some would 
assume would constitute an act of political suicide, but the continued use of this tool 
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could demonstrate that the legitimacy the ANC claims (and apparently is awarded) is 
sufficient to allow for a wide range of abuses, or South Africa as a political culture has 
simply grown accustom to abusing its poor/African population.  
 
Finally, I wish to note that whether or not the continued existence of forced removals to 
nowhere, the bureaucratization of racialized and class-dependent space and the 
indifference of elites to miserable housing conditions is the persistence of Apartheid, 
these policies are ugly. These policy choices are dehumanizing and cruel. That the words 
“Apartheid” and “colonial” should cause revulsion is surely not missed on the author. 
Indeed, when arguing that something is “persistent” or “continued” Apartheid a speaker 
no doubt intends to conjure all the hostility that an audience might possess. We use the 
word to demonstrate just how vile the situation is. And in fear that I have not 
demonstrated so, I will rest on the claim that these actions by the ANC and the Republic 
of South Africa are vicious, and seemingly designed to benefit only the rich at the 
expense of the majority. Given that that majority is Black and the setting is South Africa, 
we might consider the situation akin to Apartheid. But given that many of the 
practitioners are Black, the “Apartheid” label may be difficult to stick. Let us rest then, 
and agree that these policies, regardless of their authors and victims, are as malignant as 
any Botha and the Broederbond considered. Apartheid or not, 2006 South Africa is a 
horror in many ways for the Black majority due to the choices of its rulers. And replace 
2006 with 1956 and you’d call it Apartheid, replace it with 1856 and you’d be in the 
Republic of Natalia.     
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Chapter Seven – Conclusion 
As predicted by Gramsci, South African’s rulers have maintained faithful to capital, but 
have done so with more success than the NP could because of their perceived legitimacy. 
Whereas the NP’s Normative Economic Model in 1993 could not be implemented 
because the NP had failed politically, the ANC’s GEAR macro-economic policy, though 
strikingly similar in ideology and effect to the NEM, could be rammed through South 
Africa without much coercion. South Africans as a whole, demonstrated by elections and 
their withdrawal from resistance, have consented. In power, the ANC’s decisions to 
privatize “as many [municipal] services as possible”
452 was a boon to investors, one that 
could not have been accomplished during the NP’s rule. These decisions “would not only 
lead to retrenchment of workers but would rapidly hike the price of services and cause a 
clampdown of unimaginable proportions on those who were too poor to pays for the 
meager services they were receiving.”
453 On the margins, coercion is required for those 
who remain committed to a change in life. But the new “hegemony by the ruling class 
has resulted in a new historic bloc, comprising large-scale export-oriented capital 
together with African nationalist political leadership.”
454 Capital has indeed wedded the 
ANC, and the ANC capital, as the “political legitimacy of the ANC, founded on years of 
struggle, enabled the banks to act on bad debts,”
455 the privatization of public services, 
and facilitated South Africa’s passage into neo-liberalism. Capital employed the ANC to 
return South Africa’s population to governability by gaining their consent. As “a ruling 
group exercises hegemony to the extent that it can rely on the voluntary cooperation of its 
citizens [and to] that extent it has to employ police-state methods it does not possess 
hegemony,”
456 we can observe that the transition to democracy was an elite transfer of 
power rather than a break with the past. Capital’s middle-managers, its deputies and local 
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enforcers, are now those who once opposed both the capitalist system and South Africa’s 
local managers. With the once-“opposition” in power, ungovernability vanishes and 
hegemony is maintained; consent is secured because of the leaders and their history, not 
because of the policies they enforce. Mbeki has even argued “against the specter of 
ungovernability’” in internal ANC documents.
457 Mbeki’s reliance on COSATU and the 
SACP is most obvious during elections: “Mbeki needs COSATU and the SACP to 
contain the working class and deliver the votes. There’s no way he wants to break up the 
alliance; he just doesn’t want them to cross a certain line.”
458 
 
In few areas other than land reform is this argument stronger. The NLC’s protests during 
the Kempton Park negotiations have already been mentioned, but a fuller discussion of 
the stalled land reform policies the ANC has promulgated should quickly show that the 
ANC has used its position as a legitimate and (self-) righteous national force to mold the 
South African population back into earlier designs: “the ‘nation’ translated this image of 
unity into organized consent for policies of development and modernization.”
459 The 
policies violently resisted during Apartheid are now cemented. Land reform, in a 
nutshell, “has been side tracked, and there has been no significant attempt to reorganize 
the rural economy on the basis of a more egalitarian ownership structure.”
460 In effect, the 
ANC decided it would not disrupt the ownership patterns Apartheid created and coerced 
its subjects to follow. But now, the ANC generates spontaneous consent, but of course 
not everywhere. Subaltern and marginalized groups protested with great publicity at the 
2001 World Conference Against Racism in Durban. Over 20,000, compared to the 
ANC’s few hundred, denounced the conference and its sponsors under the slogan 
“Neoliberalism is Racism.” They were denounced as “ultra-leftists” by the regime and its 
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cohorts, but their words are important. The motley group of landless, HIV+, 
environmentalists and others objected to “the UN system and the ways in which the ANC 
and heads of state all over the world are allowed to posture as acting in the interests of the 
poor through proclamations around fighting racism while implementing policies that 
prevent the eradication of racism.”
461 COSATU has used its heft to denounce, demonize 
and disrupt participants, notably at the World Summit on Sustainable Development the 
next year when the labour congress forbade entrance to groups critical of the ANC. 
COSATU’s 2005 Central Committee Declaration reiterates these points. In their own 
words (to a shrinking membership), they declare: 
 
7. ANC 
The Central Committee welcome the decision of the ANC NGC that the ANC 
should retain its character as a liberation movement. Under no circumstances 
should the ANC give up its traditions of working-class leadership, internal 
democracy and debate in exchange for a western-style bureaucratic political party 
geared only to winning elections. 
462 
 
Operating within the aforementioned property clause restrictions, the ANC in power 
enacted land reform legislation that was designed to be minimal in impact. The large 
agricultural sector had commanded an important place in the Apartheid regime that 
related its legitimacy to the “Great Trek” of Boer farmers into the veld. Forced removals 
in urban and rural areas had deracinated millions during the period of minority rule (both 
British and Afrikaner) and turned them into subjects of South Africa, not citizens. The 
government’s re-tribalization should be seen as an aspect of indirect control, in 
Mamdani’s argument the apex of colonization, not an aberration.  
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Greenberg argues that these property thefts are crucial in understanding the loss of 
citizenship rights for South Africans, and redressing them is as important a step as could 
be taken toward making South Africans full persons before the law again. This was not in 
the interest of capital or the ANC if we are to take their policies as any indication of their 
interest. A strong protection of property in the new Constitution, landless groups 
screamed during negotiations, “would actually ensure that historic land theft would be 
legitimized by the new Constitution, thereby limiting the possibilities of land reform in 
the post-Apartheid era.”
463 Pressures from the World Bank and industrial capital 
demanded that the ANC resist any large property returns, and those pressures triumphed. 
And in urban areas, “despite the rhetoric of integrated urban spaces,” the Rainbow 
Nation, and the deracialized South Africa, “most housing subsidy projects have been – 
and continue to be – located on cheap land in peripheral locations, thereby consolidating 
existing Apartheid spatial patterns and creating new inequities.”
464 
 
Land reform has been premised on a “willing buyer-seller” model; the market god is 
entrusted “as the primary mechanism for the allocation of productive resources and the 
distribution of goods and services.”
465 Fewer than 3% of slated land has been 
redistributed since 1994, and that allocation target was selected by the ANC. In terms of 
commercial land, the most valuable and highly important in terms of our discussion on 
the persistence of an Apartheid-economy, the deracinated have seen .007% of 
commercial agricultural land returned.
466  “There is no clear break with the colonial and 
Apartheid relations of oppression, exploitation and indignity for these landless, less so 
with capitalist property relations and ownership of land.”
467 Again, we see the ANC’s 
“seductive discourses [of] ‘National Liberation’ and ‘Developmentism’” have allowed it 
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to do what the NP could not – entrench Apartheid’s dividends. All claims for land reform 
had to be dated after 1913, the year the Native Land Act went into effect and the African 
population was confined to 7% of the country. This was, crucially, one of the largest 
singular dispossessions, one of the most obvious state crimes, and one of the last national 
thefts – the ANC’s decision to only hear land claims after 1913 ensured that these crimes 
would never be redressed, that the fundamental market they had created could remain 
intact. The land issue – both urban and rural, if they are even separate – has been one of 
the most persistently contentious in South Africa since Europeans arrived in 1652, and it 
would continue were it not for the ANC’s ability to end the issue. Desai and Pithouse are 
frank when they explain, 
 
The white elite relentlessly seeks to naturalize its privilege by disguising its 
history of conquest, expropriation and exploitation and presenting itself as the 
modernizing vanguard while the Black elite seeks, with equal vigour, to entrench 
a systemic forgetting of the radical values of the struggles that brought it to power 
to be able to claim to be the vanguard of a project called transformation.’ In both 
cases the majority, who are becoming steadily poorer, are told that everything 
depends on nurturing and perpetuating the privilege of a minority who are 
becoming steadily richer.
468 
 
Witness the rise of forced removals in Johannesburg, Durban and Cape Town, and one 
can find the protection of an Apartheid distribution of power and wealth in action. But 
what is most interesting is the quiescence of South Africans to the conditions (or more 
impoverished conditions) in these slums that were once the sites of violent and sustained 
anti-systemic movements. Writing about the forced removals of thousands at the Mandela 
Park settlement outside Cape Town, Desai and Pithouse show how the ANC has taken to 
using its legitimacy to act on Apartheid-era debts and institute the forced removals of 
debtors. 
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It was not only in Durban that resistance to the new government and its policies 
was being bred. Struggles led by independent community-based organizations 
flared up all over South Africa. Those closer to the action in Soweto in Gauteng 
and Tafelsig in the Western Cape are better able to make sense of the dramatic 
developments in these areas. But in the townships of Durban, Cape Town, and 
Johannesburg the issues were the same: cost recovery was causing government to 
attack its own citizens in ways reminiscent of the Apartheid days.
469 
 
 In this private-public-partnership with the South African Nation Civics Organization 
(SANCO), the ANC gave a 20% stake in the Apartheid-created slum to the 
“independent” civil society group. Acting to collect debts accrued under Apartheid for 
the shacks, SANCO and the ANC responded to the banks demands for removals. “Banks 
are important, even revered. When the bank’s lawyers get nasty, the state must be seen to 
respond to their Court orders immediately, lest boardroom whispers begin about South 
Africa’s commitment to the rule of law.”
470 SANCO is like other parts of civil society 
that the ANC has directly funded or supported, often after losing popular battles with 
indigenous NGOs. The Treatment Action Campaign, a highly-successful and militant 
HIV+ rights and treatment group, found itself challenged on the right by the ANC’s 
National Association for People With AIDS after the TAC’s successes. Prescient, long-
term observers observe “The ANC has taken this further by trying to create or co-opt 
simulated mass organization to legitimize its policies.”
471 
 
Beyond the initiation of forced removals, entrenching the land rights of the Apartheid 
masters may be the ANC’s most deliberate and conspicuous machinations to appease 
capital. The fiscal crisis the Black majority caused to South African capital in the 80s 
could only be managed, I have argued, by the ANC. As the “State is the entire complex 
of practical and theoretical activities with which the ruling class not only justifies and 
maintains its dominance, but manages to win the active consent of those over whom it 
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rules,”
472 and the NP had outlasted its abilities to win consent, justify its dominance and 
pursue new reforms in the world capitalist system, it could not remain. We should not be 
surprised that the CEO of Anglo-American, the mining cartel that controls most of the 
world’s diamonds and almost everything that comes out of the mines in South Africa, 
officially met with the ANC before the NP did.   
 
Apartheid coercion became too expensive for capital, and the ANC offered capital the 
most adequate stabilization force, the best consent-generators for a democratic South 
Africa. Given that divestment and domestic unrest would not end without majority rule, 
the majority’s rulers were groomed to accomplish what their sadistic predecessors could 
not: “liberalize” the economy and secure their dominance. Throughout the 1980s, “South 
African capitalism was increasingly viewed not only as a prisoner of an outmoded (and 
increasingly politically dangerous) racial ideology but of an outmoded economic strategy 
as well.”
473 The Apartheid government’s pariah status prevented its incorporation in the 
sub-region and continent. Since “liberation,” the ANC has presided over South Africa’s 
entrance into and dominance of the Southern Africa Development Community, an 
economic cooperation program designed to reduce tariffs and encourage investment. 
Growth, they claim, will follow. South Africa contains Africa’s most developed 
infrastructure and represents nearly half the continent’s GDP; finally, South African 
industry can expand beyond its Apartheid borders and pursue new markets.  
 
The mind-bogglingly large repressive state apparatus that was Apartheid had broken in 
many regards, thanks largely to the militancy of the COSATU, the very organization the 
ANC would successfully demobilize and corporatize after the transition to majority rule. 
This decision was crucial to its success as the new managers of South Africa for the 
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radical democratic nature of COSATU and its economic-left orientation had to shut down 
and begin serving its purpose in civil society: reiterate TINA and nationalist bromides, 
and generate consent for the (unchanged) productive requirements of society. Industrial 
“conflict was to be institutionalized” and COSATU began “to contain and domesticate 
dissent” to the ANC.
474  COSATU, when formed, would in the words of its leaders, allow 
the workers to dictate the terms and goals of the liberation struggle. COSATU found 
itself working for the ANC’s bankers after 1994, banning members who saw their goals 
dashed by the leadership, and attacking anti-hegemonic groups like the Anti-Privatization 
Forum.
475 COSATU’s internal documents acknowledge its current position as lieutenant 
for the ANC’s investors; its 2003 discussion document states “The Alliance has been 
reduced in practice into a crisis manager, mediating mostly between the state and 
COSATU.”
476 Estimates rage, but it is clear that South Africa has been hemorrhaging 
jobs since the 1970s – and the ANC has ruled over the “biggest reduction in 
employment” in decades.
477 In the late 1990s, when the COSATU-ANC-SACP Alliance 
was firmly in controls of government, net job losses at 1-4% registered, and the estimates 
of unemployment in the country approach 50% nationally, while some regions 
(particularly in the North) are well  over 65%.
478 Even official governmental figures show 
that in 2002, unemployment jumped from 16% in 1995 to 30% in 2002.
479 These figures 
challenge the alleged liberation of South African’s Africans, and complicates the image 
of a new/improved/different South Africa. Bond argues “ANC’s demobilization of unions 
and hostility to national strikes undertaken for political purposes, such as the national 
actions against privatization in 2001 and 2002”
480 are indicative of the new role of 
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COSATU: a muffler in civil society. After participating and witnessing his struggles for 
decades, Desai records how the COSATU has become a powerful force in civil society 
that supports the ANC and uses its position to reinforce their neoliberal policies rather 
than attack them. They are consent-generators, and especially strong ones given their 
history and past lives of resistance: 
 
Given the scale of their contribution to the struggle against Apartheid, one would 
expect the unions to lead the fight for social justice in the new South Africa. This 
is not the reality, however…the big trade unions are part of the bulwark that is 
preventing autonomous and radical resistance developing against the ANC and its 
neoliberal policies.
481 
 
These circumstances are strikingly reminiscent of Gramsci’s “civil society” sketches, 
such that COSATU’s function is now to dampen labour militancy and mold its members 
to the productive needs of the larger society. With its partner the ANC in power, capital 
has muted the once-opposition COSATU.  Whereas once non-racial trade unions were 
therefore a huge impediment to the Apartheid system – the solidarity of workers in a 
1984 stay-away demonstrated to the shareholders of South Africa that political demands 
would now be voiced in the workplace – COSATU works to secure consent for the 
hegemony of the economic system which the ANC has inherited. Whereas COSATU’s 
first purpose was to bring the anti-Apartheid struggle into the workplace so that no part of 
South Africa was immune to the ungovernability tactic, it is now charged with 
legitimating and rationalizing the ANC’s neoliberal policies. In the crucial period 
following the unbanning of the ANC and release of Mandela and other leaders, it was 
COSATU’s mobilizing capacity, organizing drives and councils that allowed the ANC to 
hit the ground running. COSATU was “a fit and fearsome champion – world champion 
perhaps – of class and national liberation struggle.”
482 And this had to end: the 
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demobilizing effects of ANC labour legislation were intentional; the institutional 
framework arranged by the post-Apartheid government “binds labour to a set of 
processes that prevent industrial action and bind workers to the vision of enhancing 
productivity in the interests of growth as defined by GEAR.”
483  
 
Considering whether the new government has really succeeded in (or attempted to) make 
anything “post” Apartheid different from Apartheid, we might look into the words of 
Walter Sisulu, one of the founders of the armed wing of the ANC who spent 27 years 
with Mandela in Robben Island.  
 
When Walter Sisulu was released from prison and went back to Soweto, he had 
said, ‘Much of Soweto has not changed since I first came to live here in the 
thirties…with few exception the matchbox houses are very much the same. A 
government who is not addressing the basic issue of decent housing is not 
seriously committed towards political change.
484 
 
And this is exactly the point. The ANC’s mantle of a national liberation force allowed it 
to impose and extract consent from the majority of South Africans in several election 
cycles; their command over the country is nearly total. Given their now awesome 
responsibilities to maintaining the inequalities that were so advantageous to a minority, 
and molding the population according to the productive desires of that same plutocracy, 
“the reality was that, for many, things were going to get worse and more difficult”
485 after 
the ANC assumed the commanding heights. The ANC, if we take Sisulu’s judgment 
forward a few years, “is not seriously committed towards political change.” It is 
committed to perpetuating the economic apparatus most advantageous to the small elite 
section of society; building new homes for the slum population is not their concern; the 
houses are very much the same. “The multitude that brought that ANC to power with 
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millions of acts of rebellion, from strikes to burning barricades to refusing to stay and pay 
and obey, became a (just slightly fractious) people under the ANC.”
486 Much has 
persisted in South Africa; it is only the decline of coercion that waned, not poverty; it is 
only consent that has increased, certainly not wages, health or living standards.  
 
In this thesis I have attempted to analyze the ANC’s performance with guidance from 
Antonio Gramsci’s theories on consent and coercion. It was argued that the ANC’s 
predecessors, the NP, failed to extract consent from the majority of the population, and 
consequently had to exert their coercive apparatus against this majority. But as such a 
situation was untenable to the interests of investors and South Africa’s financial 
managers, they sought replacements whose leadership could generate spontaneous 
consent, and thus bring the country into a more current model of political economy. 
Central to the success of this strategy was the demobilization of counter-hegemonic 
organizations (COSATU the most important), and the transformation of these elements 
into loyal members of civil society.  
If I am correct, counter-hegemonic strategies aimed at unseating the ANC (only the 
current most visible element of power in South Africa) and the system it manages, should 
strive to indicate the continuities between successive regimes. Given the demonization of 
Apartheid across the world, any linkages that can be substantiated between ANC and NP 
policies against the Black majority and poor majority might work toward unearthing the 
situation Gramsci may have predicted. “Apartheid Persists Under the ANC,” 
“Neoliberalism is Racism,” “Privatization is Afrikaans for Poverty,” “LEAVE 
COSATU,” for instance, may help to convince persons of the inevitable failure of the 
ANC. Persistent criticisms of land reform of both urban and rural character, in 
Greenberg’s eyes the central issue to South Africa, and according to Mike Davis the 
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possible location of an enormous and impending anti-systemic current
487, may be one of 
the most strategic paths. We would do well to simply listen to the subaltern. One activist 
considers the situation this way:  
The Apartheid system was defeated but nothing changed. This is a farm. South 
Africa is a farm. And the whites were the farm managers. Now they’ve been 
kicked and we have Black farm managers, same mother fuckers, same minds, 
same greed, different color, it’s a little paint. It’s the haves and the have-nots. It’s 
always been the haves and the have-nots. Simply put, the Americans, Germans, 
Canadians, who had so much invested in keeping us miles under the ground 
digging our gold and diamonds, they found out that their shares were at risk, all 
right, because the mineworkers were organizing themselves and so they went to 
the ANC who had been in bed with the communists for all that time, and they 
says, 
“Are you willing to manage our business?” 
“What’s your business?” 
“South Africa” 
And they said “sure.” 
So now, in fact, our government is the farm managers. I’m a field nigger. South 
Africa is a farm.
488 
  
Real change is elusive in South Africa, and Gramsci can help us understand how 
Apartheid-era policies have been expanded and entrenched by the ANC. It has been my 
attempt to use the Italian’s words to help understand the dynamics of the struggle in 
South Africa.  
 
Durban’s Warriors 
We’re trying to create a movement that is for everyone’s struggle. It’s a poor 
people’s movement. What is not on board already should be brought on board. If 
people don’t know what happening in the community we should bring it on. The 
ANC is not relevant to our struggle – we are here about poor people and poor 
people’s struggles. People that come there and don’t know about what is 
happening and want to learn must know it’s about poor people’s struggles.
489 
 
                                                 
487 Davis, Mike. “Planet of Slums.” New Left Review, 26 2004. 
488 Unattributed interviews in the film “The Fourth World War.” Likely Milo, Yazir Henry, Ashraf Cassim, 
or Zane Ibrahim, as credited in the company details under “South Africa – Interviews.” Big Noise Tactical 
Productions: 2003.  
489 Naidoo, Orlean. 27-May-2006, community meeting.     
  136
The diverse demands of the Abahlali baseMjondolo, Westcliffe Flats Residents 
Association, Wentworth Development Forum and South Durban Community 
Environmental Alliance lead many to consider these movements as distinct. 
Shackdwellers, flatdwellers, and a larger environmental-community group share, at face 
value, little more than their marginal position in the “new” South Africa. These 
communities are predominately poor, though relative income and possessions are not 
identical. Shack settlements surrounding Durban are, likely, the “poorest of the poor,”
490 
living in tin-roofed and paper-walled shacks in some of the most inhospitable venues in 
the city. The Kennedy Road Community, for instance, abuts the largest landfill on the 
African continent, and residents there have grown thick skins to mosquitoes. Lungs and 
livers, however, cannot often be supplemented by stout hearts. The Bisasra landfill will 
be open for new garbage until 2017
491. Given earlier pronouncements of earlier close-
dates, we should not expect 2017 to be exceedingly firm. If a proposed carbon trading 
scheme is successful, perhaps we could imagine Bisasra to continue spewing carcinogens 
for many years after 2017. “Seven out of then households in this downwind area of Clare 
Estate reported tumour cases”
492 and for the sake of human life it is reasonable to assume 
that this is caused by Bisasra’s “waste emissions considered potentially hazardous” 
including 10x the safe level of Pb and 2x Cd.
493 For this reason, it seems unlikely that 
public health in and around the Kennedy Road settlement will ever substantially improve. 
More electricity and water connections are possible and should not be written off, though 
the reality remains and will not likely change that the area around Bisasra will be 
detrimental to human and plant life for at least 50 years after its closure (whenever that 
                                                 
490 Zikode, S’bu. Wolpe Lecture. 28-June-2006, Howard College, Durban, UKZN.  
491 http://www.durban.gov.za/eThekwini/Services/dsw/recycling/copy_of_index_html. Accessed 22-May-
06.  
492 Ruddy, Trisha. “Durban’s Perfume Rods, Plastic Covers and Sweet-Smelling Toxic Dump.” in Trouble 
in the Air – Global Warming and the Privatised Atmosphere. Bond, Patrick, and Dada, Rehana. Centre for 
Civil Society Energy Reader, 2005.  p.69.  
493 Ruddy  p.69.     
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may be). In this scenario, we must carefully weigh the prospect of resettlement when we 
advocate for improved services in existing locations.
494  
 
South Durban’s flat communities, however, live in housing blocks built “in 1961 and not 
once upgraded since then.”
495 Cracks in the walls, holes in the ceiling, and citing of the 
flats on the sharp slopes of bluffs makes life similarly challenging, especially for the 
elderly and disabled. The most obvious difference between these communities, between 
the Foreman Road shack settlement and the flats of Bayview, is race. As per Durban’s 
Group Areas plans, Indians were housed in flats directly abutting the industrial strip of 
refineries, chemical storage facilities, and paper mills. The accumulated horrors of these 
toxins are nothing short of murderous. Hence, the flats were built in 1961 and since not 
upgraded. Africans, on the other hand, were still considered foreigners, and there never 
were any Group Areas proclaimed for them, as the homelands and self-governing states 
were nominally “theirs.”  
 
For clarity’s sake, it is worth noting that the flats comprise a “kitchen” with lavatory, and 
a “lounge.” Some house as many as ten persons in a space no wider than one park bench, 
and just as long as two. The shacks are created personally, though within guidelines 
specified by the community development committees. Kennedy Road and many like it 
sprang into existence in the 1980s when Influx Control and Group Areas were relaxed. 
                                                 
494 Pithouse and Patel’s 12 May 2006 essay in The Mercury, for instance, called for electric outlays to the 
settlements involved in the Abahlali baseMjondolo movement. There are obvious complications with this 
positions, which I shall not address fully here. Importantly, however, demands for upgrades in existing 
locations essentially condone or accept those locations, and the spatial relationships th p.have required 
them. Mobilizing around councilors for better service delivery also represents a rather reformist position. If 
communities fight for less corrupt or more responsible councilors, are they not endorsing the policies 
handed down to the councilors? There seem few events more pleasing to the true managers of South Africa 
than militant demands made to the most replaceable and unimportant persons, the most accessible face of 
power – local councilors. Just how much those demanding better services are conceding in terms of the 
policy framework charged to deliver “access” (not water, but access to water, not housing and electricity, 
but access thereto), is a vitally important debate which we should enter immediately.  
495 Ebriham, Shirley. Interview, 16-June-2006.     
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That people were willing to resettle there should give us some indication about the 
possibilities of employment and quality of life in the homelands where they had been 
confined earlier.  
 
Alliances between these groups were not immediate. “When we started organizing, we 
were racist” and did not believe “the shackdwellers shared our problems,” says Orlean 
Naidoo.
496 In addition, these communities lacked common borders and were preyed on by 
different electoral machines. Politicians regarded the shackdwellers as solidly ANC, 
while the predominantly Indian and Coloured communities of South Durban have voted 
for the DA and ANC in different cycles.  
 
Demands from the flats centered on arrear-scrapping, and service delivery. Chiefly 
regarding rent, water and electricity, some communities of flat dwellers have mobilized 
around these issues, with spikes in activity surrounding brutal evictions. This history is 
well captured elsewhere.
497 Organizing in the shacks, however, was slower, as many 
focused energies on the painfully-slow and notoriously corrupt and inept housing 
programmes implemented by the ANC since 1994. Their issues, in the words of Mnikelo 
Ndabankulu are “land and housing.”
498 He continues “no one, no matter how poor, should 
be forced to live in the jondolos.”
499 
 
What these struggles concretely share is their disgust with the pace and cost of housing 
and service delivery, and, I would argue, hostility to the “attempts” to redress the 
enduring distribution of space and land in South Africa.  At a meeting of over 200 
                                                 
496 Naidoo, Orlean. Chairperson of the Westcliff Flats Residents Association (WFRA) 28-July-2006,  
p.community meeting. 
497 Desai, Ashwin. We Are the Poors. New York: Monthly Review Press. 2002. For a powerful description 
of the origins of Abahlali baseMjondolo, see Pithouse, Richard. “Struggle Is a School: The Rise of a Shack 
Dwellers’ Movement in Durban, South Africa.” Monthly Review. February 2006.   
498 Ndabankulu, Mnikelo. 13-June-2006, community meeting.  
499 Ibid.     
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activists from throughout the province on 25 June, 2006, at Kennedy Road, almost one 
third of the agenda was devoted to sharing stories of struggles.
500 What was obvious from 
these multilingual conversations was the similarities of the evictions, the commonalities 
of the crises of water and electricity, and the indifference of to government to all of them 
(or, in fact, the role of government as perpetrator in all of them). Perhaps this is what 
Naidoo means when she describes the new government as “waging war on the poor.” 
What became clear to participants was their linked struggle; indeed, it is a struggle 
against the setup of South Africa. South Durbanites are exposed to carcinogens because 
they were forced to live next to refineries. The same is evident at Kennedy Road, though 
cadmium stands in for sulfur dioxide, and regular infernos do much of the evicting work 
for the government.  What seems obvious is the continued misery forced on the poor of 
South Africa as a direct result of the allocation of space and land in the country. Given 
that the Bisasar landfill was cited next to an Indian community of Clare Estate because 
the government considered their lives less valuable, does it not follow that the 
indifference of the government to house those now living even closer to it now are treated 
again as sub-human? Could we replace “sub-human” with “non-white” and get the same 
result? These struggles, I believe, are coalescing precisely because they are each fighting 
the persistence of the settler colony’s land and space restrictions in which they are, 
perennially, excluded from full ownership, full citizenship, and full rights. This happened 
because Natal’s managers, long ago, decided Natal was only for Europeans, and 
successive regimes have not yet acted in contradiction. The evolution of space exclusion 
and landlessness has taken many forms – Locations, Reserves, Peggings, Group Areas 
Acts, and now privatization and cost-recovery, pathetic subsidies and market-led 
“reforms” – all of which aim to “concentrate on perpetuating what has been achieved.”
501  
                                                 
500 Organizers did not make the common mistake of neglecting translation; so often government officials 
are deaf, and simultaneously speaking not to, but at, the people in front of them. Translations were 
constant, such th p.those most comfortable in isiZulu could express themselves fully. 
501 Strydom Report  p.29.     
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We operate on a bounded plane. That is, as long as we accept the distribution of space in 
KwaZulu-Natal. Housing, urbanization, and industrialization policies in SA are largely 
static since at least the early 1980s. ANC and GNU-led governments have authored and 
promulgated policies with great similarity – in letter and spirit – to the NP. The policies 
of Apartheid relating to space and development (two of its most notorious elements) are 
today in practice. Whatever ended about or in Apartheid did obviously not include these 
elements. It seems inescapable that any form of redress, redistribution, or even 
movements toward justice, must involve the displacement of the owners of the landmass. 
The specter of the “Mau Mau” can be used effectively to demand concessions. Many in 
South Africa, especially governing circles, fear the prospect of a “South African 
Mugabe,” a reference to Zimbabwean President (and thug) Robert Mugabe, whose land 
reform resulted in the seizure of thousands of white farms.
502  
 
Insofar as we do not contest the legitimacy of deeded property in KZN, there will 
continue to be a dearth of “suitable land” and there will continue to be deaths resulting 
directly from these horribly unequal shares of South Africa’s soil. There are no 
conclusions to these problems that do not involve massive alterations to existing 
property-owning patterns and distributions. Given that majority-rule has done so little to 
actually affect these relationships, pursuit of justice through the “system” seems doomed 
to failure. Audre Lorde explained this well: “The master’s tools will never dismantle the 
master’s house. They may allow us temporarily to beat him at his own game, but they 
will never enable us to bring about genuine change.”
503 That state’s job, after all, is to 
protect private property, and few things make this fact more clear than the reinforcement 
                                                 
502 Mugabe’s “reforms” were cronyism, violent, and actually against the will of Zimbabweans. A 2002 
referendum was defeated, but Mugabe proceeded anyway, and largely doled out the seized farms to 
veterans.  
503 cited in ill Collins, Patricia. Black Feminist Thought. Revised Tenth Anniversary Edition. New York: 
Routledge. 2000.  p.117. the line is Lorde’s.     
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of property rights in the Interim and Final Constitutions, and the half-assed land reform 
and housing supply schemes in place. The land and housing questions are not dissimilar, 
and they are not distinct. These “questions” are the same, and we should be wary of 
attempts to bifurcate them. The answer to each requires a fundamental restructuring of 
South Africa. It will require, for the first time, the movement and discomfort of South 
Africa’s minority white population. As long as whites retain control, whether electoral or 
economic, over the landmass, there will be no upending of the colonial land schemes 
responsible for so very much of the conditions that these social movements protest. Land 
occupations, I would argue, are the best and only option. We cannot safely and healthily 
house South Africans as long as there are three golf courses in urban Durban. It is long 
past time that we object to the legitimacy of these deeds and these parcels, rather than the 
councilors, the ANC, and the pathetic subsidy programs. No subsidy is large enough to 
retake the Berea.  
 
The Landless People’s Movement is, in my approximation, a culmination of these 
logics.
504 Contenting that “the market-based approach has not fundamentally shifted the 
economic order, and leaves the redress of historical dispossession out of the equation,”
505 
the LPM has refused the land “reform” offered by the ANC, and has insisted “We will 
not buy back our land.”
506 Though five observers in 2006 were “astonished” to learn that 
85% of Black South Africans believed “most land in South Africa was taken unfairly by 
white settlers, and they therefore have no right in the land today” and two-thirds agreed 
that “land must be returned to Blacks in South Africa, no matter what the consequences 
                                                 
504 The various movements in Durban today have not formally linked with the LPM, though their “No 
Land, No House, No Vote” campaign during this year’s election cycle makes obvious these movements are 
in dialogue.  
505 Alexander, Amanda. “Rights beyond the urban-rural divide: South Africa’s Landless People’s 
Movement and the creation of a landless subject.” Paper prepared for the ‘Silencing Human Rights’ 
conference, University of Sussex, 8-9 June, 2006.  p.14.  
506 Ibid  p.14.     
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are for the current owners and for political stability in the country,”
507 this short history of 
the realities of land and space in South Africa should quiet the wonder of readers. The 
land and space imperative, not question, in South Africa is nothing short of life-ending 
and shortening. In the three months I was in Durban, no fewer than two shack settlements 
erupted in flames; given the municipality refuses to electrify the shacks for lack of funds 
and the cause of these fires is from candles, paraffin stoves and other crude heating 
devices, we should expect much more of the same.
508  
 
When dozens of shacks burned at Jadhu Place on 1 August 2006, and I stood over the 
incinerated life-savings of hundreds of South Africans, the brightly-illuminated houses 
just across the road distance painted a rabid juxtaposition that belies anything “new” 
about this South Africa. Zipela Arurela told to me the fire “went into my wife’s mouth, 
down her throat.”
509 Only by looking straight into the cinders could one fail to notice the 
homes in the distance. As the shacks still smoldered, the lights of porches and dens 
illuminated the hillside opposite Jadhu Place. The cost of the shining distance is paid by 
the smoke rising from the release of energy from someone’s possessions at my feet. 
Those bulbs run on these flames. Cost-recovery and orderly urbanization cause people to 
eat fire.  Let that conclude this discussion.  
 
Some Concluding Thoughts 
 
I have attempted to argue that the original land theft has been perpetuated intentionally by 
successive South African governments, and that schemes of private development and 
cost-recovery are two of the primary means of these actions. That these policies were 
                                                 
507 van den Brink et al  p.17-8.  
508 See Patel, Raj, and Pithouse, Richard. The Durban Mercury. 12-May-2006.  
509 Arurela, Zipela. 1-August-2006, Jadhu Place, Durban. More than 20 shacks, a tuck shop, and a chapel 
burned to the ground th p.night. It took firefighters “45 minutes” to arrive according to Zipela. Often, the 
fire department does not respond to shack calls  p.all.     
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recommended by the NP in order to preserve their gains, and subsequently taken up by 
the ANC, is the main discovery of the research. Much more work needs to be done in 
these areas, of course. And, an important area I have not included above is water. It is not 
surprising that the homelands and other places where disqualified persons were forced to 
live were resource-poor, especially regarding water. The continued shortage of clean, free 
and accessible water is a manufactured draught, owing much to the colonial and 
Apartheid-era spatial dispossessions and forced removals.
510 When Jan planted the bitter 
hedge in the Cape, he also declared that all water was owned by the Dutch and forbade 
“’incoming chiefs and less qualified persons’ from washing their persons and their 
clothing” in the streams of the Table Valley.
511 
 
I have not touched on GEAR much. This is because I think GEAR exacerbates the 
situation, but bears little responsibility for it. Whether GEAR is to blame or just the 
current costume for these processes, is left for the reader to decide. Given the history of 
SA, any adherence to capitalist practices and processes – in the form of GEAR or another 
– seems more to entrench than rectify, more to perpetuate than offer restitution.  
 
On the whole, I have aimed to understand and consider the history of land and space in 
KwaZulu-Natal that has led the Landless People’s Movement to declare 
The 28-million poor & landless Black majority of South Africa are poor and landless 
today mainly because of our land was stolen from us through centuries of brutal and 
violent wars and laws of dispossession that began in 1652 and continued throughout 
colonialism and Apartheid. Our ancestors fought valiantly against this theft and we 
fought to end Apartheid so that this land would be returned to us. We are not willing 
to buy back our stolen land! We are not willing buyers! Today, more than 80% of 
the land of our ancestors remains in the hands of less than 60,000 white farmers who 
inherited the land from this colonial and Apartheid theft. We do not care whether 
they are willing to sell it back to us or not – we demand that our land be 
returned to us! The market-led land reform model that the post-Apartheid 
government copied from the World Bank has not worked anywhere in the world! In 
                                                 
510 See my “A Brief Social History of Water in South Africa.” December 2005, unpublished. 
511 Hall, C. G. “The Origin of Water Rights in South Africa.” 54 S. African L. J. 160. 1937.  p.160. 
translation is my own.     
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South Africa, it is an insult to our ancestors that we must buy back our stolen land! 
The entire South Africa ‘land market’ on which our stolen land is bought and sold at 
price determined by the beneficiaries of Apartheid is nothing but a continuation of 
Apartheid. We demand that the state and the landless organise to ‘take back the 
land’ that was stolen from us!
512  
 
I have attempted to do the speakers justice and honestly explore the historical and 
political events leading to these statements. Any errors in understanding herein are my 
own, and I apologize for them. 
                                                 
512 Landless People’s Movement. 2005. Memorandum of demands to the National Land Summit held in 
Johannesburg on 27-31 July, 2005. http://land.pwv.gov.za/Land_Summit/Position_Conference_Papers/ 
Conference_Papers/LPM.doc.    
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APPENDIX I 
 
Interviews/Meetings Consulted 
 
Meetings occurred at Howard College, UKZN, the Community Centre at Kennedy Road, 
the South Durban Community Hall, and at the Centre for Public Participation. 
The most important participant organizations included were the  
•  Abahlali baseMjondolo; President Sbu Zikode, Vice President Philani Zungu, 
General Secretary Mdu Hlongwa, Vice Secretary Molswanda, Treasurer Lindela 
Figlan, P.R.O. Mnikelo Ndabankuzu, Chief Whip Mr. Jakuja). ABM’s affiliates 
include the Foreman Road Development Committee, Motala Heights 
Development Committee, and community groups from Jadhu Place, Pinetown, 
and throughout Durban.  
•  South Durban Community Environmental Alliance (SDCEA); President Des D’sa 
•  Peoples Social Movement (PSM), Social Movement Indaba (SMI). 
•  Wentworth Development Forum; Des D’sa, Chairperson, Vice-Chair Catherine 
Goordeen 
•  Westcliff Flats Residents Association;  Chairperson Orlean Naidoo, Vice 
Chairperson Mehmood Ismail, Secretary Vanessa Pillay. 
 
Ebrhiam, Shirley. Interview, 20-June-2006. 
    
27 May 2007 Community Meeting 
3 June 2007 Community Meeting 
10 June 2007 Community Meeting 
13 June 2007 Community Meeting 
17 June 2007 Community Meeting & Writing Workshop 
25 June 2007 Social Movement Indaba 
6 July 2006 Centre for Public Participation. 
22 July 2007 World Social Forum Workshop 
11 August 2007 Community Meeting      
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APPENDIX II 
 
Program from the 25 June Social Movement Indaba   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
KZN Social 
Movement 
Workshop 
25 June 2006 
 
 
 
 
 
Kennedy Road 
 Durban 
AMANDLA BAHLALI!
1
4
7 
isikhathi  Uhlelo Lomhlangano nge siZULU
11.50-12.20  Ukuwamukela nezaziso- umculo nengoma e vela 
kubahlali base Kennedy road. Uhlelo nezintloso 
zomhlangano.  
12.20-13.05  Inkulumo ya base ohlelweni abahlukahlukene 
13.05-13.30 Kuyini  iSMI? Inkulumo elungisiwe yika Komrade 
Mondli Hlatswayo, Mdu, Orlean isikhashana 
semibuzo nenxoxo. 
13.30-1345  Inkulumo elungisiwe  ezo xoxa nomhlangano 
wonke ngokuthi ubumbano elemihlangano 
ehlukile lingahle lisebenze kanjani- uKomrade 
Richard Pithouse uzo phawula ngalokho sizo 
kuxoxa ema cembini amancane. ukuhlukaniswa 
kumaqembu amacane   
13.45-14.30  ukukhuluma ngokuthi imbumbo ehlangene inga 
sebenza kanjani.X10 amacembu ana Bantu abayi 25 
ngalinye. Kufanela ku khethwe ushlali, unobhala, 
umtoliki no sgcina sikhathi. 
14.30-15. 10  Imibiko yamaqembu amancane 3 minithi 
yokukhuluma iqembu ngalinye. 
15.10-16.00  Isikhathi sokudla 
16.00-16.45 Ukuqhubheka  Phambili kwomzabalazo 
inaxoxisano nga lokho siku lindele ngalembumbano. 
Ukuhlaganisa Imizabalazo eye zinhlangano ezihluka 
hlukile no uku thatha isiqumo ngosuku loku  
songulula imbumba ye Kwazulu Natal  
16.45-17.00  Usuku lomhlangano olandelayo 
18.00 Ukuzijabulisa  ngamafilimu alethwe ngi CCS 
Time Workshop  Program   
 
11.50-12.20 
Greetings and welcome, a performance from 
Kennedy road cultural groups. Program review, 
aims and objectives.  
12.20- 13.05  Presentation to plenary by organizational speakers: 
each has Four minutes to present & 3 min for 
clarity points from floor  
13.05-13.30  Who is the SMI?- prepared presentation from 
comrade Mondli Hlatshwayo with response by Mdu 
and Orlean.  
Brief Plenary discussion and questions of clarity 
13.30-13.45  What forms a united movement should take? 
Presentation from comrade Richard Pithouse and 
drawing key issues to be discussed in small 
commissions. Break into small groups 
13.45-14.30  Small groups discuss what forms a united 
movement should take. X10 groups of 25, should 
consist of chairperson, scribe, translator and time 
keeper/s. 
14.30-  15.15  Report back from commissions and brief 
discussion-3 minute for each group report. 
15.15- 16.00  Supper 
 
16.00-16.45 
Plenary discussion on expectations, and what people 
want from united front. Future campaigns, launch 
of united movement discussion 
 
16.45-17.00  Date of next meeting,  closure 
18.00  film screening   
1
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Profiles and struggles 
Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement South Africa 
S'bu Zikode 083 547 0474 
Philani Dlamini 072 760 0680 
Mdu Hlongwa: 0723358966 
Mr Jakuja: 0732854270 
Mr. Mcwango: 076 225 0260 
Mnikelo Ndabankulu 073 565 6241 
Foreman Road/ Jadhu place/ Joe Slovo/ Lacey Road / Kennedy 
Road Abahlali  
Umungameli ngumnumzana S’bu Zikode, usekela wakhe ngu 
Mnumzana Philani Zungu, uNobala jikelele ngumNnumzane Mdu 
Hlongwa, usekela nobala ngu Molswanda, usozimali ngu mnumzana 
Lindela Figlan, owezomphakathi ne sikhulumi ngu mnumzana Mnikelo 
Ndabankuzu, owezokuziphatha kwa malungu ngu mnomzana Jakuja. 
Inhlangano yAbahlali Base Mijondolo sungulwa ngo 2005 ukuze 
isheshise izindaba zezindlu ezindaweni zalabo abahlala emijondolo 
kuzwe lonke. Lapho uthola imijondolo kule lizwe, kulapho uthola 
inhlangano yabahlali. Ukuhlupheka akusho ukuthi sifanele sifele 
emijondolo. 
 
Sesibuya kwimizabalazo eminingu kunyaka wo 2005, sasi masha 
sibikishela amakhansela abazicabangela bona bodwa futhi abahlule kile 
ukuzifeza izithembiso zabo. u2005 sasi wuqabe nje ngonyaka 
wokunyakazisa imiphakathi, u2006  sibhekana noku tholakala kwe zindlu  
nomhlaba wethu.  Ngo November 14 2005, sasiyo bhikisha eThekwini, 
sangathola iphemithi lokumasha, amaphoyisa wasilimaza esishaya 
ababanye bethu baboshwa ngamaphoyisa. 
 
1
4
9 
Saphumelela ukukhipha abanye bamalungu awethu ejele, noku 
Phoqaumeya Obet Mlaba kuthi ahlale phantsi nathi si xoxe nge zinkinga 
zezindlu. Sanqoba kakhulu futhi ngo 27 ka February lapho sikwaze uku 
jika isinqumo sika city mananga we eThekwini  Municipality umonzana 
Sutcliff, ngo ku thola amaphepha awe kundla yamacala enkulu yase 
thekwini. 
Izinqumo zenhlangano  zithathwa ngokuya kwe ntando ye ningi izwi le 
ningi yilona elisalayo. Imhlangano yetho siyibiza njalo ngoMgqibelo nge 
hora lesihlanu ntambama. 
Amalungu ethu  ayi yonke iminyaka , zonke izinhlanga ngokuhlukana 
kwazo,futhi abeslisa nabesfazane ba amukelekile kunhlangano yethu. 
Asinalo ubandlululo. Futhi sinakho uku hlanganisa imizabalazo yethu 
nezinye izintlangano. 
 Lomhlangano we Social Movements Indaba ungakwazi ukuthi uakhe 
noma u phule imizabalazo yethu kulesifundazwe se Kwazulu natal. 
Iszizwa singa thembi ukuthi ngepela iSMI izokwazi yini ukuqinisa  
imizabalazo yethu  ngoba sasi badinga ngomhla ka 27 February kwodwa 
azange sibathole. Kwenzeke kanjani bangakwazanga ukusisiza ngalolo 
suku? 
Singa thanda ukuwazi ngokuthi yona le SMI izimiseleni nokuthi 
singasebenzisana kanjani nayo. Kufanele ukuphathwa kwamalungu 
kufane futhi kulingane.iKwazulu natal kufanele iandiselwe amalungu aku 
zinga lokuthatha iziqumo. 
 
Abahlali baseMjondolo Movement South Africa 
S'bu Zikode 083 547 0474 
Philani Dlamini 072 760 0680 
Foreman Road/Abahlali Mnikelo Ndabankulu 073 565 6241 
 
President Sbu Zikode, Vice President Philani Zungu, General Secretary 
Mdu Hlongwa, Vice Secretary Nokwanda, Treasurer Lindela Figlan, 
P.R.O. Mnikelo Ndabankuzu, Chief Whip Mr. Jakuja.  
The A.B.M. was formed in 2005 to speed up the housing issues in the 
informal settlement nationwide. A.B.M  is located everywhere in South 
Africa where you see informal settlements. Being a poor person should 
not mean staying in the ijimondolo and all other poor people including 
the rural poor. 
We have struggled a lot in 2005, marching against councilors who were 
not serving the shack dwellers as their promised. We even call 2005 as a 
year of action so automatically, 2006 must be a year of land and housing. 
Our protest was on 14 November 2005 when we did not get the permit 
to march. Thereafter our members got assaulted and arrested by the 
police. Our victories were to get our members out of jail, and after the 
arrests on 14 November, to force the mayor, Obet Mlaba, to sit down 
with us to discuss housing issues. The greatest victory was on 27 
February 2007. We won the court case against Mr. Sutcliff, the city 
manager of eThekwini Municipality, to get a permit to march in the city.  
 
We take decisions democratically and choose majority voice as final. We 
meet every Saturday at 5pm. Our members are all ages, colours and 
genders. We are non-racial. We have partnered with other Social 
Movements, on issues of lack of service deliveries. 
SMI can strengthen or weaken the struggles in the region. We do not 
think they will strengthen our struggle because when we needed them 
most they were nowhere to be found, such as on activism day of 27 
February. They did not support us that day. 
 
We need to know about the aims and objectives of the SMI. It must be 
democratically, equal treatment. We must have several representatives 
from our province in on decision-taking.  
1
5
0 
 
 
 
Westcliff-flat Residents Association, Chatsworth  
Chairperson    Orlean Naidoo   084 838 5628 
Vice Chairperson  Mehmood Ismail  031 401 1155 
Secretary    Vanessa Pillay    031 401 1155 
 
iWestcliff Flats Residents Association  ya sungulwa ngo 1998, ukuze 
isize ukulwela amalungelo aba hluphekile labo bahlala emafulethini kulo 
lonke iThekwu. Ngesikhathi umbuso omusha ungena, sethola ukuthi 
abahluphekile bayi zinyamazana zombuso wa makapitali amuama. Imali 
yo ukusiza izingane ezemideni ehluphekile  ya phungulwa kakhulu, 
kusenjalo amarenti wakhupukaSathola inkinga enkulu yokuthi imizi 
ephethwe ngabesifazane yiyo ehlupheke kakhulu futhi uma kufanele I 
khokhele ugasi namanzi iyahluleka, ngakho umaumasipali a cisha ugesi 
kakhulu kuhlupheka lemizi.njengomphakathi we ndawo sa qala sa 
zihlanganisa njengenhlangano.  
Sesi bhikishe kaningi se yisa izikhalazo zethu ku mahovisi ase 
Chatsworth nase City Hall saze sakwazi uku hlala pansi nopaspala. 
Umasipala wabonisa ukusidelela, waze waletha abantu kuze basikhiphe 
ngamandla ezindlini zethu. Sasukuma ngeinyawo nathi sa bambana nabo 
ngezandla namanqindi sa phinde saya enkantolo lapho umasipala wa 
tshelwa ukuthi a yeke lento ayiyenzayo namaje akaze azame lutho. 
 
Ugesi wethu namanzi asacishiwa, kondwa ingathi uzinga lwakhona 
lithanda ukuyehla. Sesiqale umzamo woku khanyisa endaweni yethu. 
Phezukwa lezinkinga  umphakathi wethu ubhekene nezinkinga 
zezidakamizo ezisebenziswa yizingane zethu, ukuhlukumezeka 
kwemideni, indlala noku sweleka kwemisebenzi. Sekubonakele uku ama 
pesente aiwu 75% iphila ngaphasi kwezinga lokwazi ukuthenga isinkwa 
ngosuku.ne 50% yama khaya a phethwe ngo mama. 
 
Umncidezeli wethu omkhulu ngu masipala. Baze endaweni zethu bathi 
bazo lungisa amflathi kodwa abasizeke ngalokhu abanezimali. Uningi 
lwe mali yoku akha lidliwe ngu sonkontraka namakonsultanti wakhe. 
Amafulethi ase zingeni loku dilika phezu kwethu. Asisawafuni ngoba ane 
ngozi kunqono siakhelwe izindlu eziphephile.  
Westcliff-flat Residents Association, Chatsworth  
Chairperson    Orlean Naidoo   084 838 5628 
Vice Chairperson  Mehmood Ismail  031 401 1155 
Secretary    Vanessa Pillay    031 401 1155 
 
The Westcliff Flats Residents Association was established in 1998 
around the struggles of the poor flat dwellers around Durban. When the 
new government came into power we found that poor people were the 
target of the government. They cut off child support by 1/3 and in the 
same month the rents were increased. We found this to be a major 
problem. Female headed households were now threatened with 
disconnections and evictions. As a community we found a need to 
organize. We staged many protest marches to our satellite office in 
Chatsworth and to City Hall and we started engaging with the 
municipality. We found that they did not respect us and they came and 
physically started evicting. We resisted the eviction by physically fighting 
and legally by interdicting the council. They have since put a 
moratorium on evictions. Our lights and water still get cut, but on a very 
small scale. We have launched a reconnect campaign. Our communities 
face many more problems, such as school fees, teenage prostitution, 
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teenage drug abuse, family violence, poverty is a huge problem, 
unemployment is very very high. Surveys have shown that +/- 75% of 
the community lives below the bread line, 50% of the community 
consists of female-headed households. Our main oppressor is local 
government, the municipality. They came to upgrade our flats two years 
ago, but we found that only the rich have benefited. The contractor and 
the consulter have taken most of the monies. The conditions of the flats 
have worsened. We are now saying that we want decent homes. We 
want to embark on a demolish and rebuild decent homes campaign. We 
have fought for the free basic services, especially water. We found that 
the rich have only benefited. Because of the arrears, we don’t get free 
water.  
 
 
Wentworth Development Forum 
Des D’sa, Chairperson – 083 982 6939 
Catherine Goordeen – 073 613 0224, 073 4011 063 
iWentworth community development Forum ya sungulwa ngo 
1995, ukuze I bhekane nezinkinga zabahlali be ndawo yuthu ezi 
fana ne  zikweledi zamarete, ku nqunya kwo gesi na manzi kanye 
nokukhishwa kwabahlali emizini yabo. Abaningi ba malunga 
awethu a lwisana noku bola  kwe zentlalo ngaphakathi kwe 
mindeni, ukuthathwa kwe zidakamizo no jwala  izingane zesikola 
nodlame elibhekiswe kwabesifazane nezingane. 
Intloso yethu yayiku khumbuza umbuso ukuthi ufanele ubheke 
zidingo zabahlali. Inkolo yethu ithi: Babahlali ababumbene 
bay’umphakathi ohlangene. iWentworth Community 
Development Forum ikwazile ukulwisana nokucishwa kwe gesi, 
ukukhishwa kabahlali emizini yabo, futhi sa masha ukuze wonke 
umhlali a xqhase iR10 campaign eyethu. Iforum isiyenze 
umsebenzi omingi maelana noku fundisa umphakathi nge qiwane 
le HIV/AIDS, ukuphuqulwa kwamafulethi wa bahlali base 
Wentworth. Futhi uhlelo lwe Education Rights Project lisize 
kakhulu ukufundisa  abafundi be ndawo nga malungelo abo 
ezikweleni . Inkinga okungatholakali kwemisebenzi yiyo inkinga 
enkulu ebhekane nomphakathi wase Wentworth. 
 
Thina sicabanga ukuthi iSMI ifanele ithole indla yoku  siza inhlano 
zethu ekutholeni izinxazululo zalezinkinga siyazi ukuthi lokhu 
akukho lula kodwa imizamo iyadingakala kumele sihlanganiseni 
amakhanda sonke sibone ukuthi  siyi khulisa kanjani imizabalazo 
ehlukile.   
 
 
 
 
 
The Wentworth Development Forum was formed in 1995 due to the 
concerns that communities were facing: rental arrears, electricity cut-
offs, water cut-offs, and evictions. Some were faced with social 
problems in the homes: alcohol and drug abuse, family violence and 
sexual abuse. Our aim was to hold the government accountable for the 
people (communities). Our slogan: One Community One People. The 
Wentworth Development Forum has challenged government-enforced 
evictions, works to prevent service cut-offs, and marched against the 
Wentworth Development Forum 
Chairperson Des D’sa,– 083 982 6939 
Catherine Goordeen – 073 613 0224, 073 4011 063
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R10 campaign. It does extensive work around HIV/AIDS, upgrading of 
flats, and made Chatsworth Housing stop evictions. Our School 
Education Rights Project has gone a long way in educating people about 
their rights as learners and parents. Unemployment is a huge issue that 
impacts all these other areas as well.  
 
We would like the SMI to address all these problems which we know 
will be difficult but the communities are desperate. It is difficult to say 
how, maybe we can put our heads together and come up with a solution.  
 
 
 
ECOPEACE www.ecopeace.co.za 
Alan Murphy (Coordinator) 0731946585 
alanmurphy@absamail.co.za 
Vanita Naidu (Candidate Ward 25) 0824959953, 0835308443 
buyer2@sabex.co.za 
Silungile Sibiya (Empowerment and Publicity) 0833827189 
slus@goldcircle.co.za 
  
ECOPEACE Environmental Party was launched in Durban on 11 May 
1995 as eThekwini Ecoparty - because the new government was still not 
‘environmental’ and the ANC had taken a 180o turn on being elected 
(changing from pro-nationalisation to pro-privatisation over a 24-hour 
period). ECOPEACE has about 200 signed-up members and about 
2000 supporters.  
  
ECOPEACE campaigned in the 1996 first democratic local elections 
but was not elected. Since 1996 ECOPEACE participated in many 
government/public processes and Environmental Impact Assessments 
(EIA). In 2000 one PR seat was won in the local elections. ECOPEACE 
also used its councillor’s income to fund community projects. 
  
ECOPEACE meets once a month or more with a varied membership 
from across the South African social spectrum. ECOPEACE has 
partnered with social movements and community groups including 
People Against War, Abahlali baseMjondolo, ELA’s Nuclear Energy 
Costs the Earth Campaign, SAFeAGE, etc. ECOPEACE has supported 
DSF, CCF, SMI and eSF/PSM. The KZN Social Movement needs to 
be; organized in structure, pro-active and community driven, 
independent in funding. A visible forward movement is imperative. It 
must be inclusive, principles based, operate on consensus, and develop 
explicit policies and programs to promote clearly shared vision and 
values.  
 
  
 
The PSM emerged out of the eThekwini Social Forum, which was a 
location for social movements to discuss their struggles. The PSM is like 
the SMI in that it is a forum more than an organization. Matthew 
Francis from Merebank is its current coordinator.  
The current structure has a small working group of 5-6 individuals, who  
meet regularly to discuss issues. 
PSM 
Matthew Fairbank, Coordinator, mattf@telkomsa.net 
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UBUNTU MABANDE – The PEOPLES SOCIAL MOVEMENT (PSM) is a 
duly constituted inclusive, democratic, participatory network of 
organisations and individuals committed to social, economic and 
environmental justice.  We stand with the oppressed in their struggles 
and challenges and uphold their right to be heard on the issues of: 
HIV/AIDS, Cut-Offs, Evictions, Privatisation, Poverty, Apartheid 
Debt, Reparations, Land Reform, Human Rights, War, Military 
Spending, Pollution, etc. 
  
We are committed to an autonomous, unified Africa and demand 
that we the people of Africa, and not the corporate and political 
elites, shape our own destiny. We reject neo-liberal economic 
policies, as embodied in NEPAD and GEAR, including 
privatisation and unregulated "free trade".  We reject the use of 
race, sex, gender or adult sexual preference as exclusionary criteria 
as well as other traditional authoritarian methods.  We support 
proactive non-violence, participatory-democracy and consensus 
process 
.  
Abahlali base mijondolo 
Problems of our place- Motala Heights, Pinetown 
Ninga sithinta ku lelu cingo: Sthembiso Mkhize: 0839853869 
Ever since we have been living in Motala Heights we have never 
received anything. It has been thirty years since we have been living here 
and still nothing has been done to improve our conditions of life in the 
mjodolos. The greatest tragedy and an open wound in the community is 
the fact that, when it comes to voting periods that happen once in a blue 
moon, we see movement on the side of the municipality, they bring 
their bulldozers and their saws and begin demolishing, this is done to 
appease nearby residents in formal housing. We have families here, now 
it is impossible to have healthy sexual relations if you live in a small 
room and share it with all members of the family, especially the children. 
When we try to attach small extensions to our Mjondolos, we are 
greeted by municipality’s saw. In the end we were fed up with being 
Dimba’s fools. Every time around election period he comes and 
promises us houses in Nazareth (some distance away from Motala) 
whilst at the same time municipal workers chop down our Mjondolos.   
 
To be clear: We Don’t Want to Be Moved to another Place, We Want 
Development To Happen Where We Are Living.  
 
Here are some of our problems with the current councilor:  
1.  When there are employment opportunities, he only gives these 
to his pals and cronies. 
2.  The councilor appointed his committee there was no 
community participation. 
3.  The councilor hogs all the money for the ward he ends up 
enriching himself and we as the community do not benefit. 
4.  The clean water we are now having came out of the efforts of 
the community itself, the council failed to provide us with 
water. 
5.  The few toilets we have, we contribute a portion of money so as 
to pay someone to keep them hygienic.  
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6.  We are denied Bank accounts and our children struggle to be 
registered at schools and the councilor has done nothing to 
improve our situation. 
7.  We want a person who will champion our interests to be our 
councilor apart from that- there is no point in participating. 
8.  The councilor is scornful and abusive; he has sworn that we will 
suffer for another five years. NDIMBA MUST GO!  
 
Izinkinga ze ndawo : Motala Hieghts, Pinetown. 
Abahlali base Motala Heights. 
Ninga sithinta ku lelu cingo: Sthembiso Mkhize: 0839853869 
 
Selokhu safika la kulendawo asikaze sithole lutho. Seesineminyaka engu 
30 asikaze sithole lutho. Sibalula kusukela si thola inkululeko ya Bantu 
abamyama ngo 1994, kwakune zindlu eziqashisile ezendiya uPhushka. Sa 
khala  ngezindlu zangasese, sa khala ngamanzi siphuza iziphephu kanye 
nezinya. 
 
Sase sinqaba ukurenta endiyeni lase lilanda umaspala wafika wawisa 
amkotheshi awethu. Amaphoyisa athatha  izimpahla zethu ahamba nazo. 
Saqala lapho ke ukuzakhela ezethu izindlu; wa lokhu elifakile umaspala 
isaha. 
 
Sazama inhlangano ye Federation kwahlangana zimuka nomoya langena 
isaha. Kwathi ngo 1997, sazama ummeli umabaso e Klaarwater, ngoba 
sifuna ukuthi asivimbele umaspala, sahlala phantsi nomaspala- ummeli 
Mabaso wathi kuwo mawume ukufaka isaha kulezindlu. 
Zaqhubeka izingxoxo nomaspala ulokhu uphikile, ikhansela elalikhona 
ngaleso sikhathi kwaku ngu Mrs Olive: owayethi asiyohlala  ematendeni 
sasingakwamukeli lokho waze washiya kuse njalo. 
Emva kwalokho  umkhandlu wasinikeza u Barbra #  okwathiwa 
nguyena ozosisiza. Wasizamela usizo wasinikeza amathuba emsebenzi, 
wa nikeza pheqelezi: ‘allocator’, izindlu eziwu foti (40) wase wahamba 
lokho.  
Ukuqala kwa wesibili waba nenkinga ngoku hamba kwe ndlu ezazi 
akhiwa eSthundu Hill. Waphinda wa ‘locator’ izindlu ezingu 29 Etsheni 
Elimnyama kodwa labo batu basahlala nathi namanje. 
Bamkhipha uBarbra. 
Kwabese kungena uNkosi Dimba, aqhubeka nokulwela lezindlu ezingu 
29 ukuthi aziqhutshwa ngani. 
Njalo ntambama sasihlala kwamaspala no Jeff # kanye ne kansela lethu 
uNkosi Dimba owayefike angalaleli lutho alale. Uma evuka lapho athi 
kukhona enye imeeting ajahe kuyo. 
uJeff kanye noNdimba baphetha ngokuthi izindlu lezo ezingu  29 ngeke 
sizithole ngoba zine corruption. Emva kwalokho ba phinda basthembisa 
ukuthi bazosakhela ama flat khona la ku lot 49! Kwaphinda kwathiwa 
sizokwakhelwa ngakwa Mecedes ku Surprise Road. 
Kwafika u Jeff wajikeleza  indawo kodwa kodwa kwa phinde kwa 
thuleka saze sakhathala ngamanga ka masipala. 
Okubi kakhulunokuhlukumeza umphakathi wukuthi  njalo uma 
sekuzovotwa sibona ngo masipala namasaha, kanye nogandaganda 
bezodiliza. Sesinemindeni la maje inkonzo yase kameleni ayisinzeki. 
Umasixhuma amanye amakamela kungena isaha. Sagnina sesikhathele 
ukuba izithutha zika Dimba. Njalo uma kusondele ukhetho asithembise 
ngezindlu zase Nazareth. Emva kwalokho lingene isaha. Okuseqinisweni 
nje asifuni ukuya kwezinye izindawo njengako Nazareth noma eTshenelimnyama. 
Sifuna lendawo esikuyo.  
Nansi into esicasula kuleli khansela: 
1.  uma kuvela amathuba emisebenzi libhekela abangani balo. 
2.  Liyazikhethela ikomiti elizo sebenza nalo. 
3.  Liyaziphathela imali ekugcineni singatholi lutho 
4.  Amanzi sa zizamela wona thina ngokwethu. 
5.  Amathoyilethi sikhokhela umuntu owa hlanzayo. 
6.  Wathi  githi sesi ‘well developed’ kodwa sisahlala emjondolo. 
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7.  umasiyocela izincwadi zasemabank ne zezikola asilutholi usizo, 
lisikhomba kwi Independent. 
8.  Okokuqala asilikhethanga , lithe lisuka lakhetha umuntu 
ozosebenza lona lizoba ngemva. 
9.  Sifuna umuntu ozolwelw izimfuno zethu- ngale kwalokho 
sibuyele ku mavoting station. 
10.  Wathi sizo hlupheka eminye iminyaka emihlanu- ASIMFUNI  u 
NDIMBA.  
 
Social Movement Indaba 
 
 
Social Movement Indaba, SMI, came together in 2002 around a 
common platform. It is more of a network than a body. It was launched 
at the World Summit for Sustainable Development (WSSD) in 
Johannesburgburg in 2002. There, it  
attacked neoliberalism, the economic theory that requires payment for 
everything from the government, privatization, and full cost-recovery. 
SMI has meetings a few times a year and activists from around SA go to 
its workshops to share experiences of struggle against environmental 
and social injustice.  The SMI says it wants to bring different 
movements together “under the umbrella of the struggle against 
neoliberalism.” Some joint campaigns and days of protest were planned, 
but outside Durban none of them happened.  
 
The SMI setup a legal fund to help comrades in struggle pay for bail, 
lawyers fees, etc. The Freedom of Expression Institute was to 
administer the funds. When Abahlali and other Durban groups asked 
for some of these legal funds in 2005, they were denied.  
 
The SMI meeting in December 2005 decided that the next national 
meeting should be in Durban, but some in Durban feel this decision was 
taken without their input. It is still not clear if the SMI will fund a 
national meeting in KZN.  
 
Social Movement Indaba 
Uhlelo lwe nhlangano ye Social Movements Indaba 
 
iSocial Moovements Indaba ya songululwa ngo 2002, yayi akhalwe ukuze 
izinhlangano zemiphakathi ilwela izinkinga ezabampofu nabahlali 
bezindawo zabantu abantsundu ezifundazweni ezihlukahlukene  za se 
mZantsi afric zikwazi uku akha imbumba. Ya sungulwa ngesikhathi 
imizabalazo eyayi phikisana no hlelo lwe World Summit on Sustainable 
Development leyo  ibizobambelwa eJohannesburg.  Kusukela kulezo 
ntsuku, yonke imizamo yayi bhekene nokuakha isvumelano ngaphakathi 
kwe zinhlangano ezihlukahlukene  ngoku cinisa imizabalazo yazo zonke. 
Letloso kusa yiyona ekhokhela imihlangano engaphakathi kwe SMI 
nanamhlange. 
 
Umoya we mbumbano u fikelele ezingeni eliphezulu kuzinhlangano ze 
SMI kuzindawo ezihlukahlukene. eJohannesburg  inhlangano  iAnti- 
Privatisation Forum ne Landless People’s Movement ziye zahlanganisa 
imizabalazo yazo ngezinkinga zomhlaba nokutholakala kwezindlu. 
eThekwini  nase Cape town, izinhlangano zilwisana noku hlaselwa kwe 
Iraq ne zinkinga ezibhekene ne zidingo zabahlali. 
Siyakueamukela  ukuthi iSMI ine zinkinga ezezimali no kuhluleka 
ukusiza ekuhlanganiseni amalungu wayo ezindaweni zawo. Ukuze 
sixazulule lezinkinga; kungasiza ukuthi izintlangano zi sondelane 
ezifundazweni zazo. 
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African Social Forum eyayi babelwe e Harare-Zimbabwe ngo 
2005.ezinkulumweni na bafowethu eZimbabwe, kuvezwe ukuthi uningi 
lwa batu abazibandakanya ne mizabalazo yabahlali base Zimbabwe, 
baboshiwe emajele  wase Zimbabwe. Njenga balweli bamalungulo 
abahlali lana eMzansi, asikwazi ukudeda si songe izandla uma sibona 
ukukhohlakala kwembuso wase Zimbabwe; sifanele si sukume sizame 
uku nika usizo kumaqabane ethu. 
Ezinye zezinhloso zomhlangano: 
1.  Ukuxoxisana nge simo sa lana emzantsi na kwamanye amazwe. 
2.  Ukuthola izaziso ngo kuqhubeka kwemizabalazo emalokishini 
nezindawo ezabampofu ezweni lonke. 
3.  Uku akha isivumelano, pheqelezi: Platform nge mizabalazo 
yemizabalazo ehlukahlukene. 
4.  uku bonisana nge zinkinga izibbhekene ne SMI. 
Lomhlangano uvale ngo kuthi umhlangano olandelayo we SMI 
ubanjelwe eThekwini. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(Isithombe so Mhlangano we SMI obowubabelwe eJohannesburg 2005) 
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